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This project involved qualitative primary research into 
criminality within seaports, by observing how ports, as 
microcosmic realities run through formal and informal 
relationships and have specific security vulnerabilities, which 
facilitate different types of illegal or deviant behaviours. 
Research has been carried out in two European ports (Liverpool 
and Genoa) and three non-European ones (Montreal, New York 
and Melbourne), which are either targets of, or transit zones for, 
criminal activities and criminal networks.  
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The main aim of this comparative research project was to 
improve policy understanding of how the complex relationships 
within ports act as conduits or facilitators in how criminal 
networks operate in the territory of and around the ports. With 
specific attention to the changing geopolitical conditions 
surrounding the port of Liverpool within the Brexit scenario, the 
study has looked at what could be learned in the British 
experience from international ones both in terms of security and 




The project has run from January 2019 to May 2020 and 
involved field visits to the various ports in this order: Genova, 
January-February 2019; Melbourne, March 2019; Montreal, 
June-July 2019; New York/New Jersey, May 2019 and August 
2019; Liverpool, ad hoc visits in December 2019 and January 
2020. This order is maintained in the report.  
In these ports, only container terminals were included in the 
project, with the main focus remaining on large-scale trafficking 
through cargo.  
The aim was to explore five key research questions: 
 
1. How are informalities and vulnerabilities manifested in 
ports? 
2. What are the perceptions and the knowledge of law 
enforcement and authorities on the vulnerabilities to 
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organised crime in ports, within the areas and regions of 
reference? 
3. What are the aims, in the short, medium and long terms, 
of organised crime infiltration and mechanisms of control 
of the ports? 
4. Is there any difference in the way criminal groups 
involved in similar trades behave in different ports across 
the same region, and, if so, what explains the 
differences?  
5. What are the best practices and the lessons learned in 
detecting the infiltration of organised crime groups in 
port and in countering their penetration in the area? 
 
The project involved collecting court data through national 
databases (through portals like Westlaw, DeIure, Pacer, Canlii, 
Austlii etc) but also press releases from law enforcement 
authorities. Interviews included port authorities, waterfront 
commissions, police forces, special prosecutors, and security 
firms working at the ports (see a list of participant institutions in 
the sections dedicated to each port).  
Where possible a tour of the port terminals to observe the 
spaces directly was carried out. All data was used to contribute 
to academic publications in the form of journal articles and in 




The research is funded by The British Academy (a registered 
charity) under the funding call “Tackling the UK’s International 
Challenges 2018”.  




Informality; corruption; organized crime; mafia; drug 




The report will bring the main considerations, results and 
findings from the ports visited in order of visit. This means that 
the findings will be presented as incremental knowledge from 
one port to the other; lessons learned and questions asked in 
one port might not have been asked in another port, as 
considered not relevant for that specific reality. Much depends 
not only on the specificity of each port, but also on the 
availability of data that authorities are willing to share.  
This research is an exploration of the field of organised 
crime in seaports. Being that as it may, this report cannot 
provide with commentary of statistics or with exact 
measurements of the presence of organised crime groups and 
their traffics in the ports selected, but rather aims at stimulating 
a reflection within an analytical framework that uses different 
data and different qualitative resources.  
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This report does not give neither a comprehensive nor a 
complete guide to the ports, nor the quintessential truth about 
criminal activities in the port. Rather, it aims at bringing forward 
certain topics that are not often looked at together, with a view 
to stimulate further research.   
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Executive Summary – At a glance 
 
 
 Top Best practice Top Challenge 
Genova, 
Italy 
Port is investigated as 
both a border zone 
and a specialist 
business space. 
Organised crime in the 
port is investigated 
through the lenses of 
Antimafia tools. 
Partnerships across 
different police forces 
and Antimafia 
prosecutorial teams 
allow for a 
comprehensive 
approach to the 
phenomenon, from 
illicit trafficking to 
corruption and 
infiltration in the legal 
economy.   
The urban nature of 
two of three 
container terminals 
and the distance of 
the remaining, but 
larger, terminal, lead 
to visible variations 
in both security 
protocols as well as 
space governance 




A very strong local 
police practice, with a 
dedicated port 
taskforce, and strong 
local partnerships, 
allow for outstanding 
knowledge of the 
territory of the port, 
within the urban 
space. 
The attractiveness of 
Australia as an island 
is magnified in the 
variety of smuggling 
methods to bring 
illicit goods on the 
shores, including 
Victoria. Federal 
agencies, i.e. ABF and 
AFP, could be more 
involved not only in 
collating cross-border 
criminal intelligence 
but also in 
strategizing with 
national partners on 
anti-corruption in 
large ports.  
Montreal, 
Canada 
Port is treated as both 
a transnational space 
and an urban one. An 
embedded and 
dedicated federal 





The existence of 
three levels of 
policing – city, 
province and federal - 
might lead to 
overlapping of 
jurisdictions and 
duplication of efforts, 
especially for what 
concerns drug 
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corruption units in the 
city and the province 
allow for a strong anti-
infiltration focus also 








The port is both a gate 
and a governance 
space. On one side, 
attention to outbound 
trafficking is a unique 
feature in the USA. On 
the other side, 
attention to 
criminality of the 
waterfront has 
historical roots (i.e. 
the existence and 
resilience of the 
Waterfront 
Commission), which 




organised crime in the 
port.   
The territory of the 
NY/NJ port is too 
dispersed. This 
dispersion mirrors in 
the duplicity of 
jurisdictions (the port 
is over two states) 
and in the difficult 
management of 
authorities that can 
deal with that 
duplicity. The 
politicisation of 
matters related to 
the port economy 
(from union relations 
to port 
administration 
businesses) leads to 
repeated conflicts 
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reputation of the port 
and its city, to 
boosting the economy 
of the area and 
preparing for post-
Brexit changes, the 
port of Liverpool is an 
entity that, also due to 
its private nature, 
favours efficiency and 
effective change.  
The port is private 
territory. The public-
private relationship 
between private port 
owners and public 
policing authorities 
leads to gaps in 
information and 
intelligence sharing. 
A multitude of voices 
share informed 
opinions on Liverpool 
but data is lacking. 
This is going to be 
even more 
challenging post-
Brexit.   
 











- Prioritisation of 
investigations on 
drug trafficking as 
high harm/high gain 
kind of illicit trade; 
- Low harm/high gain 
types of trade (i.e. 
waste trafficking 
and contraband of 
tobacco) or low 
harm/low gain 
types of trade (i.e. 
counterfeit/contrab
and of fashion 
goods) are lower in 
priority list due to 
resourcing.  
- Outbound 
trafficking is largely 
left to random 
controls and highly 
under-investigated. 
 





















































considered key to 
criminality on the 
waterfront, both as 






an enabler of illicit 
trades and as a 
stand-alone 
practice. 
- Corruption of dock 
workers is indicated 
as the most 
common factor of 
persistent 
criminality on the 
waterfront; 







employees are also 
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- Infiltration in the 
port economy 
emerges in all ports, 
albeit with different 
impact. 
- At the local level, 
the port economy is 
vulnerable to 
infiltration in terms 






- At the global level, 
the port economy is 
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very few big 























have in the 
city. 
 
Table 2: Main terms of comparison across ports 
  
 24 
Organised crime and the waterfront: an introduction 
 
Popular culture is filled with images of crime on the 
waterfront as a business for corrupt and greedy port workers. 
Historically ‘organised crime’ has found a way from Melbourne 
to New York, from Liverpool to Montreal, to infiltrate, control 
and take advantage of the dockers’ proximity to the ships. These 
inroads served the handling of the most disparate activities: 
from smuggling to theft, from trafficking to corruption. 
 
 Investigations run by national and international police 
forces, private security firms or researchers confirm that many 
large seaports are hotspots for drug trafficking and smuggling of 
other illegal goods; obviously size, weight and risk determine the 
choice of logistic channels, especially when it comes to drugs. 
Some institutions also point out how specialised police forces 
are needed as “maritime shipments pose the greatest problem 
because large quantities can be transported at any one time”2.  
 
Indeed, ports are unique environments; they are 
universes of processes and meanings. Ports are border zones, 
liminal areas across different juridical systems. Even 
morphologically they are in flux, being places of arrival and 
places of transit and departures, in between economic processes 
and political decisions. Clearly, the port is an analytical locus in 
 
2 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2016. The Hague, 2016, 
page 20 
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which several dilemmas of contemporary societies converge. 
For example: deregulation of international trades, everyday life 
globalisation, endogenous tension between territories and 
economic escapes, illegality in markets etc. Ports are indeed 
places raising classical sociological and economic issues: the 
extent to which legal, grey or informal and outright criminal 
activities are intertwined with relations of logistics, production 
and management routines. Together they form the channel 
through which the illegal economy runs, often on the same track 
as that of international economic exchanges. 
 
 Ports are virtually always mentioned as key entry points 
for drugs and other illegal goods, but also as areas of influence 
of more sophisticated groups, who aim at governing spaces and 
not just profiting from them, such as mafia-type groups. In 
organised crime studies, deviance and crime in ports range from 
occasional corruption of port-workers to the employment of 
longshoremen on the criminal network’s payroll for the 
purposes of continuous drug trade; port criminality might also 
involve the control of longshoremen’s trade unions and 
associations and corruption of large companies involved in port 
administration. 
 
 The diversification of criminal activities in a port – more 
or less linked to organised crime activities and specifically to 
illicit trafficking – ranges from local to global and calls for a 
diversification of policing techniques and authorities. The port is 
usually public land, and might be either federal or national – at 
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times municipal – while private actors are usually leasing the 
land (“landlord ports”) or managing it. Indeed, crime control on 
the waterfront is a formidable task because ports are places in 
constant flow, with different infrastructures belonging to 
different owners and a multitude of authorities with jurisdictions 
over various aspects of port life, from economic needs and 
requirements to security preparedness. Various institutions 
have their spot in ports, from port police forces to city police 
agencies, from private security firms to federal/national 
institutions, from fire service to medical emergency. The 
security and policing landscapes of ports is built on multi-agency 
cooperation, as the natural answer to the challenging task that 
is policing the waterfront. Coordination between local law 
enforcement and state/federal units is challenging. The former 
treats the port as an urban territory and might police it as such, 
the latter usually see the waterfront as a border zone and thus 
treat it within mandates of national security and state revenues. 
This is especially true for customs, who, as a hybrid institution 
between administrative duties and law enforcement capacities 
are stretched out in their ability to monitor the port.  
 
 The characterisation of policing activities in seaports 
within the mandates of national security also mirrors in the 
securitisation of the threat of organised crime that has been on-
going since the 1990s and even more so after 9/11, which is 
today central to any western state’s political agenda. The term 
‘organised crime’ is an umbrella term without strict boundaries. 
It intends to cover a number of different illegal activities from 
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trafficking and smuggling – of drugs, weapons, human beings, 
counterfeit products, protected wildlife – to laundering of 
money. The latter covers the whole upperworld economy and 
finances. Violence and high-level corruption by OC may threaten 
the rule of law. Especially since the 2000 UN convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime was signed in Palermo, 
understanding the social and economic underpinnings of 
organised crime has been a priority for research to push the 
international community to refine definitions and abandon an 
Americanisation of the concept. Organised crime research is 
extremely wide, and if we consider the port economy as one of 
many economic opportunities for organised crime groups to 
exploit, then we can look at studies on organised crime and 
infiltration in different legal sectors and industries at research on 
money laundering and organisational crimes, and even to 
political and public sector corruption and investment.  
 
 Research that looks at the way organised crime groups 
need and use ports for their activities focuses largely on large 
scale drug trafficking and importation as much as other forms 
of illegal smuggling and contraband, such as weapons or 
tobacco. Transport systems in general have been often 
connected to illicit trades, but also to illicit governance, systemic 
corruption and infiltration of the port economy and 
management, i.e. infiltration of labour unions of port workers. 
On the one hand, because securing borders against illicit trade 
of people and goods remains one of the top priorities of the 
international community, effective policing and security in 
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seaports are crucial of any strategic effort. On the other hand, 
ports are also extremely linked to urban development and urban 
lives. In fact, on one side there is a link between the flourishing 
of ports and the arrival and settlement of migrant communities, 
thus the changing geography of the city. On the other side, and 
also from a perspective of studies on organised crime, some port 
cities have also been sites where organised crime groups have 
formed and grown, as the maritime industry and economy 
represents a lucrative business to launder and invest proceeds. 
This urban perspective also encompasses questioning to what 
extent the city and the port share manifestations and evolution 
of organised crime activities and groups. Overall it is clear that a 
number of disciplines and perspectives contribute to the making 
of research on organised crime and the waterfront, especially 
from a social science perspective.  
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Overview: port economy and maritime security  
 
Since the second half of the XX century, free flowing 
international trade has been carried predominantly by oceans 
and seas. World trade has been facilitated by two 
interconnected drivers: 
 
1. Policies for trade liberalisation; decreased trading 
barriers and reduced tariffs have facilitated the 
development of an interconnected and globalised 
economy. Port economy is probably the best example of 
such a globalised economy. 
2. Reductions in transportation costs; containerisation in 
particular, since after the Second World War, has 
significantly benefitted bilateral trade at the aggregate 
product level; it has increased trade flows by 75% to 
100% and it has also affected positively North-South and 
North-North trade3.  
 
The business community has clearly responded to the 
new trading environment by increasing partnerships, and 
incrementing the interrelations between suppliers and 
consumers/customers worldwide. Indeed, as also the means, 
processes and volumes of production have changed and lean 
 
3 Bernhofen, Daniel M., El-Sahlid, Zouheir and Richard Kneller, Estimating 
the effects of containerization on world trade, Journal of International 
Economics, Volume 98, January 2016, Pages 36-50 
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towards more and more proficient and cost-efficient 
international transport, it is clear that the current model for 
growth at the global level relies on effective and conflict-free 
trade. 
 
Currently, containers are the main agents of the internal 
and international logistics system, even though, in recent years 
“weak global growth and the saturation of container diffusion 
continue to weigh on the growth of port volumes”4. Clear 
advantages of containerisation for in international trade are5: 
 
I. Standardisation of transport; 
II. Flexibility of usage; 
III. Computerised tracking management; 
IV. Lower transport costs; 
V. Warehousing; 
VI. Security (as containers could in theory only be opened at 
the origin, destination, or for checks by customs). 
 
In the past ten years pressures on containerisation have led 
to some inefficiencies. These are connected to high level of 
competition, the needs to invest in infrastructure and 
technology, and the rapid growth in the size of container ships. 
 
4 Sanchez, R.J. and Barleta, Eliana P. Reflections on the future of container 
ports in view of the new containerization behavior, PortEconomics 
Discussion Report No 3, January 2019, page 5 
5 Rodrigue, J. P., C. Comtois and B. Slack, The Geography of Transport 
Systems, Abingdon, Routledge, 2006 
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Shipping companies have had to rationalise their operations and 
are constantly driven to renovate infrastructures, reduce timings 
of shipment, loading and offloading, and generally work more 
efficiently.  
Container ports are multiple-user ports, which means that 
no one cargo owner has a monopoly of trade. The throughput is 
measured by the number of TEUs6 that the container port 
handles. Cargo obviously has multiple owners while shipping 
lines might choose dedicated terminals to call into in the 
different container ports. It is also worth remembering that dry 
bulk and other liquids might be eventually operated and owned 
by the same company that also owns the cargo (i.e. a company 
might own the extraction mine, the railway, the processing plant 
and the port facility at the same time). 
 
Looking at the organisation and the development of 
international terminal operators, large conglomerates – such as 
APM Terminals, DP World, Cosco, PSA International, Hutchison 
Port Holdings Trust and the likes - are clearly dominating the 
economy. Some of these large conglomerates are more 
geographically specific, such as Hutchison Port Holdings Trust, 
 
6 The twenty-foot equivalent unit (often TEU or teu) is an inexact unit of 
cargo capacity often used to describe the capacity of container ships or 
terminals. It is based on the volume of a 20-foot-long (6.1 m) intermodal 
container, the standard-sized metal box which can be easily transferred 




whose presence is mostly confined to China and Hong Kong even 
though it remains one of the largest terminal operators in the 
world. Others, such as PSA International – consistently the 
largest terminal operator – has terminals in three continents and 
16 countries, but not Australia, nor Africa nor North America. 
APM Terminals has presence in 39 countries, DP world, with over 
65 terminals, spans over 6 continents.  
 
With such global economy and the challenges of global 
markets, the port economy is clearly a very profitable and also a 
very competitive field. Performance of ports and container 
terminals depends on many different factors including but not 
limited to intra-port competition across several terminal 
operators. Other factors include port access channel and land-
side access, the quality of backhaul area, the type of cargo 
handling equipment, the nature of labour and trade relations, 
and also the efficiency of custom, police and security checks.  
 
Predictably, the landscape of maritime security has changed 
drastically together with all the security measures in other fields 
after the events of 9/11. This created a drive to securing borders 
and ensuring the safety of citizens and of infrastructures have 
become the main challenges of today’s world. The new drive to 
security had a broad effect on the maritime institutions. 
 
 The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2002 
approved the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code by adding Chapter XI.2 (Special measures to enhance 
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maritime security) to the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) 
Convention of 1974. These provisions marked an increasingly 
neat difference between safety and security in the maritime 
field. 
▪ Maritime Safety refers to the development of 
emergency and contingency planning concerned with 
the prevention of accidental damage or incidents to 
marine environments or loss of life at sea.  
▪ Maritime Security refers to measures aimed at 
preventing intentional damage through sabotage, 
subversion, or other maritime threats, such as use of 
force or threats to territorial sovereignty; terrorist acts 
against ships and ports; piracy and armed robbery at sea; 
transnational organised crime such as smuggling or 
trafficking; illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 
fishing; environmental threats, i.e. illegal dumping. 
 
The addition of Chapter XI became broadly accepted: in 
mid-2020, the ISPS applies to 165 SOLAS members accounting 
for over 99% of world tonnage. The Code contains a mandatory 
Part A that outlines detailed maritime and port security-related 
requirements, which SOLAS contracting governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies must adhere to. Part B of 
the Code provides a series of recommendatory guidelines on 
how to meet the requirements of Part A. Part A of details 
mandatory measures to be taken by contracting governments, 
shipowners, and ports while part B lists voluntary measures to 
enhance maritime security. Certainly, as ports are gateways and 
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marine borders and therefore are crucial in any strategic effort 
to secure transit, entry in, and exit out of states, maritime 
security has been developing along the lines of the policing of 
other security threats, including terrorism and organised crime, 
especially illicit trafficking of drugs.  
  
 Beyond the compulsory elements of the IMO package 
are mandatory national initiatives, binding vessels and cargos to 
extra measures when passing through certain waters. Most 
states have supplemental rules to the IMO package, as, for 
example, the United States has interpreted the 
recommendations in part B of the ISPS code as being mandatory 
for American-bound vessels since the beginning7.  
 
The measures prescribed in SOLAS XI and the ISPS Code 
can be broadly broken down into five major categories according 
to their focus. These are: 
 
I. Measures targeting contracting governments. These 
include, among other things, determining and set 
security levels (e.g. 1=low, 2=medium and 3=high); 
determining which port facilities are required to 
designate a Port Facility Security Officer; ensuring 
completion and approval of a Port Facility Security 
Assessment and the Port Facility Security Plan for each 
 
7 OCDE, Security In Maritime Transport: Risk Factors And Economic Impact 
Maritime Transport Committee, July 2003 
 38 
port facility that serves ships engaged on international 
voyages; communicating with IMO. 
 
II. Measures targeting ships. These include three ship-
related provisions: the equipment of Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS); the permanent marking and 
display of the ship’s unique identification number; the 
installation of a ship security alert system. 
 
III. Measures targeting maritime carrier companies. These 
include designating of a Company Security Officer (CSO); 
undertaking a Ship Security Assessment (SSA); 
Developing a Flag-State-approved Ship Security Plan 
(SSP); Designating a Ship Security Officer (SSO); generally 
ensuring adequate training to carry out security 
provisions as approved and appropriate. 
 
IV. Measures targeting ports. These include: approving and 
carrying out port facility security assessments; 
developing port facility security plans to respond to 
security alert levels; designate a Port Facility Security 
Officer (PFSO) and carry out adequate training for 
security personnel. 
 
V. Other certification/documentary requirements. These 




Organised crime in ports: trafficking, corruption and 
governance  
 
For the purposes of this report organised crime refers to 
complex, multi-layered and usually serious criminalised activity 
that is aimed at both profit accumulation or reinvestment (in 
the form of trafficking, illicit trade and infiltration in the legal 
economy) and at power grabbing (in the form of acquisition of 
contracts, and in general of financial, political and administrative 
power)8. In line with this working definition, organised crime in 
ports includes complex activities such as illicit trafficking, illicit 
trade, money laundering and/or infiltration in the legal 
economy, as much as behaviours of corruption: both as enabler 
of trafficking and as governance tool.  
 
Illegal tobacco trade, the trafficking of narcotics - 
especially cocaine, heroin, marijuana and hashish - together with 
the trafficking in human beings and firearms trafficking, 
constitute the main complex criminal activities that go through 
ports on a daily basis. To this, one might want to add trafficking 
of cultural, stolen or looted, artefacts, wildlife trafficking, 
trafficking of counterfeit products, trafficking of hazardous, toxic 
or non-declared waste and the likes.  
 
 
8 Sergi, A. From Mafia to Organised Crime: A Comparison of Policing Models, 
New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017 
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Illicit Trafficking and trade through seaports are probably 
the obvious downsides of progress. Trade infrastructures, such 
as an effective seaport, may enable the economic benefits of 
globalisation, but at the same time will make countries and 
borders more vulnerable to forms of complex and organised 
crime engaged in illicit trafficking. There is no trafficking route 
that is not already a trade route.  
 
Even though trade routes have been used for trafficking 
all sorts of licit and illicit products, trafficking of drugs remains 
the most profitable and the most frequent of illicit trades. 
According to the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and their 
annual Illicit Trade Report, in 2018, 126 countries submitted 
45,497 drug trafficking cases to the WCO9, among which those 
cases related to cannabis and cocaine trafficking constituted the 
majority. Especially for cocaine, an interesting data shared by 
the WCO is that although most seizures happen on cocaine 
trafficked by air, the overall amount seized in transit through 
vessels is much higher. In other words, air and mail seizures 
accounted for 72.7% of all cocaine seizures, although vessels 
were the method implicated in the most significant seizures in 







10 Ibid., page 49 
 41 
 
Another interesting set of data by WCO in relation to IPR, 
health and safety products (Intellectual Property Rights related 
to mobile phones, computers, footwear,  clothing, even games 
and toys) shows that seizures executed on vessels made up the 
largest percentage in the number of pieces seized, constituting 
57.3% (31,573,528) of the overall total for 201811. This mirrors in 
data related to contraband of medical products seized, as 
seizures conducted on vessels netted the majority of contraband 
retrieved, responsible for 279,381,340 (80.7%) of a total 
346,086,991 pieces recovered12. A same trend for tobacco and 
alcohol, as WCO shows that products seizures were from 
vehicles, even though the conveyance method accounting for 
the greatest number of pieces was indeed vessels. Indeed, with 
various types of illicit trades, the use of maritime routes seems 
to be impacting if not the number of seizures, certainly the 
quantity of products seized. 
 
 Whereas illicit trade and trafficking are the main 
manifestations of complex criminality – often but not always 
connected to organised crime groups – they are also mostly 
transit crimes. Ports are indeed either doors – of entry as much 
as exit - or gates – of entry, exit and transit - in trafficking 
activities. Trafficking is mostly detected coming inward, but 
occasionally outward trafficking is also of interest. While each 
 
11 Ibid., page 117 
12 Ibid., page 131 
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state has their own mechanisms of control and intelligence 
about trafficking products and routes, the international 
community has attempted to synchronise data collection and 
interventions cross-borders. For example, the UNODC-WCO 
Container Control Programme (CCP) was established as a joint 
initiative of the UNODC and the WCO in 2004. The program aims 
to provide continuous monitoring and oversight, offering a 
plethora of context-specific trainings and strengthening 
cooperation between state agencies and with the private sector. 
With specific attention to improving risk management and 
enhance security in the supply chain while also facilitating trade, 
the CCP is operational in over 50 countries and has over 100 Port 
Control Units that are supposedly equipped to exchange 
information, intelligence about high-risks containers and 
obviously facilitate seizures cross-borders.  
 
However, beyond the efforts to track and investigate 
cargo through containers, most trafficking activities also include 
different degrees of corruption, as clearly getting across border 
security and checks and around duties, taxes and other forms of 
certifications requires knowledge from within and at times 
specialist knowledge as well.  
Corruption in ports can take different forms, but specifically we 
can find it both in relation to trafficking (corruption as enabling 
practice and/or resource) as much as in relation to port 
economy and its development (corruption as autonomous 
practice) .  
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 Corruption is also a cost for trade. Precisely for this 
reason, the “Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) is a 
global business network working towards the vision of a 
maritime industry free of corruption that enables fair trade to the 
benefit of society at large”13. With now over 100 members in the 
maritime companies, MACN’s members have joined forces to 
raise awareness of the challenges of corruption; implement 
common Anti-Corruption principles; develop and shar best 
practices; collaborate with governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society to identify and mitigate the root 
causes of corruption; and create and promote a culture of 
integrity within the maritime community. From demands for 
payments, to small in-kinds bribes, from non-transparent tariffs 
to incoherent regulations for approval of vessels, MACN has 
started to promote ‘say no’ campaigns together with ethical 
standards.  
 
As the maritime industry’s priority is to promote and 
ensure smooth business, the power that some port officials 
have, can clearly be distorted, corrupted, and therefore affect 
business, reputation, investments and trade. Specifically, 
corruption at the border is a matter difficult to discuss and to 
research. Clearly, border control authorities play an important 
role in facilitating trade and the circulation of goods and people 
across countries. With increasing demands for smooth global 
trade, borders are porous and difficult to control; corruption at 
 
13 https://www.maritime-acn.org/about-macn  
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the borders has a detrimental, especially linked to illicit 
trafficking, impacts on a country’s revenue collection and 
business activity in addition to impacting the maritime industry. 
Factors that have been identified as increasing corruption risks 
in border regions are14: 
 
I. Geographic dispersion, isolation and remoteness 
of borders; 
II. Size and type of border configuration might affect 
work patterns across border guards; 
III. Administrative monopoly and discretionary 
powers for border guards and customs officials; 
IV. Salaries and working conditions can offer 
incentives to accept bribes; 
V. High tariffs, non-transparent and burdensome 
complex regulatory frameworks; 
VI. Pressure from organised crime groups that might 
result in threats, intimidation and violence.  
 
While for trafficking activities corruption might be more 
or less occasional and specific (i.e. a corrupt border agent might 
serve a network once or repeatedly, and the same network can 
use different corrupt agents at once), when it comes to the port 
economy, corruptive behaviours often take more systemic or 
 




endemic forms. For example, ‘facilitation gifts’ can be 
negotiated by seafarers to an array of port officials in many parts 
of the world. Recipients ranged from health inspectors, to 
customs and immigration officers, and from agents and pilots, to 
terminal staff. The pervasiveness of this practice is staggering, as 
about 91% of respondents in a 2016 study involving over 2,500 
active seafarers around the world, admitted to have witnessed 
this practice15.  
 
Petty corruption, exchanges of favours, unethical 
behaviours, nepotism, misappropriations, including heft, 
embezzlement, falsification of records and fraud, infiltration in 
the port economy and bureaucracy all cost port governance in 
terms of business, administration, revenues, security, and even 
health. The bureaucracy of port economies and authorities is not 
only extremely complex, but also competitive and fast-paced, 
thus making the port an ideal environment for corruption, with 
high gains and low detection rates. Officials in ports engage in16: 
 
 
15 Sampson H., Acejo I., Ellis N., Tang L, Turgo N. The relationships between 
seafarers and shore‐side personnel: An outline report based on research 
undertaken in the period 2012‐2016, Seafarers International Research 
Centre (SIRC) Cardiff University, 2016 
https://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/Uploads/Publications/The%20relationships%20be
tween%20seafarers%20and%20shore-side%20personnel.pdf  
16 Sequeira, S. and Djankov, S., An Empirical Study of Corruption in Ports, 
London School of Economics, MPRA Paper No. 21791, 2010 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21791/1/MPRA_paper_21791.pdf  
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▪ Collusive corruption: when public officials and private 
agents collude to share rents generated by the illicit 
transaction; Collusive corruption is cost-reducing; it 
increases a firm’s demand for the public service. 
▪ Coercive corruption: when a public bureaucrat coerces a 
private agent into paying an additional fee, above and 
beyond the official price, just to gain access to the public 
service or good. Coercive corruption is cost-increasing; it 
reduces a firm’s demand for the public service.  
 
The organisational structure of different port environments 
creates incentives for corrupt behaviour; structural 
opportunities to exchange, requests, demand, accept a bribe 
plays an important role in the motivation for corrupt behaviour. 
The reduction of in-person contacts between clearing agents 
and officials, or the introduction of online submission of 
documentation for pre-clearance programs may also reduce 
opportunities for corruption17. However, illegal intrusions into 
port governance might not just be about authorities and their 
bureaucracy, as much as it is also about patronage, 
administrative and political corruption inside and outside of 
port authorities and economy (including corruption of industry 
relations agents and partners and election/nominations of 
management roles).  
 
 
17 Ibid.  
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Administrative corruption in port can take different forms, 
such as manipulation of procurement tenders, extracting 
kickbacks from service operators in the border area and 
appointment or promotion of officers based on nepotism. It 
usually involves the participation of higher levels of 
management or leadership in the authority18. Political 
patronage and other power-grabbing forms of corruption can 
manifest as attempts to amend regulations to serve interests of 
certain groups, people, or companies. In some cases, private 
companies might unduly influence border authorities, senior 
management or other individuals/actors who can have a say in 
approving security provisions and specific regulations for the 
port. When senior management in the port authority and/or 
high-ranking staff in border agencies have political links, 
appointments might be considered as either rewards or 
disapproval for political support or lack of it19. In other cases, 
complex corruption networks may involve local businesses 
engaged in the cross-border trafficking of goods and local 
politicians that benefit from associating with them for their 
political career.  
  
 
18 Center for the Study of Democracy, Study on Anti-Corruption Measures in 
EU Border Control, 2012 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/publications/r 
esearch/study_on_anticorruption_measures_in_e u_border_control.pdf  
 
19 Chêne, 2018, op.cit; Center for the Study of Democracy, 2012, op.cit. 
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The port of Genova is Italy’s biggest port. Since 201620 it 
includes four different port realities: Genova, Prà, Vado Ligure 
and Savona, as the Western Ligurian Sea Port Authority. This 
project only focused on Genova and Prà container terminals as 
it occurred before the unification of the ports under the same 
authority took place.  
The port ranks 68th in the world’s largest container ports 
and 8th in Europe21. With a total of 30 terminals, of which 6 
container terminals, and a total of 2.7 million TEUs of container 
traffic per year, the amounts of goods and passengers going 
through Genova is impressive. With 22 km of waterfront and 7 
million square meters, as a landlord port, Genova’s port public 
land is leased out (law 84/1994) to private companies who run 
the port facility’s economic activities as well as implement 
security regulations by nominating a Port Facility Security Office 
(PFSO) as required by the ISPS code. Around 30,000 people work 
at the Port of Genova, says its website. 
 
The main terminals for containers - Terminal PSA Voltri 
Prà (until May 2019 known as Voltri Terminal Europe, VTE, or 
simply Voltri), Terminal Sech (South European Container Hub), 
 
20 Legislative Decree no.169/2016 unifying the port authorities of Genova 
and Savona ports. 




Spinelli Group Terminal, Calata Bettolo MSC Terminal (launched 
in March 2019), Intermodal Marine Terminal (until 2016 
Terminal Messina) and Terminal San Giorgio – operate mainly 
with traders from China, United States, and Singapore, in over 
450 ports across the world and being the last port of call on the 
Far East-Mediterranean maritime trade routes. The port has 
natural deep water - that requires no dredging minimal tidal 
range and favourable marine weather conditions – and offers as 
well a variety of intra-Med, feeder and ro-ro service. Thanks to 
its strategic geographical location – it’s located at the most 
northern point of the Mediterranean Sea – this port provides 
easy access Northern Italy and Southern Europe. Through a well-
connected motorway network and direct rail connections to the 
Genova-Rotterdam Corridor (still in its final stage of 
development), the logistics chain operating in the Genova ports, 
is aimed at increasing effective and prompt movements of goods 
across the region.  
 
 
Police and Security Authorities 
 
During the course of the project, a total of 12 meetings 
were held, in the form of collective interviews, focus groups and 
individual interviews with: Capitaneria di Porto (port authority 
security office), Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia (DDA, district 
antimafia prosecutor office), Procura della Repubblica (public 
prosecutor office), Guardia di Finanza (fiscal police), Polizia di 
Frontiera (border police), Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli 
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(customs and revenue agency), Direzione Investigativa Antimafia 
(DIA, investigative antimafia directorate) in the Genoa province. 
Also, access to three container terminals, SECH, Spinelli and 
Voltri (now PSA Genova Prà) was granted and also included 








In the last years, Guardia di Finanza and Antimafia 
prosecutors (DDA) in Genova, together with the dell’Agenzia 
delle Dogane e Monopoli (customs and revenues) have 
completed various operations against drug trafficking in the port 
of Genova. In particular, in Genova, ‘ndrangheta clans (groups 
linked or belonging to the Calabrian mafia) seem to be active in 
the port for trafficking of cocaine from South America. Increased 
seizures of heroin from Afghanistan specifically (overall 28,35% 
of heroin seized in Italy was seized in the region of Liguria in 
201822) demonstrate the rising role of the port in the trafficking 
of this commodity as well.   
 
22 Prefettura - Ufficio Territoriale del Governo di Genova - Comunicato 
Stampa Conferenza Regionale Delle Autorita’ Di Pubblica Sicurezza 6 August 





Operation Artabaz, in 2018, is a perfect example of the 
work done by the authorities in coordination with others, in their 
attempt to curb both heroin and cocaine trafficking. The seizure 
of around 270 kgs of heroin on board of the ship Artabaz in 
November 2018 has marked the largest heroin seizure in the 
past 20 years, for a total value of over 10 million euros. The ship 
had left the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, headed towards 
Turkey and in Europe calling at Hamburg, Valencia and Genova, 
where 31 containers were offloaded in Terminal Spinelli. Three 
of these containers contained the heroin, camouflaged among 
bags of bentonite (materials for construction). Further 2 kgs of 
the drug were left to proceed by truck, in a controlled shipment 
that was meant to lead to the arrests of whoever was behind it. 
In practice, the investigation had started from Belgium the 
summer before – the drug seized in Genova was the second 
shipment that traffickers could not send to Antwerp in that 
occasion as there they knew they were controlled there. Belgian 
police had sent authorities in Genova all the necessary 
information to intercept the containers and had agreed with 
them the controlled shipment under the European Investigative 
Order. Authorities didn’t know what as the final destination of 
the drug. The buyer linked to those containers – in this case a 
man linked to a company based in Czech Republic – had to 
contact the shipping agent (in Austria) with further details on 
how to deliver the shipment; the man was in fact very 
preoccupied to clarify which container went where and how. The 
final address was in Rosendhal, in the Netherlands, but very 
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close to Antwerp, were two arrests were finally made. Neither 
the shipping agent nor the truck driver knew anything about the 
drugs in the container.  
 
Another case, coded Operation ‘Buon Vento Genovese’ 
(Good Genoan Wind), in summer 2019, led to the arrest of three 
Italian citizens for international drug trafficking from South 
America, with the aggravating factor of the mafia method and 
presence. In this case, the network was part of the ‘ndrina (clan) 
Alvaro, a mafia group from the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta in Sinopoli 
(Reggio Calabria). Antonio Alvaro was intercepted in Bogotà, 
Colombia while buying large quantities of cocaine. In this case 
the authorities in Genova worked with Eurojust, Colombian 
authorities, the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administartion) and the 
CBP (Customs and Border Protection) in the USA. In Genova, 368 
kgs of cocaine, worth about 100 million euros, at high level of 
purity, led to the arrest of said Antonio Alvaro in Colombia, 
Domenico Romeo, also linked to the same ‘ndrina and for a long 
time a fugitive too, and other two men, Rodolfo Militano and 
Filippo Ierinò based between Calabria and Liguria. Alvaro’s 
brother Vincenzo had already been arrested in an anti-drug 
operation in 2014, codenamed Operation Docks, involving 
personnel from then VTE (now PSA Genova Prà) terminal. The 
2019 operation, that also led to the seizure of 3 cars, cash for a 
total value of about 950,000 euros, various encrypted phones 
and a jammer to prevent radio-transmitting, confirms the trend 
that sees the ‘ndrangheta as a major player in cocaine trafficking 
and provision in Italy and abroad (see also Operation Papas and 
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Panda, in 2015). Furthermore, Operation Rebuffo, in 2017 and 
Operation Chiamata in 2019, have confirmed some trends in 
cocaine importations in Genova. These operations have in 
common the same broker, Massimo Rocca, port worker with the 
CULMV23 in Spinelli Terminal, convicted in 2018 for Operation 
Rebuffo. In the first case, the network, which had links with 
Albanian individuals based in Northern Italy, used the rip-on rip-
off system of placing bags full of cocaine bricks or bags at the 
doors of the container, easily taken out in the port once arrived. 
In the second case, which involved direct contacts with suppliers 
in Latin America (Colombia), the network was heavily relying on 
information on dates and specific locations of arrival of 
containers in the terminal given to and by some port workers, 
among which Rocca, so that the drug could be offloaded and 
then distributed. The importer in this case, a small entrepreneur 
from Genova, had alleged links with a ‘ndrangheta clan as well. 
 When it comes to drug shipments where ‘ndrangheta or 
other mafia clans are involved, apart from what eventually 
makes it to a courtroom for a trial, intelligence is much richer, as 
antimafia operations are more permissive and more intrusive. 
From mafia investigations, authorities have learned the 
 
23 The Compagnia Unica (The Unified Company)– or more specifically 
the Compagnia Unica fra i Lavoratori delle Merci Varie (CULMV) (The Unified 
Company for Workers of Various Commodities) – is the main and the most 
historically relevant service company active in the port of Genova. Its 
members are also known as ‘camalli’. The CULMV refused to be involved in 
the research project.  
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following, specifically applicable to cocaine and the port of 
Genova.  
a. Port workers and employees know who they are dealing 
with when mafia members are involved, as they tend to 
intimidate workers and their families. 
b. In cross-border shipments, the person of reference is 
usually a mafia/’ndrangheta affiliate, as it’s a matter of 
reputation and guarantee.  
c. There are mechanisms in place to control the quality of 
cocaine that gets shipped is the same of that which 
arrives. These might include using stamps, barcodes, 
pictures of the seals with phones only used to do that and 
so on. These experiments also serve the purpose to 
understand who to trust in the team available.  
d. A usual way to structure the cocaine job, in addition to 
the rip-on rip-off system is the employment of a front 
shipment – that diverts the attention of authorities onto 
a smaller shipment while the bigger one goes 
somewhere else undetected. When front shipments are 
used, the control mechanisms is operated from the 
territories above Liguria, in the southern part of 
Piemonte, where the ‘ndrangheta clans are territorially 
stronger and can better support coordination.  
 
Other illicit trade  
 
 Even though, according to Customs, the trade of 
counterfeit products is in decline, the port remains a hub for 
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such illicit trade due to the prominence of shipping routes from 
China and India, where most of counterfeit products come from. 
In particular, the following trends make the scenario interesting: 
 
1. Counterfeit goods or goods ready to be counterfeited 
come mostly from China or India, but fake labels either 
come from other countries, i.e. Morocco or Tunisia, or 
are made in/around Genova directly. 
2. In an attempt to cheat duty checks, goods usually are first 
offloaded in other low-risk countries as, upon arriving in 
Genova, only the last place of transit is relevant for 
checks. 
3. Counterfeiting of industrial patents and brands 
(intellectual property rights) are increasing, as per 
perceptions of customs and anti-fraud officers, as 
products destined to counterfeit markets are indeed 
processed and ‘created’ locally by using fake labels and 
counterfeit brands.  
 
 Counterfeit might also include perishable or food 
products. In Operation Provvidenza24 in 2016, custom officers in 
VTE- Voltri terminal (now terminal PSA Genova Prà) intercepted 
around 130,000 labels for extra virgin olive oil that had been 
falsely declared as ‘tissues and towels’ destined to the USA. 
 
24 Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale Ordinario di Reggio Calabria- 
Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia - Proc. Pen. n. 206/2017 R.G.N.R. Mod. 21 
DDA (stralcio del proc.pen.n. 2160/15 R.G.N.R. Mod. 21 DDA) - Fermo Di 
Indiziato Di Delitto.  
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Those labels were then used to perfect a commercial fraud, 
where inferior quality blended oil (imported into the US by 
another company, also involved in the fraud) was sold as extra-
virgin olive oil from Calabria or from Tuscany. Behind this 
operation, that beyond the food fraud also involved drug 
trafficking through Gioia Tauro and Genova ports, was the 
Piromalli clan, from Gioia Tauro, one of the most prominent 
‘ndrangheta clans.  
 
An interesting case of contraband pharmaceuticals, in 2017, 
investigated a shipment containing 16 tons of tramadol (24 
million pills) for a value of over 50 million euros – the so-called 
fighters’ drugs. Authorities in Genova tracked the container – 
labelled as transporting clothing and cosmetic products - 
destined to Libya. The container was loaded in India, transiting 
through Genova after some strange and unusual other stops, 
offloaded in Genova and placed on another ship destinated to 
the Calabrian port of Gioia Tauro. Authorities in Genova alerted 
the colleagues in Calabria where the cargo was seized. That one 
or more ‘ndrangheta clans might have been working for or with 
terrorist cells in Libya was a strong hypothesis in this case. In 
general, for counterfeit or contraband pharmaceuticals, it’s not 
just about the organisation of the shipment, as much as it is a 




What further things can we learn from inward trafficking 
cases in Genova? 
 
i. There are people in the port and in the city that are 
considered as being ‘available’ for a variety of networks 
and of jobs, irrespective of ethnic origins and social 
status. These individuals usually hold positions in the 
port, as port workers or terminal employees, and usually 
remain ‘available’ for certain period of time until 
arrested. 
ii. The structure to open containers in the port has to be 
very organised: a single port worker is not enough; there 
must be a way to make the crane operator place the 
container in a specific position; the rota of port workers 
must be accessible, thus access to terminals is key.   
iii. After monitoring the ‘available’ persons for a while, 
authorities start seeing the subjects who act as ‘trait-
d’union’ with the importing network/organisation.  
iv. The organisation usually becomes visible only when the 
drugs are let out of the port. This usually happens when 
Genova is the final destination for the shipment and the 
shipment is on the radar of authorities because it also 
involves locals. 
v. When the drugs or other goods are intercepted in 
Genova but Genova was not the intended destination, 
importers are usually less visible and connected on the 
territory. This might mean that communications 
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between parties and the management of the shipment is 
handled remotely.  
vi. Corruption in illicit trafficking is confirmed as enabling 
practice (it’s needed to complete the job) or as a 
resource (through the people made ‘available’, prone at 
being corrupted). In many recent cases the payment to 
corrupted employees or workers was made directly with 
the drugs (e.g. payment through a brick of cocaine), 
which poses extra problems for distribution channels. 
vii. Scanners are not the main or most reliable tool in anti-
trafficking efforts. Also, scanners are used only upon 
request. Rough figures speak of 1 out of 10,000 
containers routinely checked, about 4-5% of the total 
containers selected by the system for controls. It is easier 
to find contraband by chance in a container that looks 
unusual or whose cargo is unusual, than finding cocaine 
in a bag at the front of a container that carries precisely 
what it claims to be carrying.  
viii. As it is increasingly difficult to open containers in the 
terminals – due to the displacement effect of increased 
security controls – it is more likely that the drugs leave 
the port with the container, which involves the transport 
system and the whole supply chain in the investigation 
and, eventually, the infiltration mechanisms. Another 






 While most of the attention to illicit trafficking focuses 
on inward trade, particular attention in Genova is paid to 
outward trafficking and in particular international waste 
trafficking. Illicit waste is made of waste that is not properly 
disposed of, or for which specific duties are not paid. Usually 
hidden in containers of furnishings, clothing, old electrical 
appliances or vehicles, illicit waste from Genova is routinely 
directed to Africa - Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, Egypt, 
Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Togo - and also to China and 
India. Mostly this waste is plastic, unused or overused tyres and 
other rubber residuals, pieces from cars/motorbikes/trucks, 
batteries and vehicle compressors, gas tanks, electronic waste 
and clothing of various fabrics. With around 6,000 kgs of illicit 
waste seized in the port of Genova in 2015, 10,000 kgs in 2016, 
in 2017 a peak of 1,197,611 kgs has alarmed authorities, 
followed by 605,350 in 2018 and about 160,000 in the first half 
of 201925. This type of trafficking is not solely meant for easy 
disposal at sea or in the destination country (for elusion of 
otherwise expensive procedures), but could also be meant for 
re-use elsewhere. The modus operandi usually includes a 
shipment registered by an individual and labelled as ‘personal 
 
25 Prefettura - Ufficio Territoriale del Governo di Genova - Comunicato 
Stampa Conferenza Regionale Delle Autorita’ Di Pubblica Sicurezza 6 August 




goods’. This individual is usually a third party that is used/paid 
to take the responsibility for the cargo.  
While it appears clear that behind the lucrative 
trafficking of waste might be organised crime structures or at the 
very least predatory white collar and corporate crime, at the 
level of customs this is not easily seen. However, in 2018, the 
Ecologic unit of the Carabinieri in Genova (Nucleo Operativo 
Ecologico dei Carabinieri) has checked overall 160 companies (43 
of which in Genova) and provided fines for over 45,000 euros 
and around 3,5 million euros in seized assets.  
 
 
Infiltration in the legal economy, corruption and 
governance issues 
 
 The economy of the port is not only lucrative from a 
trade perspective, but also because of the series of services and 
contracts that it forges and attract. In both inbound illicit 
trafficking, such as drugs or counterfeit goods, and outbound 
ones, such as waste trafficking, the role of companies is key. 
Whether companies are set up as tools/means to facilitate illicit 
trades, or are the perpetrators of illicit activities themselves, the 
legal economy around the port remains particularly porous to 
infiltration, enabling and autonomous forms of corruption that 
invest mostly trade relationships and at times political and 
administrative spheres too.  
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 Two companies, Eurotransit Italia and Eurotransit Group, 
with headquarters in Genova and branches in San Ferdinando, in 
Calabria, near the port of Gioia Tauro, have been prevented from 
providing services in Genova, because of an antimafia 
interdiction26 by the Prefect of Genova. The companies in 
question belonged to four men, brothers and sons, Domenico, 
Gioacchino, Salvatore, and Massimo Careri. Eurotransit Italia 
had been established in 2013 while Eurotransit Group in 2018 – 
they both were offering services of transport (trucks, large 
vehiclesì, lorries for selling, or renting) and had their offices 
inside the Distripack building of the VTE (PSA Genova Prà) 
terminal. Thanks to strategic marriages, the Careri family is 
linked to affiliates of the Molè clan, which, together with the 
Piromalli clan, has mafia sovereignty in the town of Gioia Tauro 
in Calabria. The Careris also had other ventures, among which 
S.G.F Careri S.r.l., oil producers involved in the abovementioned 
Operation Provvidenza. Domenico and his son Gioacchino in 
fact had been already arrested for arranging the shipment of the 
blended olive oil destined to the USA with fake labels on behalf 
 
26 The Antimafia interdiction is defined by paragraph 3 of art. 84 of 
Legislative Decree no. 159/2011 and it consists of the declaration of the 
existence of one of the causes of revocation, suspension or prohibition 
referred to in article 67 – certifying the existence of any mafia infiltration 
attempts which could influence the choices and directions of the companies 
or enterprises concerned. Grounds for revocation of licenses, 
authorisations, concessions, registrations, certifications, qualifications and 
disbursements as well as the prohibition to conclude public contracts for 
works, services and supplies, and related subcontracting, including 
piecework of any type, freight and any type of supplies.  
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of the Piromalli clan, through the ports of Gioia Tauro and 
Genova. They clearly had the know-how on how to move around 
both ports, to avoid duties, document checks, move containers 
and eventually exploit the port economy.  
 
 The transport industry around the port is permeable to 
the interests of organised crime, nationally but also cross-
borders – with complacent and proactive company managers – 
as in the case of Operation Provvidenza – as much as with 
unaware shipping agents, like in the case of Operation Artabaz 
mentioned above. A specific point was made by the Guardia di 
Finanza in Genova: the more security systems make it difficult to 
move around the terminals (and therefore to pick up illicit goods 
from containers) the more illicit goods will need to get out of the 
port, hence control/infiltration/setting-up/exploitation of 
transport companies becomes the obvious solution.  
 
 Other types of infiltration in the legal economy of the 
port of Genova relate to the construction industry. In particular, 
as noted by both one of the PFSO and also by the Guardia di 
Finanza, space is a real issue in the port of Genova. The city itself 
is compressed between the mountains and the sea, making it 
very difficult to expand: as put it by the PFSO of SECH terminal, 
“a square meter of land in the port of Genova is gold”. The 
management of space, and of construction contracts, could 
escalate to more systemic or endemic forms of corruption, to 
the point that corruption becomes a form of governing the 
market.  
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 In 2015-2016 a corruption scandal in Rome invested 
contracts at the port of Genova too. The relevant facts, of what 
is a very complex case of corruption, developed as follows: 
 
▪ The events relate to the construction works of the new 
container terminal (now, in 2020, operational) in Calata 
Bettolo, a strip of land in between Terminal SECH, 
Spinelli Terminal, and Terminal Rinfuse in the old port 
area in the city.  
▪ One of the companies that won the contract, in mid 
2000, was Tecnis S.p.a., based in Catania, Sicily, one of 
the largest companies of the South of Italy.  
▪ The works of Calata Bettolo underwent a series of delays 
until, in 2014, the Port authority, through an ‘amicable 
settlement’, added 46 million euros to the initial 140 
million euros budget.  
▪ The Public Prosecutor Office in Rome, in Operation 
Dama Nera27 (part 1 and 2), since 2015, started 
investigating various cases of systemic corruption, self-
laundering, trafficking of favours, and bid rigging within 
ANAS S.p.A28. Among these occurrences, many involved 
 
27 Press Office, Guardia di Finanza, http://www.gdf.gov.it/stampa/ultime-
notizie/anno-2016/marzo/operazione-dama-nera-2-19-arrestati-tra-
imprenditori-professionisti-dirigenti-e-funzionari-di-anas-s.p.a  
28 Formerly an acronym for Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade, 
(National Autonomous Roads Corporation), ANAS is an Italian government-
owned company deputed to the construction and maintenance of Italian 
motorways.  
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bribes (called “cherries”) that were used to feed maxi-
variants, rises of costs during construction masked by 
amicable agreements, like the one of Calata Bettolo. 
▪ In 2016, Tecnis is the leader company in a consortium of 
24 companies that were subjected to judiciary 
administration as per preventative order of the tribunal 
in Catania, following Operation Dama Nera in Rome. The 
leader companies, through direct decisions of their 
administrators – charged with corruption - were said to 
contribute to mafia businesses, linked to the clan 
Santapaola of Cosa Nostra.  
▪ In addition, and de relato, the chief engineer who 
managed the works for the Port Authority, Andrea 
Pieracci, has been sentenced to two years of 
imprisonment for the crime of abuse of office (art. 323 of 
the Italian penal code). As technical manager of the Port 
Authority of Genova, in 2010, in violation of the law, he 
provided an unjust capital advantage to companies by 
fragmenting a large contract into smaller contracts to 
avoid that could be assigned directly without the proper 
tender procedure29. He had also been charged receiving 
money as a private consultant from a company with 
whom he was also dealing with at the Port, but he has 
been cleared for that. 
 
 
29 Corte Appello di Genova, sentenza Andrea Pieracci 28.02.2017 
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While obviously the single judiciary positions of individuals 
and companies involved in this case remain a matter for the 
courts of law, this chain of events show the potential disruptive 
capacity that decision making in the Port authority entails. 
Another series of events invested the works of Calata Bettolo, 
among other construction and development works at the port. 
The case is one of corruption, bribery and bid rigging that since 
2003 has had different manifestations and actors, according to 
the Court of Appeal of Genova. The Court had judged some of 
the most influential private sectors entrepreneurs in the port 
and managers of the Port authority as they essentially nourished 
a cartel to push away certain contractors and split the works 
among them, by controlling licensing and qualifications for the 
tenders. The Supreme Court, also evaluating the case in 2014, 
notices30: 
 
“The Port Authority enjoys a substantial sphere of 
discretional power. It is not possible to consider the 
existence of a public tender in the cases where potential 
contractors are individually invited to present their bids but 
the Authority remains free to choose the winner within a 
framework of convenience and opportunity similar to that of 
the private sector”. 
 
 
30 Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Penale Sesta, Sentenza N. 32237 - 
13.03.2014, page 47 
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Also in this case, as in the previous one, individual 
responsibility remains a matter for the courts to decide. There 
is, however, evidence of unjust favours to certain companies, 
abuse of power from the Port Authority managers, and lack of 
control over companies (such as the abovementioned CULMV) 
in their requirements to proceed with certain checks on their 
staff who worked on the port.  
While in the previous case, corruption was one of the means 
used to infiltrate the port economy, in this case corruption was 
an autonomous practice, and this effectively could alter the 
governance of the port authority and the port developments. 
Individuals in power managed to direct tenders and bids 
affecting the port development through systemic corruption to 
their advantage by employing: 
 
▪ a series of intimidating practices against competitors; 
▪ gentlemen’s agreements whereby someone agreed to 
renounce to a job now to secure another (better) job 
later; 
▪ agreements to exclude tenderers;  
▪ bribery of managers to produce documentation or not to 
produce documentation required to progress a bid; 
▪ forgery of public documents;  
▪ collusion of private entrepreneurs, through private 




Research notes and emerging themes 
 
The following themes have emerged from research 
fieldwork and notes as deserving of further attention and 
scrutiny, in no particular order: 
 
A. The predominance of antimafia investigations 
over ‘normal’ investigations invests also the Port 
of Genova. There is a clear interest of the 
authority to identify potential interests for mafia 
groups operating in the area and the economy of 
the port. More research is needed to identify how 
mafia-type groups have evolved in their interests 
over the port of Genova. 
B. Especially with reference to the Calabrian mafia 
clans, the ‘ndrangheta, who are very well settled 
in the Liguria region, investigators pointed out 
the fact that large drug importations are 
organised by ‘ndrangheta clans from Calabria 
rather than local ones. There seems to be a 
disconnection - or perhaps a disjuncture in 
capacity - between Calabrian-based ‘ndrangheta 
clans engaged in drugs through the port of 
Genova, and Ligurian-based ‘ndrangheta clans 
engaging in other activities on the territory.  
C. Connected to the point above, the prominence of 
some groups or clans in activities in other ports 
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(e.g. the Calabrian port of Gioia Tauro) provides 
individuals with knowledge of the port economy. 
This knowledge might be helpful in accessing 
other ports as well, as it represents a specialist 
know-how of the port system that is difficult to 
acquire for newcomers into this economy. 
D. Most of the trafficking vicissitudes in Genova 
seem to be connected to other ports of the 
Italian West coast, such as Livorno or Napoli or 
Gioia Tauro. This connection across ports needs 
further scrutiny as it also relates to some of the 
main investors and companies active in these 
ports (i.e. MSC, Spinelli Group etc.). 
E. The increasing attention of authorities to waste 
trafficking from Genova needs a standalone 
project of research that looks, at the very least, 
at: the legislative and regulatory frameworks of 
goods identifiable as ‘waste’; the corporate and 
white-collar crime element of it; the routes and 
destination.  
F. The port of Genova is tightly linked with its city 
and the economy of its region. This also seems to 
be true for what concerns organised crime 
manifestations. The port tends to mirror the city 
in terms of networks that operate both for drug 
distributions, engaging in infiltration into the 
economy and into corruption practices. An 
analysis of the urban dimension of organised 
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crime in Genova should complement any analysis 
of dimensions of organised crime in and around 
the port of Genova.  
G. The elements emerging in relation to the port 
authority deserve more scrutiny, especially from 
a point of view of governance studies and anti-
corruption studies. Discretionary powers, 
together with a criminal intent, might in fact 














The port of Melbourne is Australia’s largest and busiest 
port31, sitting at one end of the Yarra River on Port Phillip Bay 
and on 500 hectares of land bordering four municipalities in the 
state of Victoria. Over 3 million TEU32 are handled annually at 
the port, with an average of 7200 containers and 1200 new 
motor vehicles per day crossing water and port land33. With a 
total trade value of over $100 billion, the port of Melbourne 
provides for a substantial portion of Victoria state economy. In 
March 2016, Victorian Parliament passed the Delivering 
Victorian Infrastructure (Port of Melbourne Lease Transaction) 
Act 2016 (Vic). This legislation provided for the commercial 
operations of the port to be leased to the private sector for a 
period of 50 years and established Victorian Ports Corporation 
(Melbourne) as a the entity with responsibility for safe 
navigation and management of Station Pier as Victoria’s cruise 
gateway and the Port of Melbourne (PoM) Group as the private 
leaseholder and strategic manager of the Port of Melbourne’s 
commercial operations and assets.  
More than 40 commercial shipping lines call at the Port 
of Melbourne. The main routes to and from Melbourne port are 
 
31 https://www.portofmelbourne.com/about-us/  
32 Twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU). A container size standard of twenty 
feet. Two twenty-foot containers (TEUs) equal one forty-foot equivalent unit 
(FEU). Container capacity and port capacity are frequently referred to in 
TEUs.  
33 https://www.portofmelbourne.com/about-us/quick-facts/  
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from New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, China, USA, and Germany. 
With 21 km of waterfront, for 30 commercial berths, 
Melbourne port has 13 terminals, named and divided as piers, 
docks and wharfs: Swanson Dock, Appleton Dock, Webb Dock, 
Holden Dock, Gillibrand Pier, and South Wharf. There are three 
container terminals. ICTSI Group manages VICT (Victoria 
International Container Terminal), a fully automated terminal in 
Webb Dock 4 and 5. The other two container terminals are one 
in front of the other: East Swanson Dock terminal, with red 
cranes over four berths, is managed by Patrick Containers; West 
Swanson Dock terminal, with blue cranes also over four berths, 
is managed by DP World Australia. Both DP World Australia and 
Patrick Terminals have terminals also in Sydney, Brisbane and 
Fremantle (Perth) as well, dominating Australian port economy. 
DP World also manages Appleton Dock berths B, C and D for 
general cargo. Railway goods sidings serve both Swanson Dock 
East and West, so that containers can be moved between sea 
and rail transport. In order to increase terminal capacity and by-
pass inner Melbourne roads, the Port Rail Transformation 
Project is on-going. This project (to be completed in 2023) 
includes restructuring the port rail land and asset commercial 
arrangements for leaseholders within the Swanson Dock East 
Precinct; new on-dock rail terminal capacity – development of a 
new on-dock rail terminal at Swanson Dock East; improved rail 
terminal operation arrangements and transparency between 
Port of Melbourne and Rail Terminal Operators.  
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Policing and Security Authorities 
 
During the course of the research project, a total of 11 
meetings were held, in the form of collective interviews, focus 
groups and/or individual interviews with: Victoria Police – 
Trident Task Force (Melbourne); Australian Federal Police – 
Organised Crime Command (Melbourne); Australian Border 
Force (Melbourne and Canberra); National Crime Agency (UK) 
Liaison Officer in Canberra; Home Affairs Department; Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Commission; Port of Melbourne Security; 
DP World and Patrick PFSOs (during tour of premises); Australian 







 According to the latest Illicit Drug Data Report34 by the 
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, ATS 
(Amphetamine-type stimulants) accounted for the greatest 
proportion of the weight of border detections in 2017–18 by sea 
cargo, in line with trends across the nation as well. Sea cargo is 
the importation stream accounting for the greatest proportion 





international mail remains the preferred stream for importation 
irrespective of weight. Also, sea cargo features prominently as 
importation stream accounting for the greatest proportion of 
the weight detected for cocaine (10.6%, even though air cargo 
reaches 76% instead), and it does not feature significantly for 
heroin and cannabis, while remaining low for MDMA, at 6%. It is 
expected, therefore, that in Melbourne, as in the rest of the 
country, when drugs arrive by container, they are more likely to 
be ATS, or cocaine, and to a lower extent also MDMA. In June 
2019, 1.6 tons of meth, ice, for a total weight of, together with 
37 kgs of heroin were found in vacuum-sealed bags inside stereo 
speakers. The drugs, coming from Bangkok, count so far for the 
largest seizure of meth in Australia, confirming the ‘ice-crisis’ 
that Australia has been facing for years35. 
  
One of the most famous operations of the past two 
decades, Operation INCA, from the AFP Melbourne, has taught 
some lessons about the role of the port in international drug 
trafficking. In August 2008, 4.4 tons of ecstasy (MDMA) - hidden 
in tomato tins - with a street value of $440 million were found in 
containers harbouring the port of Melbourne, and originating 
from Italy, and led to the arrest of 20 people across Australia. 
Behind the shipment was a network based in Melbourne, with 
contacts in South Australia and New South Wales, affiliated to 
Calabrian mafia clans in Australia and in communication with 
 
35 Parliamentary Joint Committee On Law Enforcement - Inquiry into Crystal 
Methamphetamine (Ice) - Victoria Police Submission July 2015 
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their Calabrian partners. In the charging and conviction of Rob 
Karam36 the court depicted his role in this network, as one of the 
wholesale consumers: 
i. To initially provide an identity to be associated with a 
declared consignment that would safely provide the 
cover for the concealed cocaine. 
ii. To provide relevant consignment and fake information so 
at to facilitate early identification of the arriving 
container. 
iii. To provide updated information regarding whether the 
container would be able to be safely accessed offside. 
iv. To liaise with a third party so as to achieve that safe 
access to the contraband, its removal and its ultimate 
delivery to interested parties. 
v. To provide the confirmation as to what was going to 
happen in the days after the arrival of the container.  
Crucially, Mr. Karam reported to Pasquale Barbaro37 (the 
responsible person for, and the financier of, the job) that there 
were problems with the container, in that it was being watched 
by authorities and that it was too dangerous to proceed with any 
attempt to access the container. 
The shipping container was addressed to a legitimate 
business ‘Trans Global Food Brokers’. However, the designated 
business/consignee had no knowledge of the shipment, and no 
 
36 DPP vs Rob Karam, [2015] VCC 855; R v Karam (Unreported Supreme 
Court of Victoria, King J, 24 May 2012 (date of conviction), 30 April 2013 
(date of sentence)); Karam v R, [2015] VSCA 50 
37 DPP v Barbaro, [2009] VSC 27 
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involvement in having arranged it. The plan was that the 
container and its contents would be diverted to a person whose 
contact details had been provided separately. When safe, the 
container would be removed, and taken elsewhere to be 
unloaded, stored, and its contents ultimately distributed. 
The same network had also been responsible, in July 
2008, for the arrival of 150 kgs of cocaine, hidden in coffee beans 
from Colombia. Another shipment, containing about 100 kg of 
pseudoephedrine from India was also expected but was later 
discovered to be a scam to buyers. In these cases, as well, Mr. 
Karam provided strategic advice as to shipping documentation 
and as to which port the container should be offloaded. 
 
 Since the arrests linked to these shipments, scenarios of 
drug importations and trafficking to Melbourne has obviously 
evolved, but still retaining the following recurring 
characteristics already visible since Operation Inca: 
1. The criminal networks remain highly multi-ethnic; 
2. The origin countries are commodity-specific (from 
European transit for cocaine; Asian transit and origin for 
heroin and ATS). 
3. City brokers handle various drugs through various routes.  
 
In an operation of October 2013, one of the largest multi-
agency operations involving joint waterfront taskforces in 
Brisbane (Jericho), Sydney (Polaris) and Melbourne (Trident), as 
well as the Sydney-based Joint Organised Crime Group and the 
Melbourne-based Joint Organised Crime Taskforce, led to the 
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arrest of three people and the seizure of more than 200kg of 
methamphetamine concealed in tyres of a Sinotruk Hova 
terminal tractor truck on a ship arriving from China (Shanghai) 
via Japan. Two of the three men arrested were dock workers in 
Victoria. The truck had been imported by Motek Engineering Pty 
Ltd, a company owned by Patrick Cini, who was then charged 
and convicted for importation of a border-controlled drug. The 
truck, headed to Melbourne, was actually stopped in Brisbane 
port, the drugs confiscated and substituted with an inert 
crystalline substance to activate a law enforcement-controlled 
delivery. When the truck docked at Patrick Terminal, in 
Melbourne, Cini and his associates went to collect it to move it 
to the Motek’s factory. The case unfolded from there to build 
the criminal case38. The case does not contain more details on 
the network on the other side, in China.  
 
Operation Afloat, in June 2017, led to the arrest of seven 
men in Melbourne who were trying to import around 92 kgs of 
cocaine in three black duffle bags hidden in a cargo container 
from Panama39. Trident Taskforce, at the time composed of 
AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre), 
AFP, ABF, ACIC, the Australian Taxation Office and of course 
Victoria Police, was formed in 2013 as Commonwealth-funded 
 




maritime taskforce aimed at detecting and disrupting organised 
crime at the state’s waterfront40.  
The network in question had also run various shipments for 
months, observed by investigators. They also had a mentor in a 
businessman in Melbourne who helped different people in the 
criminal network to buy properties and assets, reinvest their 
proceeds of crime in shares and companies’ names and advice 
on drug trade as well. 
Among those arrested were Canadian, Australian and British 
men, as the network relied mostly on Canadian and Vietnamese 
connections in Colombia. The Australia/Canada/Vietnam 
connection is not new to Australia, as courts have heard in 
different cases41 in the past ten years and not only in Melbourne. 
For example, in a case in 201242, a shipment of foot spas and 
pedicure chairs arrived in Melbourne from Canada concealing 
cocaine, methamphetamine and MDMA. One of the defendants, 
Tang, a Canadian citizen, was present when the drugs departed 
Canada as his role was to confirm the same quantity arrived in 
Australia. Other defendant Pham, also Vietnamese-Canadian, 
acted as a point of liaison between the importers of the drugs 
and the freight forwarding company (by paying their fees), 
 
40 Originally, waterfront taskforces were set up in Brisbane (Jericho), Sydney 
(Polaris) and Melbourne (Trident) but as of today only Trident still exists, 
with funding extended in 2016 (but without the AFP) -  
https://newsroom.abf.gov.au/releases/trident-task-force-funding-extended  
41 DPP (Cth) v Brown [2017] VSCA 162 (23 June 2017); McCraw v The Queen 
[2011] NSWCCA 162;  
42 Pham v The Queen; Tang v The Queen [2012] VSCA 101 
 80 
facilitating delivery of the container to the warehouse and 
unpacking the contents to deliver them to the purchaser. Both 
played a material role in the movement of drugs from 
Melbourne after their arrival into Australia. Pham was also 
involved in another case in NSW in 202043, also for the 
importation of foot spas secreting cocaine and 
methamphetamine from Canada, together with her cousin 
Nguyen. Nguyen had set up a business, registered two business 
names and leased a commercial warehouse in Victoria, but also 
rented a storage space in Sydney. He was present to take 
delivery, deconstructed the foot spas to remove the packages of 
drugs and attended with Pham to hand over the packages to the 
purchaser. Nguyen was born in Vietnam but had migrated to 
Australia in 1982.  
 
What else can be learned from cases of drug importations into 
Melbourne? 
 
1. Technology has progressively helped cross-pollination of 
different ethnic groups, it helped “de-ethnicise” 
organised crime groups and activities.  
2. There is an ‘island effect’ for proceeds of crime. Money 
tends to be reinvested in Melbourne or in Australia, as 
this might be easier than sending the money to launder 
somewhere else outside the country. Usually these 
processes are facilitated by professional brokers in the 
 
43 R v Nguyen; R v Pham [2010] NSWCCA 238; (2010) 205 A Crim R 106 
 81 
city, who also support the criminal network in procuring 
other transport services, or infrastructure (i.e. mobile 
phones, cars, bank accounts).  
3. The variety of shipment methods, from printers to foot 
spas, from coffee beans to stereo speakers, is a sign of 
the variety of routes. Illicit drugs are not necessarily 
arriving in Melbourne ports, but can be moved to 
Melbourne from other ports, and from Melbourne ports 
also go to other locations. Beyond sea shipments, air and 
mail cargos are actually confirmed as more frequent 
ways to import drugs in the country. 
4. Networks usually copy companies’ names and addresses 
to import as legitimate suppliers. They exploit the 
reputation of companies with good names to avoid extra 
checks. 
5. Even though containers remain a preferred method of 
shipment, other vessels, also including personal yacht 
are also frequent. Frequent can also be smaller vessels 
(concealing the drugs inside the vessels or in its structure 
or even underneath) that approach the container ships 
in water or nearby the port.  
6. Corruption of government officials paid off in foreign 
jurisdictions in cocaine or money to allow things to go 
through their port has been observed. 
7. Corruption in Australia, of government officials, or dock 
workers are also observed consistently, notwithstanding 
the changes to recruitment strategies for dock workers 
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and the calls for transparency in the recruitment of 
border and government officials.  
8. The authorities have started paying Increased attention 
to ownership and management of warehouses around 
the port area, as these play a crucial role when handling 
containers and cargo in and out of the city.  
 
 
Counterfeit and illicit tobacco trade 
 
According to a report on Illicit Tobacco in Australia, 
drafted by KPMG in 201844, whilst the volume of overall tobacco 
consumption declined, the proportion of illicit tobacco 
consumption increased from 14.3% to 15.0% in 2017/2018. In 
particular, contraband consumption accounted for the majority 
of total illicit tobacco consumption, increasing to 51.1% of the 
total illicit consumption (or 1.20 million kg) in 2017 from 38.5% 
in 2016. Flows of Chinese and Indonesian labelled packs were 
the largest non-domestic inflows accounting for 25% and 6% of 
the total non-domestic flows in 2017 respectively. In the 
meanwhile, unbranded (or ‘Chop Chop’) consumption accounts 
for 47% of total illicit consumption even though the volume of 
unbranded tobacco decreased overall.  
 During fieldwork for this project, it became quote clear 
that illicit tobacco represents a real challenge for border forces 
 
44 KPMG LLP, Strategy Group, 2018, Illicit Tobacco in Australia, Full Year 
Report 2017, London 
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in Australia. Illicit tobacco is either grown or produced locally or 
procured illegally from overseas markets without the payment 
of customs duties. In particular, we can divide illicit tobacco into 
manufactured cigarettes, which could be counterfeit, 
contraband or illicit whites45, or unbranded tobacco, which 
includes chop-chop or pre-filled tubes46. Interestingly, tobacco 
can only be grown in Australia (for personal or commercial use) 
with an excise license but there are no current licenses for 
tobacco growing in Australia and therefore no tobacco is legally 
grown in Australia for any purpose. The illicit tobacco trade 
deprives the community of taxes and therefore is for Australian 
Border Force to curb. In July 2018, the Illicit Tobacco Taskforce 
(ITTF) was established to protect Commonwealth revenue by 
“proactively targeting, disrupting and dismantling serious actors 
and organised crime syndicates that deal in illicit tobacco”47. This 
ABF-led taskforce brings together the expertise of ABF and 
Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Commission (ACIC), the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the Commonwealth Director of 
 
45 Illicit Whites are manufactured cigarettes that are usually manufactured 
legally in one country/market but which the evidence suggests have been 
smuggled across borders during their transit to Australia, where they have 
limited or no legal distribution and are sold without the payment of tax.  
46 Unbranded tobacco is usually sold as finely cut loose leaf tobacco in 250g 
or half kilogram amounts.  It   carries no labelling or health warnings and is 
sold in pre-filled tubes or loose in bags (called Chop Chop).  
47 https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/taskforces/illicit-tobacco-taskforce 
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Public Prosecutions (CDPP) and the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO). 
 The mechanisms of shipment for illicit tobacco are similar 
to those for shipments of drugs as we can summarise the 
challenges of this trade to Australian borders as follows: 
i. The risks are low, and the profits are high, which means 
the volume of this trade is higher than drugs.  
ii. There is a wide understanding that the illegal tobacco 
trade serves as funding for other organised crime 
activities, especially as it provides cash flow. However, 
there are groups that solely deal in illicit tobacco for cash 
accumulation, with financiers that might also be 
businessmen in the city or based elsewhere. 
iii. There is, however, also a cultural element to illicit trade 
of tobacco. In fact, ABF agents link the consumption of 
illegal tobacco to ethnic and cultural heritage, whereby 
different ethnic groups tend to use, or are more willing 
to use, tobacco from their own places of origin at lower 
costs.  
iv. The illegal tobacco market is deeply interwoven with the 
legal tobacco trade, which is heavily taxed. The legal 
retailers use the same points of sale in Melbourne for 
both legal and illegal tobacco sales.  
v. Illicit trade of tobacco has, as most common origin 
countries, Malaysia, Taiwan, China and India, with South-
European, Middle Asian and Chinese networks heavily 
involved in the business.  
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As said, these trades are frequent and high in volume and 
weight. In December 2019, on Boxing Day, the Australian Border 
Force seized about one million illicit cigarettes from an air cargo 
shipment as it arrived into Sydney. The day after the ITTF was 
alerted by an overseas partner agency to a shipment arriving into 
Melbourne that they suspected to be undeclared cigarettes. The 
ABF examined the container and discovered 9.8 million 
cigarettes fraudulently declared as ‘dough mixers’, ‘cake fridges’ 
and ‘freezers’ and the estimated duty evasion was nearly 
$9 million.  A third large sea cargo shipment arrived into 
Melbourne from Hong Kong in early January 2020 and was found 
to contain more than 1.5 tons of rough-cut tobacco concealed 
within table tops. This detection was as a result of information 
passed on from authorities in Hong Kong and the shipment had 
an estimated evaded duty value of $1.9 million48. This followed 
another large seizure in Melbourne in early December 2019, 
when the Australian Border Force (ABF) detected and seized 
over 39 million illicit cigarettes in one week49. 
 
Furthermore, as said, the risks of smuggling tobacco are 
considered generally much lower than smuggling drugs. In, 
abovementioned Operation Inca, two of the defendants, Jon 






50 Visser v The Queen; Falanga v The Queen [2015] VSCA 168 (26 June 2015) 
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that they believed that the container held a large quantity of 
illicit tobacco (‘chop-chop’) and not drugs. Also, a defence 
witness for Visser claimed that, during a conversation between 
two of the organisers of the drug shipment, Barbaro and Zirilli, 
the following was said – which also shows the perception that 
tobacco remains safer than drugs, as illicit trade.  
Zirilli: We should have stayed doing tobacco containers as 
this here is a disaster. 
Barbaro: Bit late for that now. 
Zirilli: When we were getting sentenced did you hear that 
they might be charging Johnny Visser? 
Barbaro: I can’t understand why? We told Johnny that the 
container was full of tobacco and I never mentioned eccies to 
him. 
Zirilli: Yeah I remember you saying to Johnny that there was 
$4 to $5 million worth of tobacco in the container and we never 
mentioned eccies to him. 
 
 Another case that shows the autonomy and the 
endurance of some criminal networks smuggling illicit tobacco 
through the port of Melbourne, was the case against 
businessman Nabil Grege and his associates in 201351. The case 
was about the importation of two containers into Melbourne 
that contained illicit whites. Nabil Grege run a property 
development business called The First Stone in Northcote, 
 
51 DPP v Nabil Grege and James Grege, Prosecution Opening Statement, 21 
February 2018 
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Melbourne, together with other international businesses too, 
such as a logging enterprise in Cameroon. On one side the 
network needed to secure  a smooth shipment from the 
Emirates (with the cigarettes originating in Lebanon): the 
Custom broker for the containers he and his son had arranged to 
ship to Melbourne containing the illicit tobacco, was a company 
named Stokes and Bells; Patlin Transport was the trucking 
company who was supposed to help with the movement of the 
containers from Patrick Terminals. On the other side, it was 
necessary to gather information about the status of the 
containers, to find out when and whether it was safe to collect 
them. The contact here was Dean Crimes, a person who worked 
for Toll Shipping, who declared he was waiting for information 
from an employee of Patrick Terminal. While the shipment went 
wrong for the network for a mixture of law enforcement 
surveillance and substitutions of containers and goods, this case 
before court showed the intricated organised nature that illicit 
tobacco trade can take.  
 
 
Other illicit trade 
 
In terms of inward trafficking, Australia and Melbourne 
don’t differ much from other countries and ports. Beyond drugs 
and tobacco, other goods are obviously smuggled into the 
country, from wildlife to pharmaceuticals, although these have 
not featured much in the findings of this project. Of interest 
remained investigations into goods that are imported into 
 88 
Victoria, avoiding the payment of Duty and the Goods and 
Services Tax52. 
 Outward trafficking has also not featured much, even 
though, in conversation, investigators have pointed out that 
there is no real control over containers that leave the country, 
and that things like containers full of cash as much, in different 
currencies, as containers full of undeclared goods have been 
accidentally found by ABF in the course of other controls or 
random checks that are at times carried out. The emphasis has 
historically always been on importation. There are, however, 
global obligations for exports, such as nuclear materials or arms 
technology, in which case there is an export control authority, a 
department within the Ministry of Defence. In these cases, ABF 
would work with this authority, but only upon specific needs.  
Waste trafficking from Australia has been flagged as an 
emerging issue. In May 201953, the news reported that Holcim 
Philippines Inc. had officially imported materials to the 
Philippines from Australia, at Mindanao International Container 
Terminal, allegedly for use in its plants. In Manila, an inspection 
was made and showed that it contained shredded municipal 
wastes such as scrap plastic, cellophane, wrappers, textile, 
stones, and soil among others. The issue provoked a small 
diplomatic incident and it adds to the complaints of countries 







become the dumping sites of richer countries, such as 
Australia54. This type of criminality, as in the case of Genova, 
reflects corporate liabilities and white-collar crimes in dealing 
with recycling and waste disposal. They eventually are 
organised crime in the sense that they can be harmful as much 
as they can be profitable. Indeed, according to a report for the 
Department of the Environment in 201755, in Australia, the 
recycling and resource recovery industry is undermined by bad 
landfill levy design at the state level. The report concludes56 that 
“levy alignment led by the Commonwealth would stop perverse 
outcomes such as interstate waste trafficking. In addition, waste 
levy revenue should be confined to waste management and 
resource recovery initiatives and illegal dumping, not propping 









55 Blue Environment and Randall Environmental Consulting, 2017, Australian 
National Waste Report 2016, Prepared for the Department of the 
Environment and Energy  
https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/d075c9bc-45b3-
4ac0-a8f2-6494c7d1fa0d/files/national-waste-report-2016.pdf  
56 Ibid., page 28 
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Infiltration in the legal economy, corruption and 
governance issues 
 
Beyond illicit trades, organised and complex crime at 
port of Melbourne manifests through different forms of 
corruption, as an enabler and as an autonomous practice to 
infiltrate the port economy as much as to affect port governance 
and development.  
There are four main issues that can be brought forward 
when it comes to corruption and illicit governance in the port 
of Melbourne, ranging from occasional to systemic forms of 
corruption, collusion and malpractices: 
 
1. The issuing of MSICs (Maritime Security 
Identification Cards), the problems of access to 
terminals and the allegations/perceptions of 
systemic corruption in the port workforce. 
 
Conversations with port of Melbourne managers, 
including PFSOs of the two main terminals DP World and Patrick, 
emphasised problems with the MSIC scheme. MSIC are 
identification cards that were introduced in 2007 to conform the 
seaports to the airports and their Aviation Security Identification 
Card. MSIC certify that the holder has met the minimum security 
requirements to work unescorted or unmonitored in a maritime 
security zone; they are not intended as access cards as ports or 
port facilities still can control access to their own zones. The 
background check is obviously done against certain serious 
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offences (i.e. terrorism, treason, use of weapons of mass 
destruction; hijacking of a plane or a ship) and other criminal 
record checks done by the AFP and ASIO (Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation). MSIC are perceived as a risk in the 
port facility’s business. While for some participants definitely 
“MSIC provide a pathway to criminality”, the debate on their 
actual ability to curb criminality on the waterfront is ongoing57. 
The problems with MSIC are linked to the following 
considerations: 
 
a. MSIC provide access to the port precinct, but they get 
lost, they don’t get updated that often (2 or 4 years of 
validity), they don’t always get returned when expired 
(as it is requested instead), and the port sector has a high 
turnover of staff. Some MSIC holders can offer their 
services to others for hire, temporarily. Provided that 
someone in a truck has a MSIC (driver or client) the truck 
can access port zones. MSIC are not necessarily smart 
card; they don’t come with an in-built chip, which makes 
the difference between being an ID card (no functioning 
expiry) or an access card (with functioning expiry).  
b. They can be obtained without a photographic proof of 
identity (thus using other people’s names and 
documents, i.e. birth certificate). 
 
57 Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission Reference: 
Adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and 
organised crime Thursday, 18 February 2010 Sydney 
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c. The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government authorises 
organisations to serve as an approved MSIC Issuing Body. 
There are currently 15 authorised MSIC Issuing Bodies58. 
Most of the container terminal staff are issued through 
1-Stop, which is a national organisation set up by DP 
World and Patrick (used also as booking system to enter 
the facilities), while other issuers, such as Sydney Ports 
Corporations can issue MSIC to other services working 
around the port, and are also the issuing body for Port of 
Melbourne.  
d. The disqualifying offences for a MSIC (over 100 and soon 
in 2020 over 200) are mostly related to terrorism and 
other personal or infrastructure-related security threat. 
Transnational organised crime, people smuggling, drug 
importation and money laundering were added to the list 
later on and do not automatically preclude the issuing of 
a MSIC. 
e. Port authorities and terminals are not law enforcement 
agencies and therefore their priority remains trade; 
individual security companies which are contracted by 
terminals operate security checks of MSIC. 
 
The Costigan Commission (officially named the Royal 





Dockers Union) was an Australian Royal Commission in the 
1980s, set up to investigate criminal activities, including violence 
and organised crime, associated with the Painters and Dockers 
Union, with special reference to Melbourne port and waterfront. 
Leading to the set-up of the National Crime Authority in 1984, 
the Costigan Commission four volumes report on many 
members of the union that were involved in a wide range of 
criminal activities and also led to profound changes in the union 
itself. The reputation of wharfies (port workers) and of the 
maritime union (currently MUA, Maritime Union of Australia) as 
corrupt and generationally still linked to organised crime figures 
in the city remains almost intact. As noticed by investigators:  
 
“Organised crime is still embedded in the port, through 
families and friends of dockworkers; they still manipulate 
things [including MSIC cards and access]. Corruption in the 
family environment of dockworkers has never been really 
targeted or taken away; they still control the port, who they 
work with, what shifts they work, with what cruise they work 
with…the large numbers of companies can’t do anything 




In February 2020, Trident Task Force charged two men for 
alleged drug trafficking at a port facility in Melbourne59. The two 
port (dock) workers were allegedly dealing drugs directly from 
the company they were working for in Port of Melbourne. The 
case is before the courts but tends to confirm how the port 
environment in Melbourne remains vulnerable to criminal 




2. Border corruption, and allegations/expectations 
of connivance in criminal activities of border 
agents and government officials.  
 
Together with port workers, the issue of corruption-
enabled organised crime in the port of Melbourne relates heavily 
to involvement of border agents and other government officials 
in bribery and corruption schemes. To address the risk of border 
officials using their positions to assist criminal networks, a joint 
AFP/ Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
(ACLEI) Taskforce was established in 2011 in New South Wales, 
but not in Victoria, and mainly for the aviation environment and 






Heritage60, Bagatelle, Minium61). Operation Heritage (2014) in 
particular has had a lasting effect on both Customs, its successor 
the ABF, as well as on ACLEI itself. It is reported that Heritage 
“resulted in considerable changes to Custom's integrity policy, 
practice and organisational arrangements”62.  
Most of the cases collected or indicated by participants 
in this research revolved around Sydney and the aviation sector, 
with evidence of individual bribes and also more systemic forms 
of corruption whereby custom agents were working together 
with, and for, the Australian criminal group of the Bra Boys, 
characterised for their surfer culture. Alleged connections 
between the group, border force, security officers were also 
suspected at Sydney port.  
The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, in 
this case, and it is the opinion of most of the participants, that 
for Melbourne we are indeed in a case of evidence of absence 
for lack of scrutiny, rather than for lack of the phenomenon. The 
media reported about three confidential national anti-
corruption operations, two of which codenamed Operation 




61 Australian Federal Police (2015) Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity Inquiry into the 





identified suspected threats to Australia’s border security in 
both Sydney and Melbourne, in the form of connivance of 
custom officers (the ABF’s current restructuring happened in 
2015) with middle-Eastern, Balkan, Italian and Australian crime 
groups, mostly for drug importations63. In fact, ACLEI made a 
number of comments to the 2015 Inquiry into the integrity of 
Australia’s border arranged, that can be summarised as follows64 
and could be considered a good summary of the red flags 
identified in Melbourne too: 
• evidence of private illicit drug use by public officials, 
which brings them into potential compromise by 
organised crime groups; 
• the risk posed by ‘back office’ staff who may have 
access to sensitive law enforcement information, but 
who often are subject to lesser scrutiny than front-
line officers 
• vulnerabilities in specific border operating 
environments, such as airport and quarantine 
clearance environments, and 
• the prospect of ‘vertical collusion’, whereby Federal 
and State officials might collude in corruption 




64 Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity Inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border 
arrangements Submission by the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity 2015 
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In January 2019, the media65 reported on Victoria Police 
charging two Department of Agriculture & Water Resource 
employees for doing unauthorised container checks to assess 
their custom status and whether there was any Border Force 
flags on them. These individuals were both linked to organised 
crime groups in Melbourne, and in particular to Middle-Eastern 
groups. The case is currently before the court, which heard 
evidence in relation to charges of bribery and dishonesty related 
to the defendants’ roles overseeing the inspection of items, 
including shipping containers, through customs. The overall 
operation was linked to the importation of illegal cigarettes. One 
of the defendants was acting assistant director at the 
Department of Agricutlure and Water Resources and, due to its 
relationship with a prominent organised crime individual, was 
under threat. This individual was also believed to have taken a 
bribe from an undercover officer.  
 
 
3. The system of trusted insiders and corruption in 
the supply chain and services provisions. 
 
As the Australian Border Force is a law enforcement 
agency part of the Department of Home Affairs, it is Home 
Affairs that runs the intelligence and the risk profiles upon which 
 
65 Simonis, Anika, Official in crime gang link - Government boss accused of 
bribery, dishonesty, in Herald Sun Melbourne, 17 January 2019 
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ABF then acts. Looking at supply chain service providers 
(customers’ broker, freight forwarders, licensed deposits etc) 
and how they facilitate or collude with organised crime is one of 
the main focus of this intelligence work. Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) would be investigating cartels of corporations 
within their financial crime taskforces. The search for trusted 
insiders’ threats - employee or recurring client in a position to 
exploit a security system to conduct or enable an act of unlawful 
interference - remains challenging. But promoting similar 
standards of trade, through a trusted trader scheme, remains 
fundamental for both Home Affairs and the terminals.  
 
Operation Boscobel in 2015 led to the arrest of six men 
by Trident Taskforce for charges of conspiracy to dishonestly 
cause a loss to the Commonwealth, fraud and evidence of 
money laundering and links to organised crime groups, 
especially for possession of firearms66. The charges were 
brought forward by ATO and involved ACG Security, one of 
Australia’s biggest private security services. ACG was acquired by 
Spotless, retaining Port of Melbourne, including Patrick 
Stevedoring, among other clients. Just after the news broke 






takeover due to pending investigation on ACG and pending 
licence suspension too67. 
Things to note about this case: 
i. The charges related to a loss to the Australian Tax 
Office (‘ATO’) of Pay As You Go (‘PAYG’) tax 
neither withheld, declared nor remitted to the 
ATO. Supplemental untaxed cash payments were 
regularly paid to ten salaried employees of the 
company. 
ii. ACG made use of a number of sub-contractors, 
some of which also linked to ACG personnel 
involved in Operation Boscobel.  
iii. Even though ACG projected an image eschewing 
any reliance upon sub-contractors, a large 
number of guards were actually employees of 
several sub-contractors to ACG. ACG asserted 
overarching control in the recruitment, 
deployment and supervision of guard personnel, 
whether they were employed directly by ACG or 
through its several sub-contractors.  
iv. ACG was obliged to withhold an amount of PAYG 
tax from wages and salaries paid to its employees 
and to regularly remit that amount to the ATO. 





sub-contractors in respect of their employees’ 
wages.  
v. Korras, Ammouchi and Moussa68 persistently 
acted dishonestly by paying ‘off the books’ wages 
to security guard employees without remitting 
PAYG tax to the ATO.  
 
Aside from the loss to the Commonwealth and the 
charges by ATO, this operation exposed the risks of insider 
threats by trusted companies and insiders to the Port of 
Melbourne. The risks were: 
 
▪ Abuse of trust of trusted insider relationship with the 
client, Port of Melbourne and the terminals, landlords of 
the port. Abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
▪ Through the delegation to sub-contractors, lack of 
oversight over recruitment and also over who had 
access to information, files and insider data (i.e. the 
security plans, ships’ info etc) that were shared with ACG 
but eventually also accessible to sub-contractors as 
delegated powers. 
▪ As some intelligence in Boscobel also pointed out, some 
of the guards recruited by sub-contractors were 
suspected to facilitate organised crime activities, and 
specifically firearm and drug trafficking. Also, accounting 
 
68 R v Moussa [2019] VCC 1891 (25 October 2019); DPP v Korras [2019] VCC 
1681 (8 October 2019) 
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firms and lawyers and other professional facilitators 
supporting ACG also were suspected to have links with 
organised crime figures.  
▪ Infiltration of the security services could prove crucial for 
access, entry and exit and knowledge of the overall 
security protocols and systems in order to elude them.  
 
4. Corruption and collusion in contracts relating to 
construction, development and infrastructures.  
 
When the Independent Board of Anti-corruption 
Commission (IBAC) for Victoria was given new investigative 
powers in 201569, a question was raised on whether these 
powers could have applied also to political corruption. While this 
was still subject to interpretation of the new regulations, stalling 
on the legislation for the port leases was stalled for risks of IBAC 
interference70. This project has not found direct and open 
evidence of corruption and illicit governance of markets and 
industries of construction, infrastructure and the overall 
development of the port of Melbourne.  
It is again a matter of evidence of absence, as most of the 
cases discussed in this project that relate to high level corruption 







In 2016, Operation Spicer, by the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) for NSW, made a 
recommendation to prosecutors to proceed against Joseph 
Tripodi for the offence of misconduct in public office. Misusing 
his position as a member of Parliament for Labour, Mr Tripodi 
had provided of a confidential Treasury report to 
representatives of the private corporation Buildev Group Pty Ltd, 
without lawful authority to do so, in exchange for future 
benefits. This followed Minister of Roads, Maritime and Freight 
for New South Wales, Duncan Gay, confirming the existence of a 
very confidential agreement of “cross payments” to compensate 
the owners of rival ports Botany and Kembla, if Newcastle’s 
container volumes pass an agreed limit71 (of about $100 per 
container unit (about $1 million per vessel) it handled above a 
threshold of 30,000 a year). Current investigations (Operation 
Ember72) by ICAC in NSW also invest Roads and Maritime 
Services (RMS) employees and how they exercised their official 
functions when awarding consulting and construction contracts 
in NSW ports.  
Such cases are examples of high-end corruption and 




71 Legislative Council Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifty-Sixth Parliament 




“To say that these cases don’t happen here…I wouldn’t 
go that far. […] When construction contracts in or around 
the ports are involved, big roads or new cranes for 
example, various agencies have responsibility to check 
integrity…it can’t be said that there isn’t unduly influence 
for sure… there is no reason why something like that 
couldn’t happen here – there are lots of powerful people 
that have connections to the port”.   
  
Research notes and emerging themes 
 
The following themes have emerged from research 
fieldwork and notes as deserving of further attention and 
scrutiny, in no particular order: 
 
A. The port is that environment where everyone knows 
what everyone else is doing. It has been observed that it 
is specifically the case for stevedores, who know each 
other across Australia, as much as abroad as well, and 
this facilitates business, including illicit business.  
B. The port environment is full of regulations and norms, 
but informality reigns. There are things that in theory 
authorities are told no one can do in a terminal, but then 
testing them at the port, authorities learn that they can 
indeed be done (i.e. moving containers to a certain place, 
checking or not checking certain locations, moving shifts 
and rotas etc).  
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C. Law enforcement agencies, in the maritime 
environment, look for systems and processes, but the 
whole environment is very disorganised, there is 
possibility for manipulation and confusion of systems 
and processes. Industry practices are not what expected 
by law enforcement.  
D. There seems to be a decrease of the use of containers for 
drug importations; the system of using a mother-
daughter ship (a smaller ships to which the cargo is 
partially offloaded to at sea). This could be a vessel or a 
personal yacht: these represent the most common ways 
to import drugs by sea without touching the ports.  
E. Intelligence is about relationship and in Victoria this is an 
issue, as occupational culture of the different 
authorities, together with different security protocols 
across institutions, prevent a real sharing of intelligence 
across platforms.  
F. A lot of what was discussed in Victoria does not come 
from Victorian examples, but is discussed as evidence by 
absence. Mainly it is about NSW and discussed by 
comparison and lesson learned. The importance of Joint 
Task Force Polaris in 2012 has affected the way maritime 
crime and waterfront criminality are seen across the 
whole of Australia.  
G. There is an indication, or an intuition, of a ‘waterfall 
effect’ – the level of sophistication of criminal activities 
of organised crime groups in the city falls onto the port. 
For example, even though there is an understanding that 
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most of drug importations are ethnically hybrid, the 
satellite industries – logistics and transports – might not 
be. Authorities indicate that Italian clans are heavily 
involved in the transport and logistics, as much as 
Chinese/Asian clans are involved instead in the 
laundering of money, which mirrors in the role and the 
social positions of these organised crime groups in the 
city to a certain extent.  
H. There seems to be little understanding on how to 
approach instances of corruption in cases of large 
infrastructure projects affecting the maritime zone, i.e. 
the Melbourne Port Rail Shuttle73. The oversight of 
integrity and transparency seems to be spread across a 
number of authorities, not all of which law enforcement 
ones. As for the abovementioned waterfall effect, there 
are figures – mostly entrepreneur – who could exercise 
some unduly influence over contracts and procurements, 
as they are both well connected in the city’s business 
field as much as they have links with some organised 
crime figures.  
  
 
73 The current Port Rail Shuttle plan, which is effectively the first major 
initiative proposed by the Lonsdale Group the new owners of the port of 
Melbourne, foresees the establishment of a Port Rail Shuttle (PRS) which 
will operate between a portside Metropolitan Intermodal Terminal (MIRT) 
and two suburban terminals, one in the north located at Somerton and one 
in the south west at Altona. 
 106 










The second largest port of Canada after Vancouver, and 
therefore the first on the Canadian East Coast, the port of 
Montreal stretches for 26 kilometres following the St Lawrence’s 
river over the Ile of Montreal; since the boom of container 
shipping in the 1960s, the working port has in fact moved away 
from the city centre. Strategically located 1,000 miles inland and 
close to the consumer market of the US Midwest as much as 
Eastern Canada and the routes to Europe, the port of Montreal 
is a one-stop port with no intermediate calls to discharge and 
load ships. Direct services to and from Montreal comprise the 
Caribbeans and the US, Norther Europe, including Antwerp, 
Liverpool, Hmburg, Rotterdam and the Mediterranean routes, 
including Genova, Gioia Tauro, Valencia, Livorno. Transhipment 
ports of call comprise Latina America, including Santos, 
Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Cartagena, the Middle East (e.g. 
Istanbul, Abu Dhabi), Africa (e.g. Lagos, Mombasa) and Asia, 
including ports of China, Thailand, Japan and Australian/New 
Zealand ports. In terms of main routes for trade to Montreal, the 
most distinctive is the one from North Europe (37% of 
containers) followed by Asian ports (21%) with access to Panama 
and Suez Canals. The port has weekly exchanges with some of 
the major North European and Mediterranean ports such as: 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Genoa, Liverpool, Gioia Tauro, Hamburg, 
Valencia74. 
 
74 https://www.tradingwiththeworld.com/en/index.snc  
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There are ten terminals in Montreal, five of which are 
container terminals (Terminal Cast and Terminal Racine 
operated by Montreal Gateway Terminals Partnership -MGT, 
Maisonneve and Viau Terminals operated by Termont,  
Bickerdike Terminal operated by Empire Stevedoring). With a 
volume of trade of 1.4 million TEU per year, and with plans to 
expand containership in the farther territory of Contrecoeur are 
on the way, the port of Montreal serves Quebec and Ontario 
with a total of $41 billion in goods every year through over 2,000 
vessels a week and 2,500 trucks per day75. The economic impact 
of the port of Montreal is huge, with over 16,000 direct, indirect 
and induced jobs and an estimated of $2.1 billion in added value 
for the Canadian economy76. 
The Montreal Port Authority operates the Port of 
Montreal. The port authority is an autonomous self-financing 
federal agency that builds and maintains infrastructures then 
leased to private stevedoring companies. Montreal is in fact a 
landlord port.  
 
Policing and Security Authorities 
 
Since 2004 - when the port became the first Canadian 
port to be accredited by the International Ship and Port Security 




76 Port of Montreal, 2019, Directory. 
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an integrated plan. As each terminal, under Canadian law, is 
responsible to deliver and implement security plans on their 
territories, but over 20 organisations and agencies have 
jurisdictions and access to the port, the integrated plan is 
coordinated by the port authority and by the Director of Security 
and Fire Prevention. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police set up 
National Port Enforcement Team (NPETs) in key Canadian ports. 
Dedicated RCMP officers are assigned to the Port of Montreal, 
and they work in close cooperation with other agencies such as 
the City of Montreal Police (SPVM), Sûreté du Québec and 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).  
77During the course of this project, the following 
authorities were approached: Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(Port Enforcement & Organised Crime); City of Montreal Police, 
Organised Crime; Sûreté du Quebec, Organised Crime; 
Authority for Public Contracts Quebec; Port of Montreal 
Security Unit; Canadian Border Services Authority Union, 
International Longshoremen Association, Checkers;  
Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of 
Public Contracts in the Construction Industry (Charbonneau 






 Public Safety Canada hosted a Law Enforcement 
Roundtable on Drugs on March 29, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
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to foster partnerships and shared knowledge on the status of the 
illicit drug trade in Canada. Two main themes were discussed: 
the so-called ‘opioid crisis’ and the upsurge into 
methamphetamine. Overall trafficking of illicit substances by 
organised criminal is on the rise in Canada. OCGs are becoming 
increasingly involved in different drug markets, giving rise to 
poly-drug trafficking as well as increased trafficking of cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and fentanyl. With respect to the fentanyl 
market, the profitability and relative ease of entry into Canada 
attracts OCGs, leading to greater supply. The Roundtable noticed 
the increasing adaptability of criminal networks to detection and 
interdiction efforts and develop alternative transportation and 
concealment methods. Specifically, the Roundtable found that 
OCGs originating in Mexico have been increasingly involved in 
the trafficking of illicit drugs, including methamphetamines and 
opioids, to North America. Consequently, drug enforcement 
efforts in both Canada and the United States must continuously 
evolve. The routes from Latin America to Canada challenge 
border security in the United States, with cartels diversifying 
their products and “fractionalising their organisation to avoid 
disruption and dismantlement”77. These criminal enterprises 
exploit air, maritime and land-based transportation domains to 
smuggle and distribute illicit substances, including cocaine, 
heroin, and methamphetamine. 
 
 
77 Public Safety Canada 2019 Law Enforcement Roundtable on Drugs, 
Meeting Summary, September 2019, page 5 
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 The port of Montreal has a reputation of Canada's drug-
smuggling hub; this is due to the volume of trade in the port as 
much as it is linked to the prolific organised crime scene of the 
city of Montreal. While open statistics from CBSA are not broken 
down by port and regional seizures, to the rise in business for 
the docks of Montreal seems to correspond a rise in illicit trade 
as well. Between 2016 and 2018 trends for the city of Montreal 
and the province show the rise of cocaine and heroin 
consumption, as much as upsurge in meth consumption and the 
steady, widespread use of cannabis and hashish.  
 
 Drug trafficking in the port of Montreal seems to be 
linked to balance in the underworld of the city of Montreal. In 
particular, in a city of over a million and half people, organised 
crime groups of different factions seem to be working together 
to exploit various venues of profit without much conflict. 
Notwithstanding their collaboration, the   Furthermore, with 
drugs, the main sponsors of the importations are notoriously the 
same players in town. What might change are their facilitators, 
those with contacts in the country of origin for the drugs. They 
will work for different groups and will decide whether to use the 
port, if they have a safe door of entry.  
 
An operation that shows this mechanism is Project 
Celsius in 2010-2012, with cases in court until 2018. Project 
Celsius led to seizures for a total of 43.3 tonnes of hashish, made 
from the nine containers that were intercepted, the seizures 
made prior to Project Celsius and the other seizures made during 
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the course of the investigation. The drugs had an estimated 
value of $860 million and “could have supplied every resident of 
a city of 10,000 with a daily dose for more than 11 years” 78. 
 Celsius was led by the Montréal RCMP Drug Section 
jointly with the Montréal and Halifax RCMP National Ports 
Enforcement Teams and initiated after the Canada Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) found hashish in offshore containers at 
the ports of Montreal and Halifax in 2009 and 2010. According 
to the press release on Celsius, the involved criminal 
organisation purchased drugs from the Middle East, primarily 
from Pakistan. The hashish was hidden in containers that were 
shipped by boat and transited through several ports before 
being routed to Canada. Some of the suspicious containers were 
seized in Pakistan, while others were intercepted on their way to 
Canada, specifically in Italy and Belgium. 
The criminal organisation was made of 9 people in 
Quebec, charged for conspiracy, importation and possession of 
cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking. Also 2 people were 
arrested in Pakistan as leaders of the organization there. The 
network’s modus operandi in Montreal was as follows: when a 
suspicious container arrived in Montréal, a fax was sent to a local 
hotel. One of the suspects picked up the fax and implemented a 
plan to take possession of the container. Various details of these 





various duties with companies at the Port of Montreal Terminal 
Cast could be involved in the organisation. 
Among those arrested two are particularly interesting for 
this project: Alain Charron and Brian Forget. Charron was 
sentenced in 2018 to a five-year prison term for bringing three 
large shipments of hashish into Canada in 201079. He run 
meetings with almost all of the major organised crime groups 
based in Montreal – from the Hells Angels to the Rizzuto clan 
(Italian mafia), including famous underworld figure Raynald 
Desjardins, considered the head of the Montreal mafia.  
 
 The involvement of different crime groups working with 
the same drug broker and the interdependency among 
the various players in the drug conspiracy are 
characteristic of this case and are representative of 
Montreal underworld.  
 
The importations were also aided by the proximity with the 
West End Gang, the group that is historically linked to the 
Matticks family and Irish-based networks that authorities 
consider highly embedded in the docks in Montreal. Brian Forget 
- a member of the West End Gang sentenced to five-year 
sentence in 2013 – was considered the middle man between 
Charron and employees of the Port of Montreal. Thanks to his 
connections to the port, Forget had the necessary connections 
 
79 R. c. Charron 2018 QCCS 1382; R. c. Charron 2018 QCCS 1770; R. c. 
Charron 2018 QCCS 2508;  
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to facilitate the entry of illegal drugs into Canada. The use of 
intermediaries like Forget served as an insulating device for the 
key players, said the court; intermediaries were used as buffers 
for the principal players. 
 
 Obviously, the importation of drugs into Canada requires 
a «door» or a safe port of entry. The door could be 
someone working in the inside as a baggage handler at 
the airport of Montreal or a longshoreman working at 
the port of Montreal.  
 
A spin off of this story was the case of Brenda Forget against 
Transport Canada80. Mrs Forget lost her job as a checker81 at the 
port of Montreal (a job she had since 2005) once her security 
clearance to have access to certain areas in the port of Montreal 
was revoked. The revocation of Mrs Forget’s security clearance 
was largely a result of her “association” with her brother, Brian 
Forget. While Mrs Forget claimed against discrimination for her 
family status, the RCMP had sent a report in support of the 
revocation. From the report the court learned that Mrs Forget’s 
name had appeared as a person of interest in a number of police 
reports about organised crime in the Port of Montreal, due to 
 
80 Forget v. Canada (Transport), 2017 FC 620 
81 in French they call them vérificateurs. They have what they call a stow 
plan, which is a document that says exactly what will be coming off a boat, 
and this way they'll know exactly which container must go to which place 
and they will have these containers placed in a stack to move them with 
transport of any kind. 
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her association with Brian Forget. She had also been charged 
(and charged dismissed) in 2005 after large volumes of cannabis 
were found in her house and the police also considered her 
directly involved in, and/or direct knowledge of, the 
transportation of stolen goods through the Port of Montreal. The 
Office for Reconsideration she appealed to, however, found that 
her connection to her brother was not considered problematic 
to the point of justifying the revocation of security clearance, nor 
did the police suspicions. However, the Office maintained the 
revocation of the security clearance because Mrs Forget’s 
guardianship over her niece (Brian’s daughter) makes her a 
potential target who could be suborned to assist her brother, 
putting the security of marine transportation in jeopardy. Finally, 
the court quashed this decision and allowed judicial review in 
favour of Mrs Forget as the standard of reasonable suspicions 
was eventually not met.  
 
 The complexities of family relationships that seem to 
bind together dockworkers is a constant of various ports. 
In Montreal, this also creates tensions with security 
clearance measures, because of difficult balances with 
guilt by association presumptions. 
 
What else can we learn from the drug trade and importation 
in Montreal? 
 
A. There is a tendency to compartmentalise organised 
crime in the city of Montreal, differentiating groups, 
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leaderships and coordination structures. Ethnicity of 
origin (of the group, rather than of individuals) remain 
crucial in understanding ties, even when it is clear groups 
work together as needed, the heads meet when there is 
a problem. The West End Gang – i.e. the Irish ‘mafia’ – 
remains notoriously associated to the port, even though 
there is considerable proof that they lost ground. Many 
operations have targeted specific groups: Project 
Printemps in 2001 and Sharq in 2009 against the Hells 
Angels; Project Boeuf against the West End Gang in 2002; 
Project Colisee in 2006 against the Italian mafia; and 
Project Magot-Mastiff in 2015-2016 against the various 
heads of the different groups, including Italian mafia.  
 
B. Even though no-one really ‘controls’ the port, individuals 
close to Italian organised crime seem to have imposed 
themselves and gained enough authority over other 
groups active on the port – including individuals close to 
the so-called West End Gang of Irish-descent. As 
containers are less and less likely to be opened in the 
port, all is needed are 2 or 3 people who check on the 
container for a couple of days or as long as needed and 
make sure that the container goes on the right truck. 
Whoever wants to use the port needs to pay for access 
to known characters close to Italian organised crime and 
the West End Gang. They can 1) offer information on 
how the dock works on a daily basis and 2) control the 
smoothness of the operation as said above. Failure to do 
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so might result in consequent intimidation and 
retribution.  
 
C. In all of these projects, corruption of border or customs 
agents at the port (and at the airport) or involvement of 
dock workers was one of the doors to bring in cocaine 
and cannabis into Montreal, among other mechanisms of 
smuggling (via plane or truck). In Colisee, for example, 
the organisation was found to have “the services of a 
corrupt customs officer providing them with pre-stamped 
customs declaration cards and customs codes, all to 
ensure the transportation of narcotics by human 
couriers”82. 
 
D. From the port perspective importations are an open 
business, anyone with a ‘door’ can use the port for ‘new 
jobs’. From the city perspective, drug importations 
especially cocaine, are more difficult for newcomers. 
Cocaine trafficking and importation offences have 
increased of 7% in 201883. It is a free market but it’s 
controlled by a couple of individuals who have influence 
over some key markets. This is because, whereas 
importation is up to whoever has the money to finance it 
 
82 Cour Du Québec Sa Majesté La Reine V Arcadi, Francesco Del Balso, 
Francesco Giordano, Lorenzo Renda, Paolo Rizzuto, Nicolo Sollecito, Rocco, 




and the door to import it, distribution is more controlled 
by the various groups in the city, through a couple of 
influential key figures.   
 
E. Availability of cocaine in the city has increased, but port 
seizures and the centrality of port in general for 
importation have decreased. The quality of cocaine is 
higher (over 85% purity, when brought by ‘reliable’ 
importers, so that it can be cut afterwards and arrive 
20/30% purity on the street). 
 
F. When law enforcement attempts disrupt and dismantle 
routes or criminal groups who were using the port, by 
affecting their modus operandi, there is an expectation 
that another modus operandi will emerge, but it might 
not be about the port anymore. In particular, not all 
groups in Montreal will use the port of Montreal, as 
much as groups who might use the port of Montreal (as 
they have a door there) might not be from Montreal. A 
group based in Montreal might find it easier and safer to 
try a ‘door’ in Vancouver and move drugs from 
Vancouver to Montreal on the road. This is also why, for 
border protection federal police teams, intelligence 
(about containers and their movements cross borders) is 
run centrally in Ottawa and disseminated across the 
various states and provinces separately.  
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G. In Montreal, there are two main scenarios to import 
drugs, especially cocaine, equally available, depending 
on how much money is there for the importation and 
how much risk the importer is willing to take.  
 
1. Scenario no.1 - dubbed by analysts, the ‘pizza 
delivery’ scenario. This is more likely to happen 
with brokers who are in direct contact with 
traffickers, from Colombia and from Mexico for 
example, who can bear the risk of the delivery 
themselves. In this case, the cost of the delivery 
increases as the traffickers and the brokers 
handle all the logistics and the risks of finding the 
‘door’ to smuggle the drugs in. The importers 
need to pay for the whole ‘job’, including delivery 
costs, usually for at least a half of the total 
upfront.  
 
2. Scenario no.2 – dubbed by analysis the ‘pizza 
collection’ scenario. In this scenario, the 
financiers of the job will pay brokers expenses, 
but the collection is handled by someone else and 
therefore the risk is handled differently by the 
financiers. In this case the payment might be after 
collection, if the financiers are strong enough and 




Other illicit trade 
 
As noticed by a report from 2011 for Public Safety 
Canada84 escalation in the manufacture, importation, and 
distribution of counterfeit consumer products internationally in 
recent years has also impacted Canada. Vancouver port seems 
to be more affected than Montreal in this case, due to the 
proximity with China and South-East Asia were most of this 
traffic seems to originate.  In Canada, generally, like illegal drugs 
and precursor chemicals, shipping containers are used to 
smuggle large quantities of counterfeit articles, including 
contraband cigarettes and multiple other consumer products 
(from pharmaceuticals, to clothing, to brands).  
Like in other ports, also in Montreal there is concern over 
illegal waste disposal and trafficking, mostly to Western Africa. 
Outbound checks are confirmed to be virtually non-existent. 
Toxic waste, e-waste and other un-declared waste are 
problematic to detect in containers, notwithstanding the 
technical capacities available. As noticed by the Port Authority, 
this also relates to the capability that technology has to identify 
risk cargo in this field. In fact, available technology cannot 
penetrate the dense substances (such as concrete and tungsten) 
used to contain and shield nuclear or radiological materials. 
 
84 Presidia Security Consulting (2011) Economic sectors vulnerable to 
organized crime: marine port operations. Prepared for Research and 
National Coordination Organized Crime Division Law Enforcement and 
Policing Branch Public Safety Canada, Ottawa 
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Radiation-based technology cannot be used to scan food, plant 
or animal cargo.  
Among the topics discussed in the course of this project 
two other illicit trades through the port of Montreal have been 
flagged as interesting, both outbound: auto/vehicles theft and 
shipment; and food products frauds and shipments. This, 
obviously, does not mean that other ‘traditional’ illicit trades, 
such as counterfeit goods or tobacco are not of interest for this 
port and its authorities; rather their incidence in the last years 
has been on trend with other countries’ experiences.  
 
I. Auto/vehicles theft/shipment: this relates to the 
outbound shipment, via containers, of stolen cars or 
other vehicles destined usually to African or Middle 
Eastern destinations. It is usually a trade-based money 
laundering scheme involving the purchase of used cars 
and other vehicles for shipment and sale abroad, with 
funds provided by banks, currency exchanges, and 
individuals associated with a variety of organised 
criminal groups. According to the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada, a car is stolen every 6 minutes in Canada and 
auto theft has been on the rise85, even though police-
reported motor vehicle theft rates have been stable 
between 2018-201986.  
 




The CBSA warns that the shipment of stolen cars, or 
boats, or other vehicles remains a priority. But it is 
underestimated by law enforcement agencies. Without 
quick police investigations on the networks behind those 
shipment and without confirmation that the cars have 
been indeed stolen, it is difficult to hold the vehicles and 
avoid their shipment altogether. There is indeed a 
problem with investigating this type of criminality as 
competence of police forces in this field is unclear 
(between federal and state) and resources to investigate 
crimes who also are unlikely to result in a clear sentence 
are scarce. This type of illicit trade requires forged 
documents and stolen identity of existing import/export 
companies to register fraudulently the luxury vehicles 
and export them to Africa (usually via Europe, primarily 
Italy and Belgium) or Middle East and Asian countries 
(usually through Vancouver or North American ports). 
Behind these criminal activities are a variety of criminal 
networks, some of whom are linked to Russian-speaking 
and Eastern European organised crime groups, even 
though the majority remain local offenders.  
 
II. Food products fraud and shipment: this relates to 
(low/inferior quality) food products that are shipped by 
means of fraudulent activities. The following scenario has 
been offered as an example of such fraudulent activity, 
involving multiple layers of illicit gains: 
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a. A front man for an organised crime figure in 
Montreal buys good quality chicken in the USA, 
spending less than they would in Canada. 
b. When they bring it to the border, they pay duties 
on it; they then show paperwork to demonstrate 
that the chickens are going to be exported 
outside of Canada, only passing through the Port 
of Montreal and then going to Africa. Thus, taxes 
and duties are reimbursed. 
c. The good quality chicken is sold in Canada 
through a black-market network, in restaurants 
or supermarkets. 
d. Garbage pieces of chickens or other low 
quality/cheaper chickens are shipped to the 
initially declared Africa destination where other 
profit is secured by previously arranged 
brokerage.   
The main fraudulent activity here is considered to be tax 
and duty evasion, even though there are a number of 
other chained activities also illegal that could potentially 








Aside from the examples of corruption that were 
described above as enablers of illicit trade, corruption in the port 
of Montreal, as tool and manifestation of organised crime 
infiltration, has been flagged up in various occasions during this 
project as an ongoing and systemic concern for the Port of 
Montreal. In particular, conversations related to the known 
involvement of some longshoremen and checkers in the 
commission of criminal activities by organised crime groups, as 
well as to the involvement of some customs and border agents 
as well. While criminal involvement and responsibilities remain 
an individual choice, the port system overall is deemed to be 
criminogenic. A report by Senate Standing Committee on 
National Security and Defence87 in 2007 reported that  
 
“It is about time to get serious about the degree of 
corruption and vulnerability at our seaports. There seems to be 
a level of comfort among labour unions, the business community 
and port authorities with the way things are done now. 
None of them seem anxious to reform a system that is 
currently providing plenty of income for everyone – including 
crooks. All those people should wake up to the fact that their 
house of cards is likely to come tumbling down if one nasty 
container gets through. The Committee is convinced that all 
 
87 Canadian Security Guide Book (2007) An Update of Security Problems in 
Search of Solutions – SEAPORTS Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence 
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workers at Canada’s seaports should require security 
clearances”. 
 
The Senate Standing Committee on National Security and 
Defence, in 200288, reported on police estimates: at the port of 
Montreal, 15% of stevedores had criminal records, as did 36.3% 
of “checkers,” who go over manifest lists for cargo containers, 
and fully 54% of the employees of a company with the contract 
to pick up garbage, do minor repairs and operate the tenders 
servicing ships moored in open water outside the harbour. The 
committee reported that the union that supplies dockworkers 
appeared closed to outsiders; applicants must be sponsored by 
current union members, “who are sometimes members of crime 
families and their friends,” the report states.  
 
The Port of Montreal now requires that truckers with 
Transport Canada security clearance have their fingerprints 
scanned upon entry, as the first Canadian port to comply with 
Transport Canada’s Marine Transportation Security Clearance 
Program (MTSCP). In Montreal, the same program applies also 
to law enforcement at the port including CBSA. The program was 
introduced since 2004 and generally applies to workers in the 






certain restricted areas89. Notwithstanding the curbing on 
corruption as tool to serve organised crime’s interests on the 
waterfront, there is still mistrust towards both customs/border 
agents and longshoremen/checkers, both from management in 
the same institutions and from outsiders. The security clearance 
process is often seen as intrusive from both the longshoremen 
and the CBSA’s perspectives as the level of information collected 
and then shared might represent yet another vulnerability of the 
system.  
 
Aside from the attempts to curb corruption as enabler 
and facilitator of organised crime, Montreal’s history with 
corruption in the legal economy and with systemic forms of 
collusion as well, gives interesting insights into the possibility of 
corruption as autonomous activity also at the port, for what 
relates to construction, infrastructure maintenance and 
obviously services and governance of the port space. In fact, 
since the Charbonneau Commission published its report in 2015 
and UPAC’s (Unité Permanente Anti-Corruption) investigations 
started getting stronger, investigations on corruption and 
collusion in Montreal have received unprecedented interest. The 
Charbonneau Commission (officially the Commission of Inquiry 
on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in the 
Construction Industry) was a public inquiry in Quebec (2011-





in the management of public construction contracts. The 
commission was also set to paint a portrait of activities involving 
collusion and corruption in the provision and management of 
public contracts in the construction industry (including private 
organisations, government enterprises and municipalities) and 
to include any links with the financing of political parties. UPAC 
was also established by the government of Quebec in 2011, to 
coordinate the efforts of six teams, including the Charbonneau 
Commission. Another effect of the Charbonneu Commission has 
also been the strengthening of the Autorité des marchés publics 
(AMP) for Quebec and the establishment, in 2014, of the Bureau 
de l’inspecteur général de la Ville de Montréal (BIG). The two 
bodies have similar jurisdictions (even though the AMP’s one is 
more extensive) and they both have mandates to oversee the 
public procurement processes and contracts in Montreal and in 
Quebec.  
 
During the Charbonneau Commission one of the 
witnesses, former construction executive Lino Zambito90, 
brought evidence of a conspiracy involving Robert Abdallah 
related to his influence (alleged bid-rigging) over the choice of 
contractors during his time at the City of Montreal. Other 
allegations were about an agreement to push for Abdallah as 
 
90 Zambito is the former owner of the Infrabec construction firm. He 
pleaded guilty in 2015 to fraud and offering bribes in connection to a rigged 
process to build a water-treatment plant in the Montreal bedroom 
community of Boisbriand. He is better known, however, as a whistle-blower 
who exposed Quebec’s system of corruption. 
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head of the Port Authority of Montreal. Robert Abdallah was the 
director-general of the city of Montreal from 2003 to 2006. In 
2007, Mr. Abdallah was the Conservative government's favoured 
candidate to become the president of the Montreal Port 
Authority. Former prime minister (2006-2015) Stephen Harper’s 
former spokesman, Dimitri Soudas, discussed Mr. Abdallah's 
candidacy with many people in government in 2007, including 
the board of directors of the Montreal port, who was the 
ultimate decision maker on the matter. The board eventually 
decided for another candidate. There was no interference 
proven in any court, even though rumours of an RCMP 
investigation surfaced at the time, but these allegations are 
problematic for a number of reasons that have to do with the 
proximity of Abdallah to individuals and companies that were 
heavily involved in the findings of the Commission. The relevant 
events and considerations relating to these allegations can be 
summarised as follow, according to reconstructions from the 
Charbonneau Commission transcripts, reports91 and the 
narratives from some of the participants.  
i. There is proof that Mr Abdallah has travelled to 
Barbados, where he also resided, with Mr Tony Accurso 
– one of the entrepreneurs that in that period (2003-
2006) had the highest amount of contracts for public 
work with the city council with his three main companies. 
This trip was not an isolated fact, as they also travelled to 
 
91 Rapport de la Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats 
publics dans l’industrie de la construction, Tome 2, Récit de faits 
 129 
the Caribbeans and, in 2006, to Las Vegas together with 
Mr Frank Zampino, the president of the executive 
committee of the city council. A lot of the expenses in 
these trips were paid by Mr Accurso, notwithstanding the 
clear guidance to which Mr Abdallah and Mr Zampino 
were both subjected, as employees of the City, not to 
accept any type of present or payment by actors who had 
any commercial or business dealings with the city. The 
friendship between Accurso and Abdallah – that 
consisted of attending each other family gatherings and 
also travelling together - pre-existed his nomination to 
the city council, as the two had met in the 1980s when 
Accurso inherited Construction Louisbourg that had 
contracts with Hydro-Quebec, managed by Adballah.  
ii. After the trip to Vegas in 2006, the mayor Gerald 
Tremblay is informed of the ‘friendship’ with Accurso and 
asks for his resignation. After he quits the city Mr 
Abdallah becomes president of Gastier MP, one of 
Accurso’s enterprises. This one of various appointments 
of public managers into companies that had had 
contracts with the city.  
iii. In this context, when Mr Abdallah became a candidate 
for the port authority job, the influence of Accurso 
seemed to plausible. An audio recording surfaced 
purporting to be the voices of Accurso and another 
Montreal construction executive discussing how Soudas 
(the prime minister’s spokesperson) and his friend Leo 
Housakos could help get Abdallah appointed in 2007. 
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Housakos, who is referred to as "Leo" throughout the 
recording, was appointed to the Senate in 2009, which 
corresponds to what referred by Zambito to the 
Commission. 
iv. Mr Tony Accurso has been convicted to 4 years in prison 
in 2018 on five charges92: conspiracy to commit acts of 
corruption, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud of over 
$5,000, municipal corruption, and aiding in a breach of 
trust. Accurso was accused of being part of a system of 
corruption that eliminated all competition for municipal 
contracts in Laval (a city at the outskirts of Montreal) 
between 1996 and 2010. Mr. Accurso’s firms were also 
convicted of tax fraud. 
v. Mr Frank Zampino - second-in-command at Montreal city 
hall from 2002 to 2008 was arrested on corruption and 
fraud-related charges in 2012 related to the sale of the 
city-owned land known as Faubourg Contrecoeur, but 
was acquitted in the case in 2018. He was again arrested 
in 2017 following a UPAC-led investigation into the city’s 
water-meter contract that broadened into an 
investigation into political financing. Together with 
Zampino, also Robert Adballah was involved in the UPAC 
raids, for their alleged involvement in a scheme to hand 
out municipal contracts to engineering firms in return for 
political financing, kickbacks and other benefits. 
 
 
92 Accurso c. R., 2018 QCCA 1144; Accurso c. Charbonneau, 2014 QCCS 2108 
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To complete this very complex set of facts and series of 
events, Mr Accurso acknowledged to the Commission having 
had ties with senior members of the Italian Mafia in Montreal, 
describing Vito Rizzuto and his son Nick Jr – both deceased and 
both considered without any doubts as heads of the Montreal 
Italian mafia – as "minor contacts" in his wide business network. 
A rival of Mr Accurso in the construction industry said that 
Accurso was actually using mafia ties whenever he needed any 
dispute settlement.  
The Charbonneau Commission in fact did argue that 
members of the Rizzuto clan were enlisted to settle disputes 
among construction companies over contract bids and also 
collected cash from them. Nick jr Rizzuto was shot in 2009. Vito 
Rizzuto was subpoenaed to testify at the Charbonneau inquiry, 
but died of lung cancer in 2013 before he could appear. 
Operations like Project Colise, which heavily affected the 
criminal endeavours of the Rizzuto clans and associates, did 
provide the Commission for a good starting point to essentially 
understand that a number of enterprises with public contracts 
in the city of Montreal did have mafia links – they did use mafia 
protection to organise the market and settle unfair competition 
rules. In particular, and in relation to this project, Vito and his 
son Nick jr were implicated by the Commission in the 
construction of 1000 de la Commune, a project that transformed 
an old cold-storage warehouse of the Port of Montreal – just 
outside the fenced part of the port starts in front of the Santi-
Laurent river, at the end of the Old Port area – in a series of 
luxury condos. The Commission found that: 
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▪ A number of other entrepreneurs were implicated in the 
dossiers of 1000 de la Commune. When the SVPM (a 
federal company, Société du Vieux-Port de Montreal) 
launched the call for tenders, Construction Gescor and 
HarbourTeam of brothers Tony and Alberino Magi win 
the bid and coordinate with a fiduciary for a necessary 
warranty on the works. Some financial difficulties delay 
the works until the fiduciary calls back their guarantees.  
▪ Another entrepreneur, Mike Argento, offers to help the 
Magis, by involving the Rizzuto family. Vito Rizzuto uses 
his contacts and facilitators in the financial services and 
in particular Jonathan Myette. They agree to help Magi 
with the project and get half of its revenue afterwards. 
Rizzuto agrees to act as the enforcer against Magi to 
make sure he falls in line. This is 2002. 
▪ In 2007 a unit of the building was bought by one of the 
companies of entrepreneur Giuseppe Borsellino to resell 
it in 2010.  
▪ In between 2007 and 2010 the property was shared with 
the director of FTQ-Construction who was also sharing 
the business with Raynald Desjardins, a very notorious 
organised crime member, close to the Rizzuto as much as 
other criminal groups in the city, including the Hells 
Angels.  
▪ Desjardins was given an apartment and a garage in the 
building without paying anything for it.  
▪ When in 2009 Borsellino is assaulted by three strangers 
at one of his companies, that was a message delivered by 
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people close to Desjardins and the Rizzuto: the 
intimidation message was to have the entrepreneur 
keep quiet about the nature of the business that – he had 
learned – was ongoing in that building. 
▪ Tony Magi was killed at the beginning of 2019. It was not 
the first attempt to his life (as he had been hospitalised 
in 2008 following a shooting). He had entered in business 
with Nick Rizzuto Jr over a construction project before 
Nick Jr was killed in 2009 near Magi’s company. Magi was 
rumoured to have played a part in Nick Jr’s murder. There 
is an attempt to Magi’s wife’s life in 2011 alongside 
different problems to people working for him. When in 
2019 he is killed no one is surprised as newspaper link the 
events to the proximity, and animosity with the Rizzutos. 
 
Research notes and emerging themes 
 
The following themes have emerged from research 
fieldwork and notes as deserving of further attention and 
scrutiny, in no particular order: 
 
A. The drug trade through the port of Montreal does not 
necessarily mirror the drug trade in the city of Montreal: 
other ports, such as Halifax or even Vancouver or New 
York are often preferred to Montreal. 
B. The modus operandi of a criminal group will determine 
which is the most important person for a drug 
importation, through the port or in other ways. This will 
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be the person holding the most crucial function with a 
degree of discretionary power. The criminal analyst 
needs to be able to see which organisation is using which 
person that could also be used by other organisations as 
providing a door. 
C. The increase use of other methods to ship illicit 
products, including drugs, precursors and 
pharmaceuticals into Quebec and Montreal have 
brought to a decrease of the use of containership for 
illegal trades. Other methods of shipment include boats, 
smaller vessels, yachts, postal/courier systems (which 
seem also liked to an increase in the use of online drug 
resellers through the dark web).  
D. The port is considered unreliable by criminal groups, as 
the risks associated to losing the shipment, having the 
container intercepted or delayed are to high. Security 
measures, as in other ports, seem to have had a 
displacement effect on the methods of drug supply.  
E. Leveraging the dark web and postal/courier systems for 
trafficking of illicit substances has created numerous 
challenges for supply reduction and interdiction efforts, 
which seems to have taken away the focus from the port.  
F. CBSA thoroughly inspects about three per cent of 
containers that roll through the port. Even when 
screening devices scan each container, there is a limit in 
the type of commodities they can identify. Inspections 
are only done when intelligence suggests something is 
wrong with the container and there is a very high 
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likelihood, if not certainty, that the containers carries 
illicit substances.  
G. Canada legalised the use of cannabis in 2018; it is too 
early to judge the full extent of the changes in the 
market. However, the trends confirm that the black 
market is still ongoing, as criminal groups operate by 
undercutting government’s supply and taxes. The price 
of cannabis, overall has gone down.  
H. The legacy of the Charbonneau Commission and the 
current works of the UPAC has left a profound scar in the 
trust system of the city of Montreal. With new plans for 
the port of Montreal to expand beyond the territory of 
Contrecoeur, the level of attention by the different 
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The Port of New York and New Jersey runs across 40 km 
(across 17 counties) along the New York–New Jersey Harbour 
Estuary, which runs along 1,050 km of shoreline in the vicinity of 
New York City and north-eastern New Jersey. It is the busiest 
port of the East Coast and third of the USA for tonnage, following 
only Los Angeles and Long Beach, in California.  
New York Harbour has six container terminals in New 
York City (Staten Island and Brooklyn), Jersey City, Newark and 
Elizabeth. With 34 terminals93 and 7,1 million TEUs (2018)94, the 
port is the busiest containership of the East Coast. The port 
receives the most first port of calls, 72%, more than any other 
East Coast port. Its most relevant partner is China (27% of trade), 
followed by India, Germany and Italy. Even though commonly 
associated to the city of New York, the majority of trade in the 
port is actually in New Jersey and especially in Port Elizabeth. The 
decline of business in Brooklyn and Staten Island – since the 
1980s - has been associated to geographical conditions – i.e. the 
capability of other terminals to receive larger and deeper ships 
– as well as investments in the development of infrastructures 
and political choices by the Port Authority. According to its 
website, enterprises involved with the port support 400,000 jobs 





the port generates close to $8.5 billion in federal, state and local 
tax revenues95. 
There are six container terminals in NY/NJ port. The port 
is a landlord port run by Port Newark Container Terminal, Maher 
Terminals and APM Terminals in Port Elizabeth, GCT New York 
LP Terminals in Staten Island, GCT Bayonne LP Terminals in 
Jersey City and Red Hook Container Terminals in Brooklyn.96 
Over the Hudson River it was not always easy to manage the 
jurisdiction of land and water between the two states of New 
York and New Jersey on which the estuary is naturally located. 
In 1921, with the creation of the Port of New York Authority, the 
port district became a bi-state business. 
 
Policing and Security Authorities 
 
 All levels of government and private companies are 
responsible for different activities and areas of the port. The Port 
Authority – which is also responsible for the region’s airport and 
other real estate (i.e. World Trade Centre) – has its own police 
force and an inspector general office. The port police of the Port 
Authority - overseen by the Office of the Inspector general – is 
responsible for daily security at New York Harbour, where each 
terminal implements their own security protocols as well. Other 
agencies, such as the US Coast Guard, the Waterfront 
Commission, US Customs and Border Protection and US 
 
95 https://www.panynj.gov/port/en/our-port/facts-and-figures.html  
96 https://www.panynj.gov/port/containerized-cargo.html 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement regulate access of goods 
and people, while New York Police Department, Federal Bureau 
of Investigations and Drug Enforcement Administration all have 
ad-hoc access to the terminals when needed during their 
policing operations. In particular, US Customs and Border 
Protection is tasked with the integration of security into the 
commercial operations of the port. For the purposes of this 
research the following authorities have been involved: the 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbour (field visits and 2 
collective interviews); Federal Bureau of Investigations-NY field 
office, (Transnational Organised Crime, 1 collective interview); 
Drug Enforcement Administration-NY (1 collective interview); 
New York Police Department (Criminal Enterprise Unit, 1 focus 
group); Port Authority of NY and NJ (Office of the Inspector 
General, 1 collective interview); US Customs and Border 
Protection-NY and NJ (1 focus groups with field visit); New Jersey 
Police Department, Homeland Security (NJ-Transnational 







 In the past couple of years, the trends of drug seizures in 
the US overall show important rises. According to overall figures 
by U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Air and Marine 
Operations (AMO), in Fiscal Year 2019, enforcement actions 
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resulted in the seizure or disruption of 284,825 pounds of 
cocaine, 101,874 pounds of marijuana, and 51,058 pounds of 
methamphetamine. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), in 
their 201997 national drug threat assessment, indicates that the 
availability of cocaine is high in NY and it has increased since 
2017-201898 when it was marked as moderate and stable. High 
– but not noticeably growing - is also the availability of 
marijuana; moderate and growing is the availability of 
Psychoactive Substances; high and worryingly growing is the 
availability of fentanyl; high and stable is the availability of 
heroin; moderate and stable is methamphetamine. The DEA 
report in both 2018 and 2019 analyse the networks and the 
distribution of illicit drugs across the US. In a city like New York 
this analysis is done by starting from the commodities and then 
understanding the groups behind it and their modus operandi. 
The DEA’s reflections on how the drug trade has developed in 
NYC can be summarised as follows: 
▪ All NYC-based gangs (Bloods, subsets of the Bloods – the 
city’s predominant gangs, MS-13, Trinitarios, Crips, and 
Latin Kings) traffic all available drugs, primarily 
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, and to a lesser extent, 
Controlled Prescription Drugs (CPDs). 
▪ Of the various criminal enterprises involved in the 






Generation Cartel (CJNG) - based in the city of 
Guadalajara in the Mexican State of Jalisco - is the most 
recently formed and is particularly active in NYC, 
together with other cartels (i.e. Los Zetas, Juarez). 
▪ Authorities have noticed the Dominican criminal groups 
dominate the mid-level distribution of cocaine and 
white powder heroin in major drug markets mainly in 
the Northeast United States, and control the wholesale 
distribution of heroin and fentanyl in certain areas. They 
also engage in street-level sales in select parts of the 
region. Illegal drugs destined for Dominican groups in the 
Northeast primarily arrive first in New York City, where 
the drugs are distributed throughout the greater 
metropolitan area, or routed to secondary hubs and 
retail markets in other regions. Dominican groups work 
in collaboration with foreign suppliers to have cocaine, 
heroin, and fentanyl shipped directly to the Northeast 
from Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. 
They are sourcing their fentanyl from Mexican 
traffickers, expanding the reach of both organizations. 
▪ As cocaine production in Colombia has resurged, 
increasing of almost 400% in the last 4-5 years, 
Colombian groups remain leaders in production and 
trafficking of cocaine. Cocaine is generally transported 
and stored in large quantities in remote areas of 
Venezuela and Ecuador until maritime or aerial 
transportation can be secured and shipments can 
proceed to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. 
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▪ The overall increased availability of cocaine in the United 
States might have led, in NYC, to a significant co-
occurrence of cocaine and fentanyl in overdose deaths.  
▪ The importation of these drugs to NYC differs in origin, 
network and obviously method of shipment. Smuggling 
techniques mostly include movement and concealment 
in vehicles, but also have included underground tunnels, 
maritime and air means, including speedboats, fishing 
vessels, semi-submersibles, private aircraft, and 
commercial air and sea cargo. Maritime importation, 
including commercial cargos through seaports, is still 
particularly frequent for cocaine.  
 
In 2018 546.5 lbs of cocaine have been seized in the port, 
according to the CBP. Dubbed as the second largest seizure of 
its kind in 25 years, on February 28 2019, approximately 3,200 
lbs of cocaine (approximately 1.5 tons), with an estimated street 
value of $77,000,000, was seized at the Port of New 
York/Newark in a joint operation involving U. S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), the New York Police Department (NYPD), 
and the New York State Police (NYSP). The shipment, just arrived 
from Colombia, was intercepted when the vessel, MSC Carlotta, 
stopped over in New York/Newark on its way to Antwerp, 
Belgium. It contained a legitimate shipment of dried fruit, whose 
seal looked like it had been tampered with. It is unclear whether 
the drugs were destined for the U.S., or meant to continue on to 
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Europe. According to the authorities involved, this seizure was 
one of the confirmative events that cocaine is back in large 
quantities on the streets of NYC and that what authorities can 
seize is a small portion of all the available cocaine. In fact, from 
NYC field office of the DEA start various investigations that lead 
to seizure elsewhere. Drugs might not seem to reach the port of 
NY/NJ but they do reach the city when smuggled through 
another entry point. For example, in June 2019, 16 tons of 
cocaine where seized in the port of Philapdephia carried by MSC 
Gayane, a 1,030-foot Liberian-flagged container ship. The 





What else can we learn from the drug trade and importation 
in New York/New Jersey? 
 
 
A. Traffickers seem to push to build an emerging customer 
base of users mixing cocaine with fentanyl. Even though 
fentanyl’s – an opioid - potent deadly effect (2 
milligrams) might however discourage some cocaine 
users, it might ‘hook’ others and decrease the price of 
some cocaine on the market, boosting competition. Or it 
might just be a mistake done by the dealers for lack of 
hygiene when cutting their drugs. Not just cocaine, but 
also and primarily heroin is often cut with fentanyl to 
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make it more potent, which has been a leading factor in 
America's opioid overdose epidemic. Indeed, the 
presence of fentanyl in the New York City drug supply has 
dramatically increased the number of overdose deaths, 
and fentanyl is now the most common drug involved in 
overdose deaths99. This might lead to high risk 
consumptions for occasional users not used to the 
substance in the first place. A public campaign across the 
city is still currently active100. 
B. There are still big players controlling some drug markets 
in the metropolitan area, but things have changed in 
terms of how the trades are managed. Trading in heroin 
is usually for capital accumulation, while cocaine is 
considered the stable business. 
C. A typical cocaine trafficker in NYC who used to receive 1 
kg of cocaine is now receiving 5 kgs - they all receive more 
than before. Everyone has jumped up on the supply 
chain. This is due to the increased availability of cocaine 
from producing countries. Additionally, the financers 
could be anywhere and not in NYC. 
D. In NYC, differently from cities like Montreal, Mexican 
cartels’ brokers are said to control the importation – in 
terms of methods of transportation - of cocaine; they 
 






can talk to any other organisation, including Colombian 
producers and Dominican distributors in the city. Other 
organisations get bulk drugs and then they distribute in 
their communities and networks. Distribution seems to 
remain ethnic-based. 
E. Chinese and Asian-based groups are involved in the 
management of proceeds of crime as they offer a 
guarantee system of money laundering to the traffickers. 
The traffickers receive its laundered money (with an 
increased charge for the risk) even in case of police 
seizures. This creates an insulation between the dealers 
and the traffickers and offers producers (e.g. in 
Colombia) to outsource the task of collecting money 
from the various traffickers too. This system is done 
mostly in NYC, but also for trafficking happening 
elsewhere, as NYC is the Mecca for the different aspects 
of the drug trade.  
F. LCN is still active in NYC – mostly beyond drugs. Young 
smart graduates of the different families, when it comes 
to drug, do the business like everyone else does it, 
including use of online technologies. Italian-American 
organised crime individuals are known to handle well 
the logistics of the drug trade. They have people that 
help divert things, they are involved with giving people 
access to different trades as their knowledge and 
reputation in the city remains superior to many other 
‘newer’ groups. 
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G. The volume of cargo through all the ports in the US is 
obviously huge and also from NY, there are so many leads 
on a single day that it becomes easy for importers to 
organise diversions and send authorities in the wrong 
directions.  
H. The links with Canada and also Canadian ports and 
Canadian mailing system even, which is more relaxed for 
trade relationships, is growing as a concern for what 
relates to the smuggling of the majority of drugs from 
Latin America. For example, smaller vessels can depart 
from Colombia to Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic, 
enter Mexico and cross over the border from Mexico to 
the US and proceed into Canada that way so the US 
receives trafficking/imports from Canada too to certain 
extents.  
I. When a container is hijacked and it is shipped by a 
legitimate company, it is quite intricate to understand 
where is the criminal organisation behind that shipment 
as there will be someone owning the business, more or 
less aware of the illicit trade, and someone financing the 
shipment, more or less in touch with the owner of the 
trade. The system is highly adaptable. 
 
 
Other illicit trade and the role of CBP 
 
The CBP is responsible for the port of NY/NJ territorially. 
This is to avoid also confusion over policing and security 
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responsibility. The more one scrutinises the port the more costs 
for legitimate businesses increase and the more crime gets 
displaced as observed also in other ports.  The merging of US 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) into the United State 
Department of Homeland Security on 1 March 2003 was one 
among many reactions by the US government to improve 
national security post 9/11. This change in organisational 
structure led to a change in the role of CBP. 
Most of the other illicit trades are approached from a 
fee-collection perspective, to avoid loss of revenues and duties.  
As it can take up to 8-10 hours to inspect a container, and 
obviously depending of what is found in the container (money, 
guns, drugs, counterfeit…), different agencies might compete to 
handle the cargo and detain the products (especially if it’s cash). 
CBP utilises predictive analysis, available technology, targeted 
enforcement, and the ability to rapidly readjust counter 
surveillance activities to affect and degrade the ability of 
criminal organisations to operate in a given environment. 
In the 9/11 aftermath one of the actions taken, the 9/11 
Commission Act, came into force on 3 August 2007. According to 
Section 1701, Container Scanning and Seals, under the Title XVII, 
Maritime Cargo of Public Law 110–53—AUG. 3, 2007 issued by 
the 110th Congress of the US on Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, “A 
container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not 
enter the United States (either directly or via a foreign port) 
unless the container was scanned by nonintrusive imaging 
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equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign port 
before it was loaded on a vessel by July 2012”.  
In October 2009, the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO)101 reported challenges to scanning 100 percent of 
U.S.- bound cargo at foreign ports. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) officials acknowledged that most, if not all foreign 
ports, would not be able to meet the July 2012 target date and a 
viable solution to meet the requirement was difficult to identify.  
In September 2013, GAO reported that CBP had not 
regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to cargo since 2005. 
GAO recommended that DHS periodically assess the security 
risks from ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the 
results to inform whether changes need to be made to Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) ports. CSI is a bilateral government 
partnership program operated by CBP that aims to identify and 
examine U.S.-bound cargo container shipments that are at risk 
of containing Weapons of Mass Destruction or other 
contraband. As part of the program, CBP officers are stationed 
at select foreign seaports and review information about US-
bound containerised cargo shipments. CBP estimates that, 
through the CSI program, it pre-screens over 80 percent of all 
maritime containerised cargo imported into the United States. 
In January 2015102, GAO found that CBP did not have 
accurate data on the number and disposition of each high-risk 
shipment scheduled to arrive in the United States. Specifically, 
 
101 https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-790t  
102 https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678249.pdf  
 149 
CBP’s data overstated the number of high-risk shipments, 
including those that appeared not to be examined or waived in 
accordance with CBP policy. CBP officers inconsistently applied 
criteria to make some waiver decisions and incorrectly 
documented waiver reasons. GAO recommended that CBP 
define waiver categories and disseminate policy on issuing 
waivers. In response, CBP issued a new policy that includes new 
criteria for waiving examinations of high-risk shipments and 
developed a new process for recording waivers and issued a 
memorandum. 
Overall, CBP, since its renewed mandate, has made 
substantial progress in implementing various initiatives and 
programs that, collectively, have enhanced cargo security, but 
some challenges remain. Examples of progress and challenges 
are generally in the areas of 
1. using information for improving targeting and risk 
assessment of cargo shipments 
2. partnerships with foreign governments 
3. partnerships with the trade industry. 
 
When it comes to other illicit trade beyond drugs, NY/NJ 
seems to behave like other ports. As for some other ports 
elsewhere, internal conspiracy is the name for ‘organised crime’ 
at play in the port. For internal conspiracy, rip or whip loads, 
smaller bags concealing illicit goods, are usually the key findings 
for customs, but larger loads have been more frequent. While 
rip loads are easier to handle also for CBP, it is often the case 
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that deep concealments will require deeper inspections in the 
warehouses.  
There were 137 seizures in 2018 from commercial vessels, 
and more than half of them were counterfeit products, in 
violation of intellectual property rights. Prohibited 
pharmaceuticals are usually sent through airmail but obviously 
some also come through more vessels. Prohibited firearms, and 
trafficked art as well might come through maritime routes. Also, 
like in other ports, agriculture enforcement regulations have 
caught garbage and environmental violations, also qualifying as 
waste trafficking and wildlife trafficking at times. The two most 
common methods of illegal export are mislabelling containers to 
conceal (e)waste and mixing (e)waste with a legitimate 
consignment, such as end-of- life vehicles, like in NY/NJ in other 
ports. 
In NY/NJ CBP carries out 4 types of inspections: Anti-
Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (ATCET) Inspection; 
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII); Agricultural Inspection: Trade 
Compliance Inspection. Automated Targeting System (ATS) is 
CBP database of incoming and certain outbound cargo and 
persons. Advanced screening information is added to the ATS 
and checked against intelligence data from CBP’s National 
Targeting Center (NTC) and other intelligence and law 
enforcement databases to produce a risk-based score. Cargo 
above a certain ATS threshold generally are selected for 
secondary inspection, but it is unclear how many outbound 
inspections are carried out in reality. The Outbound 
Enforcement Program is part of CBP’s effort to effectively 
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monitor and control the flow of goods and people leaving the 
United States. Recent figures103 show that illicit currencies and 
drugs are usually the targets of this program when it comes to 
cargo. Obviously, CBP the amount of these risk-based Outbound 
enforcement operations depends on the availability of officers 
and funding at each port and field division of the CBP. 
 
 
Infiltration in the legal economy, corruption and 
governance issues 
 
 Differently from other ports, in NY/NJ the most discussed 
topic during meetings, interviews and collective conversations, 
has been mostly related to corruption in the port and 
systemic/endemic manifestations of organised crime related to 
both the port economy and the port development. This 
obviously has to do with the spotlight that institutions, such as 
the Waterfront Commission, has been keeping on certain 
aspects of the port life in NY/NJ.  
 In particular three interconnected aspects have emerged 
in relation to this aspect of the research. 
 
I. The legacy of LCN and the relationship between 






There is a clear indication in the words and in the work of the 
Waterfront commission that the influence that certain organised 
crime networks - albeit evolved into different structures from 
what they were known to be – still persists and still affects the 
capacity of the port to function in a transparent manner. Also, it 
is the institutional opinion of the Waterfront commission that 
the mechanisms of corruption that were known to rule the 
workforce in the port, through the union (the International 
Longshoremen Association) have not disappeared, but mainly 
evolved into more pervasive and hidden forms of corruption and 
collusion. Various judicial cases collected, even when they are 
not as contemporary, show these mechanisms at play: these 
include extortions of union members and, through union 
members, of companies; loan-sharking to companies and 
individuals; bogus insurance claims and no-shows job cover up; 
intimidation. One among various others summarises some of the 
issues.  
 
 US v. Michael Coppola104.  
 
This case provided evidence of the Genovese family's 
criminal control over the Manhattan and New Jersey 
waterfronts generally, and over ILA Local 1235, in particular. 
Genovese family member George Barone, Genovese associate 
 
104 United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael Coppola, Defendant-
Appellant. Docket No. 10-0065-Cr. - United States Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit. Argued: May 20, 2011. Decided: February 14, 2012. 
 153 
Michael D'Urso, Gambino family member Primo Cassarino, and 
Lucchese family member Thomas Ricciardi testified that criminal 
“control” over the metropolitan area waterfront dated from the 
1950s, with an understanding between the Genovese and 
Gambino families that the Genoveses would influence and 
control unions and businesses operating on the Manhattan and 
New Jersey docks, while the Gambinos would influence and 
control unions and businesses operating in Brooklyn and Staten 
Island. When Barone was asked how such control was exercised, 
he replied, through "intimidation, fear, whatever" – the mafia 
method.  
Evidence showed that intimidation and fear was the 
common method used by the Genovese family to secure and 
maintain waterfront control. In the Manhattan-based ILA Local 
1804-1, control was eventually exercised by Coppola and his 
one-time Genovese captain, Tino Fiumara who was respected 
and feared by everyone – as testified by Local 1804-1 vice-
president Thomas Buzzanca in the case. The Genovese family 
used its influence of unions to dictate what businesses worked 
on the waterfront, by including and excluding any “ordinary guy 
wanted to go into the trucking business on the docks, or wanted 
to open up something on the docks”, as testified by D’Urso.  
Coppola was convicted on a two-count indictment charging 
him with substantive and conspiratorial racketeering in 
connection with his activities over three decades as an associate, 
soldier, and ultimately captain of the Genovese family. The 
pattern of racketeering through which Coppola was alleged to 
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have conducted and participated in the affairs of the Genovese 
family was charged in three predicate acts.  
Racketeering Act One is particularly interesting; it alleged 
conspiracy to extort, extortion, and wire fraud in connection 
with the Genovese family's control of ILA Local 1235. As for the 
extortion, between January 1974 and March 2007, Coppola and 
others obtained or conspired to obtain the property of Local 
1235 members both in the tangible form of “Local 1235 labor 
union positions, money paid as wages and employee benefits 
and other economic benefits that such Local 1235 union 
members would have obtained but for the defendant and his co-
conspirators' corrupt influence over such union” and in the 
intangible form of “the right of Local 1235 members to have the 
officers, agents, delegates, employees and other representatives 
of their labour organisation manage the money, property and 
financial affairs of the organisation”. The property was allegedly 
obtained with the consent of union officials "induced by 
wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence or fear".  
As to the wire fraud, between January 1974 and March 2007, 
Coppola and others devised a scheme to defraud Local 1235 
union members of (1) the same tangible property charged in the 
extortion scheme, and (2) intangible property in the form of "the 
right of the honest services of the Local 1235 Presidents".  
 In a typical mafia behaviour, the Genovese family was 
providing “through contacts (…), labour peace on the 
waterfronts where trucks were picking up containers”. In 
exchange for this peace, tribute payments were demanded from 
both waterfront businesses and unions, based on the earnings 
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that the company and the union made. In addition to monthly 
tribute payments, the Genovese family demanded 
"Christmases", special year-end payments. Also, the tributes 
paid by businesses were often channelled to the criminal 
enterprise through the union. 
 
 
With particular reference to Local 1235, evidence from 
various cases showed Genovese family control of that union for 
more than thirty years through three successive local 
presidents: Vincent Colucci, Albert Cernadas and Vincent Aulisi. 
Evidence also showed that the Genovese family exploited its 
control over waterfront unions to make union employment 
decisions. Barone testified that the Genovese family "sent word" 
to ILA president John Bowers to put Harold Daggett into a senior 
position with the union. The family then "told Daggett what we 
wanted him to do… If he didn't do it, we take him out." Barone 
testified that he personally secured union employment for 
numerous Genovese associates, for example positions at an ILA 
health care clinic for Coppola's brother and Cernadas' wife, 
among others. Due to his association with Michael Coppola, 
Edward Aulisi, a checker working at the Port, and son of former 
ILA Local 1235 President Vincent Aulisi, was barred from working 
at any port property since 2009. In 2010, Albert Cernadas, a 
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former president of ILA Local 1235 was arrested on federal 
charges of racketeering, extortion and conspiracy105.  
What the case against Cernadas et al. shows is that in the 30 
years before the charges were brought, a continuous 
mechanism where, for years, these high-ranking members of the 
ILA did conspire to “obstruct, delay and affect commerce, and 
the movement of articles and commodities in commerce, by 
extortion”, in that they agreed to obtain money from ILA union 
members, with their consent induced by wrongful use of actual 
and threatened force, violence and fear.  
 
II. The interests of organised crime and collusive networks 
over the port economy 
 
The port economy in NY/NJ is obviously particularly 
interesting for a number of different reasons that mostly have to 
do with contracts of services and commerce on the waterfront. 
In 2007 a civil RICO case against the ILA was filed and still has not 
been resolved106. The case detailed how ILA’s president, Harold 
Daggett, is allegedly an associate of Genovese family part of the 
"Waterfront Enterprise" - an alleged association-in-fact RICO 
 
105 United States of America v. Stephen Depiro, Albert Cernadas, Nunzio 
Lagrasso, Richard Dehmer, Edward Aulisi, Vincent Aulisi, Thomas Leonardis, 
Robert Ruiz, Michael Trueba, Ramiro Quintans, Salvatore Lagrasso, Anthony 
Alfano, Tonino Colantonio, John Hartmann, Giuseppe Pugliese, First 




enterprise that is comprised of the members of the Gambino and 
Genovese families operating on the Waterfront and their 
associates and co-conspirators in the ILA and other legitimate 
Waterfront organisations.  
 
 
 American Stevedoring, Inc. v. ILA et al.107  
 
In 2013, American Stevedoring Inc. filed a civil RICO lawsuit 
accusing the International Longshoremen’s Association, the 
ILA’s president and several others of forcing the company to sell 
its operations at the Port of New York and New Jersey. The case 
was before the court for two years. In 2015 the parties agreed 
and executed a settlement agreement after they went into 
mediation108. We can still look at the claim as an example of 
conduct among big players in the port environment.  
The defendants are presented together as an enterprise, 
including the ILA, the executive members of the ILA, the 
individual members of the ILA local unions ("Locals") and other 
 
107 American Stevedoring, Inc., Plaintiff V. – International Longshoremen's 
Association, Afl-Cio, Harold J. Daggett (President), Stephen Knott (General 
Vice President), Louis Pernice (Vice President), Nysa-Ila Pension Fund: 
Joseph Curt (Co-Chairman), Port Police and Guards Union (PPGU), John T. 
Oates (President), Paul Punturieri (Vice President), NYSA-PPGU Pension 
Fund, Michael Farrino, and Joseph Pollio, Defendants, Case 1:13-cv-00918-




ILA subordinate labor organisations, the trustees of the New 
York Shipping Association (NYSA)-ILA Pension Trust Fund, the 
Port Police and Guards Union (PPGU), the executive members of 
the PPGU, the individual members of PPGU Locals and other 
PPGU subordinate labor organisations, the trustees of the NYSA-
PPGU Fund and a few other individuals. The dispute related to 
American’s reluctant agreement in 2011 to sell its operations at 
the Red Hook terminal in Brooklyn and at Port 
Newark. American's operations were sold in September 2011 to 
Red Hook Container Terminal LLC. American claimed the ILA 
wanted to oust the company because it was unwilling to 
participate in “illegal and corrupt activities” including no-show 
jobs, loan-sharking and bogus insurance claims. 
American claims that the defendants acted in a pattern of 
racketeering activities including, among other things, the 
establishment of a syndicate linked to organized crime (the 
“Waterfront Group”). This case is ultimately about recovery of 
damages as a result of a particular scheme directed at American 
by the Waterfront Group, to oust American from its business 
conducted at the New York and New Jersey Ports. However, the 
claimant also affirms that the Waterfront Group had first 
attempted to coerce American to participate in racketeering 
activities, and then eventually retaliated against American when 
American refused to do so. The claim proceeds by listing and 
connecting all the dots among the individuals and structures of 
the Waterfront Group, their indictments or convictions for 
crimes and their association with organised crime and illicit 
activities, including illegal gambling, loan sharking, extortion, 
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labour racketeering, witness retaliation, mail fraud, wire fraud 
etc109.  
One of the main arguments in this claim is that notwithstanding 
the many convictions and investigations, and despite evidence 
of association with organised crime and racketeering activity, 
various high-ranking members of the ILA have been re-elected. 
In particular, American’s claim focused on the chief role of the 
President of the ILA, Harold Daggett in the scheme of the 
extortion and particularly in the pressure on American to sign an 
agreement with the Port Authority, by which American would be 
ejected from the Terminals, with control to be taken over by Red 
Hook Container Terminal LLC, a company favored by the 
Waterfront Group over American. Using the mechanism of a 
port-wide strike, the ILA planned to coerce the signature of the 
agreement and eventually succeeded.  
 
III. The difficulty of investigating and curbing corruption 
within and around the Port Authority. 
 
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) is 
a joint venture between the U.S. states of New York and New 
Jersey, established in 1921 to take care, initially of port 
commerce. Today the mandate of the Port Authority is 
considerably larger as it oversees much of the regional 
transportation infrastructure, including bridges, tunnels, 
 
109 Exhibit 2 of the claim - 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.407617.1.2.pdf  
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airports, and seaports, within the geographical jurisdiction of the 
Port of New York and New Jersey. The Port Authority is 
headquartered at the World Trade Center and is a member of 
the Real Estate Board of New York. At the port, the authority 
operates from Port Newark–Elizabeth Marine Terminal. The 
agency has its own 1,700-member Port Authority Police 
Department. 
On first glance to the media of the last years, it is quite 
obvious that the Port Authority has been connected to a number 
of scandals related to several key players, ‘power brokers’, in the 
political arena of New York and New Jersey. Some of these 
scandals stemmed from within the Authority, some others 
affected the functioning of the Authority. For example, in July 
2016, the former chairman of the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey, David Samson, pleaded guilty in a probe examining 
whether he used his office for personal gain. He was under 
investigation for nearly three years by federal prosecutors for 
trading official actions for the resumption of a direct flight by 
United Airlines from Newark Airport to Columbia airport, near 
his country home in South Carolina110. 
In 2018 a multimillion-dollar scandal related to the 
acquisition of government contracts through bribery and 
collusion111. Overall, 13 individuals and 9 companies were 
charged for engaging in three separate schemes involving 
 





bribery, business fraud, and political campaign contributions. 
For construction management companies, public works are 
highly-prized jobs, and any competitive edge in the bidding 
process could mean the difference in the award of a contract 
worth millions. The corrupted process involved several leading 
construction management companies and executives, and a 
mid-level government employee (Mr Ifeanyi Madu) whose leaks 
to the companies enabled hundreds of millions of dollars in 
fraud. Mr Madu, an employee with the New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), would offer 
confidential selection committee info, advance scopes of work, 
score sheets and cost estimates, in exchange for various 
benefits, including Broadway tickets, hotel stays, fine dining and 
millions of subcontracts for his companies. The case was handled 
by the Manhattan DA Construction Fraud Task Force in 
partnership with the Port Authority Inspector General’s Office.  
As construction is an evergreen industry for organised crime 
in NYC, other influences and attempts of collusion and 
corruption involving the Port Authority don’t surprise. For 
example, in April 2017, Vincent Vertuccio112, who has 
maintained a long affiliation with the Bonanno organised crime 
family of La Cosa Nostra, pleaded guilty at the federal 
courthouse in Brooklyn, New York, to conspiring to alter records 
for use in a grand jury investigation and to making and 





by a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York for conspiring 
to defraud the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey in 
connection with the One World Trade Center project located in 
lower Manhattan, as well as related money laundering and tax 
crimes. Vertuccio had hidden his control of Crimson 
Construction Corporation (Crimson) during the bidding process 
for the One World Trade Center project in light of his ties to 
organized crime and so as to hide taxable income that he 
received through Crimson. 
 
In 1992 the Port Authority of NY & NJ's Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) was set up to keep the agency corruption-free. 
The OIG detects, receives, and investigates allegations of fraud, 
corruption, and abuse with respect to employees, or other 
individuals or organisations doing business with the Port 
Authority. The OIG has attempted a number of strategies to curb 
corruption in the past decades, and many of these strategies are 
aimed at low level corruption, thus outside of the direct scope of 
this project. These strategies are prevention-oriented models 
including background checks of individuals and businesses to 
ensure integrity and also confirm that no-one with links with 
organised crime is engaging with the port authority. These 
integrity monitoring activities include vetting of contractors and 
subcontractors. This also includes companies working at the 
port, including those who get permits or leases from the 
terminal companies for renovation works or short-term 
engagements.  
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The OIG confirms the general impression of other 
institutions that the type of corruption that organised crime 
families engages in nowadays is individual and not systemic 
anymore. Rather than corruption a whole industry (for example, 
construction), a single individual or a company might be targeted 
for unduly influence by organised crime. It is unclear whether 
this is a case of evidence by absence or absence by evidence 
once more, considering some reflections shared by the NYPD on 
the pervasive nature of NYC crime families in traditional 




Research notes and emerging themes 
 
The following themes have emerged from research 
fieldwork and notes as deserving of further attention and 
scrutiny, in no particular order: 
 
A. In terms of trafficking, it is impressive to note the efforts 
that the USA put into outbound controls from abroad, 
through the Container Security Initiative. It is unclear, 
however, whether the same degree of care is exercised 
from within, as controls over outbound containers are 
essentially, like in other countries, an exception rather 
than a rule.  
B. It is maintained by media and other public sources, that 
the US is one of the main producers of electronic waste. 
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According to UNODC113, in the United States, the analysis 
of prosecutions for the illegal export certain types of e-
waste has revealed that the culprits are seemingly 
legitimate recycling firms. Usually, recycling firms tasked 
with disposing of e-waste in accordance with US law have 
to charge their clients for recycling fees. Some companies 
would sell the e-waste to brokers representing foreign 
buyers and shipped the waste to other countries, i.e. 
China, instead. The e-waste buyers in the East Asia and 
Pacific region are usually brokers and waste traders. 
Verifiable information on links between e-waste 
trafficking and other forms of transnational organised 
crimes is scarce, and it has not been discussed by any of 
the participants.  
C. Much of what happens around the Port of New 
York/New Jersey – in a similar fashion to other states – is 
about political and public management of the city of 
New York and the relationships among the elites also in 
the state of New Jersey. In particular the relevance of the 
port businesses can be seen impacting the following: 
a. The survival of the Waterfront Commission114, 









by high-ranking members of the ILA, and the 
NYSA. While for now plans to dismiss the agency 
seem under control, both ILA, NYSA and political 
supporters of this plan say the agency has 
become an impediment to economic growth.  
b. The recruitment process of workforce at the port 
has become a nodal issue as well. While the 
Waterfront Commission detains powers of 
scrutiny over new hires, the ILA is the one that 
proposes new hires and generally handles 
recruitment. The Commission's involvement in 
the hiring process for dock workers is seen 
unfavourably by both the ILA and the NYSA as it 
slows down processes and it interferes with 
business and contracts. Current trends in 
recruitment to understand the actual percentage 
of organised crime infiltration or attempt of 
infiltration that the Waterfront Commission 
detects in their checks needs to be monitored, 
and possibly strengthened, as it does not seem to 
have slowed down.  
c. The existence of big players in the local and bi-
state battles around the Commission, the trade 
unions’ networks, the Port Authority’s voice and 





surrounding the interests on the waterfront are 
concerning. That the Civil RICO case against the 
ILA has been pending since 2007 is one of the 
examples given of the difficulty to disentangle 
these networks of powers. Similarly, different 
conflict of interests – for example of politicians 
who also serve on the board of the NYSA or ILA 
high ranking members who donate to political 
parties who, in turn, support the ILA, also give 
reasons for concern. More generally, slowing 
down legal proceedings and abusing powers to 
impede progress on regulations and controls 
seem to be the used tactics.  
D. The role of the unions in the port and those dealing with 
the Port Authority (there are 22 unions normally 
engaging with the Port Authority) is extensive and as 
such is prone to being used and abused to reach positions 
of privilege and of mutual, particularistic, benefit. Even 
though links with organised crime and the unions have 
been largely curbed in the last decades, influence on 
essential and key positions is still not only possible but 
very likely. 
E. (Illegally) controlling a large industry is at times only a 
matter of controlling an essential service of that industry, 
by, for example, extracting monopoly profit. In the port 
of NY/NJ, control over the workforce, slowing it down or 
speeding it up, its contracts and conditions, has been 
considered historically a way to control the port. Even 
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though practices have evolved and the economy of the 
waterfront is now more complex than in previous years, 
this ‘mentality’ has been flagged as still enduring. Even in 
the complexity of the port economy, however, there are 
very few moving parts in the port economy – parts that 
do not depend from one another – in the port. While the 
trades are indeed global, the relationships and the 
workforce remain a local business and as such can be 














The Port of Liverpool sits on both banks of the River 
Mersey in a strategic point within the North West of the United 
Kingdom. The Port is 12.1 km long (7.5 miles) of dock system that 
runs from Brunswick Dock in Liverpool to Seaforth Dock, 
Seaforth, on the east side of the River Mersey and the 
Birkenhead Docks between Birkenhead and Wallasey on the 
west side of the river. The port runs through the River Mersey 
eastwards to and excluding Garston docks (in the city) and the 
Manchester Ship Canal; it includes, therefore, Seaforth, 
Bromborough & Tranmere. The port was extended in 2016 by 
the building of an in-river terminal at Seaforth Dock, name 
Liverpool2. The terminal, a £400m deep-water container 
terminal, can berth two 14,000 container Post-Panamax ships. 
This has doubled the container capacity of the port and made 
Liverpool one of the country’s best-equipped and connected 
terminals. In 2017, Liverpool was the UK’s fourth largest port by 
tonnage of freight, handling 32.5 million tonnes115, and this 
remained unchanged in 2018116- In 2018 as well, 6.7 thousand 
cargo vessels arrived in Liverpool in comparison to Dover which 







handling crude oil, RoRo, containers, agricultural products, oil 
products, coal, other dry bulk, ores, passengers, a total of 820 
thousand TEU were mobilised in Liverpool in both directions 
(415 thousand TEU outward and 403 thousand TEU inward 
traffic)117. Among the countries for inward trafficking into 
Liverpool are majorly the rest of the EU (which accounts for over 
40% of traffic), then USA, Canada, Argentina, Brazil118. The Port 
of Liverpool was a free port between 1984 and 2012. 
Port ownership in the UK falls into three categories: 
privately owned ports; trust ports; and municipal ports owned 
by local government authorities. Liverpool originally a trust port, 
but in 1971 in order to avoid bankruptcy the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board was corporatized as the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company (a mixed public-private sector company). In 
2005 the port was privatised and acquired by Peel Holdings. 
Many of the privatised ports have since changed hands again 
and now there are a handful of major port groups operating 
across the UK. Peel Ports Group now owns Liverpool1 and 
Liverpool2, the whole port of Liverpool and also employs the 
Port Police.  
 
 
117 UK major port freight traffic, by port and year (filter by direction and 
cargo type), from 2000 - https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-
sets/port-and-domestic-waterborne-freight-statistics-port#all-port-traffic-
totals-major-and-minor  





Policing and Security Authorities 
 
Probably due to the different governance setting of the 
ports in UK and Liverpool as well, the amount of available data 
to collect during the course of the project was inferior to other 
ports. A total of 8 meetings were held, in the form of collective 
interviews or individual interviews with: Merseyside Police – 
Organised Crime Unit, North Western Regional Organised Crime 
Unit, Security at Port of Liverpool (Seaforth), Port Police 
Liverpool (Peel Group), National Crime Agency – Intelligence 
Command, National Crime Agency – Drug Threat Assessment, 
Border Force Intelligence Command (Merseyside), Associated 








National and international authorities have identified routes 
and mobility mechanisms of drug shipments involving Liverpool 
port or Liverpool-based criminal networks over a much larger 
area than just Merseyside. Let’s consider some of the cases and 
events reported at the national and international levels. 
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 In March 2020, the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
reported119 that one of the “most wanted” fugitives in 
the UK – had been arrested in Operation Captura, which 
targets fugitives suspected to be hiding out among the 
UK national community in parts of Spain. The man, from 
Liverpool, is the alleged head of a cocaine trafficking 
group through Merseyside. On the most wanted list, 
there are other three men wanted for drug offences who 
are from Liverpool; their activities range from 
transportation and distribution of amphetamines in 
Scotland120, to cocaine importation together with Dutch 
groups121.  
 
 In December 2019 the NCA reported122 on the arrest of a 
man from Liverpool in the Netherlands, thanks to a 
European Arrest Warrant after 5 years on the run. The 
man is the alleged ringleader of an organised criminal 
network, thought to be behind the importation of 












Netherlands into the UK and also wanted for drug 
offences (conspiracy to supply class A and B drugs) by 
Merseyside Police.   
 
 In August 2019 Border Force seized more than 250 
kilograms of cocaine, after an investigation led to the 
interception of a yacht off the coast of Wales (escorting 
it to Fishguard port). NCA intelligence after cooperation 
with Spanish national police123 had identified the vessel, 
the Sy Atrevido, as carrying a large drugs shipment to the 
UK from South America. Around 750kgs of cocaine were 
found with a wholesale value of around £24 million and 
a potential street value of £60 million once cut. The 
operation led to the arrest of two people from Liverpool 
on board of the yacht and four others arrested later in 
Liverpool and Loughborough. It is believed the drugs 
were destined to the Merseyside area and they were 
coming from a seller in Mallorca, Spain124.  
 
 A case collected in Genova reported of a seizure of 100 
kgs of cocaine seized by Customs for the Direzione 









Pra’ – Voltri (VTE) in June 2019. The narcotics was found 
in a container transporting refrigerated transporting 
frozen fish - on the MSC Nuria – a ship built in 2008 and 
registered with the Panama maritime registry. MSC 
Nuria’s destination was scheduled for June 18th and it 
was the Port of Liverpool; the ship was coming from 
Montreal, Canada, from where it had left on June 10th. 
The frozen fish appeared to be destined to a commercial 
company in Milan, but it was unclear where the two 
hidde of cocaine were supposed to be offloaded and 
whether they were also destined to Milan.  
 
 In June 2018 400kgs of cannabis125, worth 4 million 
pounds, were seized at the Port of Liverpool and led to 
the arrest of seven men found on board of the ship. 
Border Force and NCA found the drug concealed in crates 
of lettuce on board the vessel Wec Vermeer arrived from 
Spain. The authorities kept the container under covert 
surveillance for three days to follow the importation and 
eventually made their arrest after following the 
container to industrial premises in Lancashire.   
 
 In July 2017, an investigation by The Times126 reported 







network that supported the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel 
(headed by convicted Joaquin Guzman, known as ‘El 
Chapo’) in bringing drugs into the UK, thanks to their 
capability to drive HGVs (Heavy Goods Vehicles) to 
import large amounts of cocaine into the UK on a weekly 
basis127. Through places such as Liverpool's docks and 
ports in Dover, Felixstowe and Harwich drugs transit to 
the UK from other European entry points (such as 
airports or ports in Belgium or Germany or the 
Netherlands or Spain). The investigation followed 
intelligence of NCA tracked UK-based criminals who had 
travelled to or established themselves in Mexico to 
facilitate the supply and transportation of drugs.  
 
 In 2015, the Irish Court of Appeal128 heard a case related 
to facts in 2008, when three people, sailing the yacht 
‘Dances with Waves’ outside of Irish territorial waters 
were found carrying cocaine weighing 1,504 kg. and 
valued at between €100 and €400 million. The suspect 
vessel was identified as a result of confidential 
information supplied to the Irish Joint Taskforce on Drugs 
(“JTF”) by the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre 
for Narcotics (MAOCN) in Lisbon, Portugal. The three 




128 Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Wiggins [2015] IECA 178 (31 July 2015) 
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2015/CA178.html  
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and subsequently confessed and were detained. The 
vessel had been registered in Liverpool. 
 
There are three emerging issues on data collection for the port 
of Liverpool: 
 
1. The port has a reputation as a drug hub but there are no 
clear figures available on how many seizures and/or drug 
importation are estimated through Liverpool docks, in 
the same way as there is no data on other ports. 
2. News – and also some cases collected for the other ports 
– mention Liverpool as the destination port or a middle 
point of arrival for the narcotics (seized elsewhere), but 
it is difficult to confirm some of these cases with other 
open data.  
3. National authorities – especially those based in London – 
confirm that criminality from Liverpool echoes over drug 
importations across the country.  
 
In connection to point one, it is worth remembering the 
statements from a European Parliament’s thematic report 
in 2012 that was looking at drug cartels’ links with criminal 
groups in Europe129. It must be reminded as well that up until 
 
129 Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money 
Laundering (CRIM) 2012-2013 - Thematic Paper on Organised Crime - Drug 
Cartels and their Links with European Organised Crime 
 177 
2012 Liverpool was a free port. The report confirms that 
Mexico’s drug cartels may have found a new route through 
the English port city of Liverpool for smuggling cocaine into 
Britain and the rest of Europe, working closely with local 
gangs to distribute the drug. According to the report, 
Liverpool port had become a hib for cocaine smuggling and 
a valid alternative to smuggling routes through West Africa 
and through Spain. In this new partnerships, criminal groups 
in Merseyside act to arrange transport to other key places in 
the UK.  
In connection to the third point, in a report on county 
lines intelligence in the UK130, the NCA has confirmed that 
the greatest number of county lines in the country continue 
to originate from the area covered by the Metropolitan 
Police Service – London - (approximately 15% of individual 
deal lines), followed by the West Midlands Police (9%) and 
Merseyside Police (7%) force areas. This confirms that 
groups from Merseyside and the nearby West Midlands 













What else can we learn from/about illicit trafficking and trade 
in Liverpool? 
 
I. There is a threshold of tolerability about what is 
supposedly going on around the port, through the port, 
of Liverpool. Investigations on internal threats are risk-
based, intelligence-based and discoveries are also 
random. Huge quantities of cocaine continue to be found 
– outside the port and around or in the city – but the 
price of cocaine has not gone up, which indicates that the 
market is saturated.  
II. Trends are confirmed also in Liverpool, regarding stolen 
vehicles across Merseyside and the Manchester area 
shipped out to western African routes through Liverpool 
port. There is suspicion related to a company arranging 
the outgoing containers and involved in this business 
across the whole of the UK.  
III. Counterfeit goods do constitute a concern because of 
the amount of money they involve, especially when 
goods are sold at the street level. These goods are 
necessarily coming through containers but it is difficult to 
track them before arrival. There seems to be a 
diversification of activities across criminal groups so that 
groups that previously were involved in drugs, or tobacco 
smuggling, are now engaged in contraband and 
counterfeit as it is less risky.  
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IV. The approach to detection and investigation remains 
more national than locally focused on Liverpool. There 
are differences in border threats at the North and the 
South of the countries, for illicit trade; in the North, 
including Liverpool, the focus remains on goods, in the 
South it is more on people and this affects resourcing. In 
Liverpool, in addition to cross-continent movements of 
containers, the trade with Ireland is a concern for Border 
Force.  
V. In terms of security, it seems more likely that contraband 
or drugs are coming to Liverpool docks through hijacking 
of legitimate companies’ legal routes of trade, rather 
than rip-on/rip-off that is instead displaced and would 
stand out on the premises of the port. Financial 
registration data collected for commercial intelligence 
can be used for security checks as well, but following up 
on what appear to be money laundering activities or 
other forms of economic crimes and frauds (through 
companies) is difficult to follow up with HMRC or other 
relevant authorities.  
VI. It is unconceivable for law enforcement that the type of 
criminality in and around Liverpool does not reach out to 
the port or port workers, who move different 
commodities, including illicit ones, and might benefit 
from one off payment if they are willing and capable. 
There is a perception, by local authorities, that 
Merseyside is still largely untouchable; if a gang from 
Manchester appears into Liverpool to buy stolen cars, a 
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feud is likely to erupt. This is likely to have echo over the 
port as well.  
VII. Local investigators, in Liverpool city and in Merseyside 
region, agree that a large part of Merseyside criminality 
stems from the port; first because of new business 
opportunities that will increase direct routes from North 
America, and second because of the importance of the 
trafficking networks through Merseyside for which 
criminality at the port was for a long time a badge of 
honour.  
VIII. International investigations, especially in large 
European ports (i.e. Antwerp and Rotterdam) confirm 
that in many cases intercepted shipments were directed 
to the UK, thus also confirming that there are less direct 
routes of illicit trades to the UK and Liverpool than there 
are indirect ones. Whenever a shipment is intercepted 
outside of the UK, national law enforcement in Liverpool 
expects some backlashes in the city.  
IX. Available intelligence on current illicit trades, especially 
drugs, does not provide much insight on the connection 
between traffickers and importers from and through 
Liverpool. The networks appear completely diffused. 
Intelligence actually shows that importers are often 
outside of the UK, in jurisdictions that might be difficult 
to reach, i.e. Thailand or other Asian countries, and with 
expat communities that protect them. Often, there are 
suspicions about corrupted officials in foreign ports that 
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support some of the trafficking networks of these 
individuals into the UK, including Liverpool.  
 
 
Infiltration in the legal economy, corruption and 
governance issues 
 
 There was no indication of any case of corruption nor 
illicit governance as the ones described for the other ports in 
this report. The issues with governance at the port of Liverpool, 
with some sort of echo for security and policing of organised 
crime are related – to a minor extent - to the reputation of the 
owners and the companies at the port on one side and – to a 
larger extent – to the post-Brexit scenario and the proposal to 
establish 10 free ports in the UK, including Liverpool, since 
2021. 
 
Peel Port and port economics 
 
The complexity of the private governance in Liverpool, 
de facto in the hands of Peel Group, has raised a number of 
questions related to the power and accountability linked to a 
conglomerate that has hundreds of subsidiaries and increasing 
economic power over the region132. The problem with 
 
132 ExUrbe, 2013, “Peel and the Liverpool City Region: Predatory Capitalism 
or Providential Corporatism.” 
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overlapping public and private interests also poses questions 
around transparency133. An infrastructure, transport and real 
estate investment group, Peel owns holdings in land and 
property, transport (including ports and airports), logistics, 
retail, energy and media (MediaCityUK, home of the BBC in 
Salford). ExUrbe, a think-thank that operated in Liverpool in 
2013 called for more scrutiny over Peel Group around the 
following aspects134: 
▪ its financial arrangements; 
▪ the extent and complexity of its corporate structure; 
▪ its experience and ‘track record’ on delivering major 
development projects; 
▪ the credibility of the evidence it produces in-house or 
via paid consultants to support its causes; 
▪ the power of its PR machine. 
 
Called one of the most secretive companies in the UK135, Peel 
Group obviously faces some of the vicissitudes of all big 












Peel has attracted criticism for using the Isle of Man, a low-tax 
jurisdiction, as its base for the holding company137, but the 
accusation has not led to anything concrete, if not a stronger 
statement by the group over the commitment to not engage in 
any contract that might lead to avoidance of taxes138.  
 
In November 2019139, Peel Ports agreed a 15-year contract 
extension with ACL (Atlantic Container Line) on container and ro-
ro operations at the Port of Liverpool, until 2035, marking ACL’s 
confidence in the growing volume of transatlantic trade 
between the UK and North America. ACL is part of the Grimaldi 
Group company, the largest ocean carrier operating at 
Liverpool’s Royal Seaforth Container Terminal and the port’s 
longest serving container carrier. The ACL transmits more than 
125,000 units of containers, cars and RoRo machinery annually, 
and supports a supply chain with a critical link between the UK’s 
export and import trades. In a case collected for the Italian side 
of this project, Grimaldi Group appeared as the sole beneficiary 
in a court case140 of abuse of office and fraudulent activity 
involving the Authority of the Port of Livorno (Italy) and three 
companies operating in the port of Livorno that were all favoring 
 





140 Giudice per l’Udienza Preliminare presso il Tribunale di Livorno, Sentenza 
di Rinvio a Giudizio, N. 1391/19 R.G.N.R. 
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the affairs of Grimaldi in violation of the laws of competition and 
fair trade.  In that occasion, the public prosecutor argued that 
there was an ongoing criminal conduct, which tended to favour 
Grimaldi in their management of port contracts as they were 
(are) the most relevant economic and strategic power in the 
port. Within this conduct of diffused trafficking of favours, other 
companies in Livorno had been affected. Even though in that 
case there is no evidence of misconduct from Grimaldi Group, 
this case is particularly interesting because it suggested – albeit 
in a different location – that when private and public interests 
are handled within private rationales, the logic of favour tends 
to become the main one. This logic tends to serve the interests 
of single companies but it is not beneficial for the common good.  
This needs to be specifically addressed also in Liverpool, where 





As said, Liverpool was a free port between 1984 and 2012. 
Proposals to set up 10 free ports in the UK in the aftermath of 
Brexit, and including Liverpool, has been on the table since 
2018141 and with a consultation open until April 2020142. There 
 
141 House of Commons, Debate Pack, Number CDP 2018-0211, 9 October 





are not currently any free ports in the UK, though there is one 
on the Isle of Man. The Treasury currently has the power to 
designate free ports by Statutory Instrument under section 100A 
of the Customs and Excise Management Act (CEMA) 1979. Seven 
free ports operated in the UK at various points between 1984 
and 2012. In July 2012, the Statutory Instruments that set up the 
remaining five free ports (Liverpool, Southampton, Port of 
Tilbury, Port of Sheerness and Prestwick Airport) expired.  
 A report published in 2018 by UK consultants Mace143 
said Liverpool alone could see the creation of up to 12,000 high-
value jobs as a result of setting up freeport status. The report 
identified seven UK locations as being ideally placed to benefit – 
Liverpool, Immingham & Grimsby Ports, Hull Port, Rivers Hull & 
Humber, Tees & Hartlepool, Tyne and Manchester Airport. 
Representative body Mersey Maritime is backing the policy as is 
Port of Liverpool operator Peel Ports.  
Obviously at the core of the new proposal to set up 10 
free ports in the UK lies an economic motivation, to boost the 
economy post-Brexit. As part of the consultation, the 
government is seeking views on removing low tariffs, tariffs on 
key inputs to production and tariffs where the UK has zero or 
limited domestic production. Commentators have raised issues 
over the implications that freeports might have for security and 







lack of obligation for freeport administrators to report 
suspicious transactions to authorities; despite the attempts to 
increase regulations145, they exit from the EU still leaves way to 
grey zones. A March 2019 report by the European Parliament146 
notes that free zones, originally intended as spaces to store 
merchandise in transit, have become popular for the storage of 
substitute assets, including art, precious stones, antiques, gold 
and wine collections financed from unknown sources. Also, 
notes the EU parliament, free zones can have the same effects 
as tax havens as the motivations for their use include a high 
degree of secrecy and the deferral of import duties and indirect 
taxes. Additionally, “money laundering risks in free ports are 
directly associated with money laundering risks in the substitute 
assets market”, i.e. other cash/investment options including 
those that are harboured in warehouses at the ports as indicated 
above. In fact, by acting as compensating chambers, 
warehouses in between a no-tax zone and the rest of the 
country, they could allow for products to arrive and ‘leak’ into 
 
145 The EU’s fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) will classify 
freeports as ‘non-financial obliged entities’, requiring them to conduct the 
same customer due diligence expected of estate agents and notaries. 
However, firstly, this due diligence is only required for those trading in art 
and connected to transactions of €10,000 and above. Secondly, there is no 
obligation for freeport administrators to report suspicious transactions to 




PROV(2019)0240.pdf section 4.2 
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the rest of the economy, and that includes illicit goods as well. 
Without customs checks, the true nature of the goods and their 
identity might easily be disguised. In this sense, free ports might 
actively disguise both goods and their owners’ identity, thus 
fuelling the informal economy. 
In 2018, the European Parliament had published another 
report147 on the risks of tax evasion and money laundering 
associated to free ports, highlighting especially the risks for the 
art market and similar niche markets. Free ports resemble 
offshore financial centres; they offer both high security and 
discretion and allow transactions to be made without attracting 
the attention of regulators and direct tax authorities. As tax 
fraud and tax evasion have been considered predicate offences 
for money laundering since the entry into force of the Anti 
Money Laundering Directive IV in June 2017, the money 
laundering risks associated to the establishment of free ports is 
very high. It would be virtually impossible for a free port 
operator to establish whether a client did make the rightful 
declaration to the tax authorities in the country of tax residence 









Research notes and emerging themes 
 
The following themes have emerged from research 
fieldwork and notes as deserving of further attention and 
scrutiny, in no particular order: 
 
A. Coordination remains a problem and trust issues among 
institutions have emerged. This could be one of the 
reasons for the lack of specific data for Liverpool. 
Additionally, even when law enforcement agencies share 
data not Peel port does not, as a private owner, which 
does create imbalances.  
B. The business agenda of Liverpool seems to invest in the 
North-American and South American markets. The 
rationale is that much of the UK's container demand is 
closer to Liverpool than to the south-eastern ports of the 
UK. The question remains on whether the ships will 
divert from the major trade lanes to serve Liverpool 
rather than the current model whereby vessels traverse 
the shortest route to northwest Europe and the 
containers then must travel overland from southern UK 
ports to their destinations. This is also a Brexit-related 
question. According to authorities in Liverpool, post-
Brexit will lead to greater volumes from shore-sea 
movements, as it will cost less to ship by sea from Spain, 
for example, than carry over produce in trucks within EU 
territory to the UK. Brexit might lead to the increased use 
of containers, as ferries will become more expensive to 
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use and more burdensome for checks on cargo on the 
customers’ side.  
C. In terms of security regulations, Brexit might not bring 
immediate risks, if not for the possibilities of stowaways 
hiding in containers from Europe into Liverpool. 
However, a grey area remains in the ability of port 
authorities to detect corruption on the docks, both for 
employees and for law enforcement agents accessing the 
ports.  
D. Institutions often converge in linking the drug scene in 
Liverpool with the port, but the link remains unproved. 
The city of Liverpool, which has been home to many 
‘famous’ UK drug traffickers (e.g. Curtis Warren) has 
shaped and still shapes the drug scene across the 
country. In particular, while it is taken as a given that the 
majority of drugs arrive into Liverpool, it is also 
considered that these drugs, especially cocaine, arrive 
into the country on containers to European ports and 
then to the southern English ports. Through lorries, 
boats, yachts, or other vehicles, they then make their 
way through Merseyside. There might be interests from 
individuals based in Liverpool and Merseyside to 
participate in this business but not through the port of 
Liverpool necessarily.  
E. Networks based in the southern Coast of Spain show 
connections to Merseyside; in the same way authorities 
evidence a preponderance of people from Liverpool or 
Merseyside in drug trafficking cases outside of the UK. 
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F. The reason for such preponderance is linked to the drug 
scene in Liverpool, a mafia-like underworld where 
reputation and money reach out into all different areas 
of society, not just the purely illicit ones.  
G. The legacy of individuals who have made the history of 
drug trafficking in Liverpool and the UK, of the likes of 
Curtis Warren, still endures and influences cocaine trade 
to the UK also today. The modus operandi of the group 
surrounding Warren remains an example to follow also 
today.  Warren led an international network, even 
though he was based in Liverpool, acting in a diffused 
way throughout the country. Close to him, younger and 
senior individuals performed different tasks; some of 
them were very involved in social control techniques in 
Liverpool, by looking at car plates and hotel stays for 
example. Others were not based in Liverpool and were 
mostly operational in the drug trade business. The 
network was highly dispersed.  
H. In Liverpool, the city-port interface for criminal ventures 
is particularly interesting and needs to be further 
investigated. This, specifically, in the light of the 
sophistication of some of the groups in the city that have 
long ago started investing in legal businesses, especially 
corruption. For example, since operation Seahog was 
launched in August 2006 to crackdown on illegitimate 
security firms in the construction industry, the 
knowledge of how underworld figures enter legitimate 
markets and industries has increased and does leave an 
 191 
open question on the business interests of organised 
crime in the city/infrastructure of Liverpool port.   
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Lessons Learned, Challenges & Recommendations 
 
 
Illicit Trafficking  
 
Across all port sites law enforcement’s priority remains 
on investigating and disrupting drug trafficking through and in 
the port. Drug trafficking is considered a high harm/high gain 
kind of activity. On the one hand, potential harm to drug users is 
the reason why the stakes are high to disrupt drug importations. 
On the other hand, profits of the drug trade are bound to re-
enter the economy, after being laundered, and can fuel further 
criminal activity in addition to affecting the legal economy.  
 
Other forms of illicit trades are obviously recorded at all 
sites, especially inbound, with a specific emphasis on tobacco 
contraband; counterfeit goods (including pharmaceuticals); 
counterfeit food produce; counterfeit luxury goods and fashion. 
Outbound trafficking, especially waste, stolen vehicles, and 
cash, is also recorded. Due to, officially, a problem of resourcing 
but also in consideration of the difficulty of measuring success 
in this kind of endeavour, outbound trafficking is not a priority in 
any of the port sites. With the exception of the USA’s Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) – which allows CBP and other US Agencies 
to request checks to outbound cargo abroad – border agencies 
and customs do no operate strategically in the controls and 
checks of outbound cargo from their waterfronts. Controls and 
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checks are left to specific intelligence leads or, even more so, to 
randomness.  
 
All groups involved in illicit drug trade in all port sites 
exhibit hybrid ethnic compositions. The ethnic connotation of 
organised crime is considered an unhelpful way to look at the 
city/port underworld. Location and specific ethnic connotations 
are not relevant for the groups involved in the trade, but they 
might be relevant for the origin of the product. Also, in all cities 
there is an understanding of how major players of the 
underworld are interested in drug importation to the city, with 
or without involving the port as a ‘door’.  
 
For other illicit trade, different from narcotics, there is a 
tendency for criminal groups to specialise in a specific trade. This 
specialisation can also be ethnic-driven. This is at times related 
to cultural reasons to specialisation (for example a certain type 
of contraband tobacco smuggled from Greece/Turkey to 
specifically serve the Greek/Turkish community). Other times, 
specialisation follows the specific characteristic, and origin, of a 
certain smuggled/counterfeit/illicit good (for example, 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals from China in the port of 
Melbourne, smuggled by predominantly Chinese groups).  
 
Smuggling methods vary across sites, especially via 
cargo. There are, however, some trends that are worth pointing 
out across all sites: 
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 Overall decrease of rip-on/rip-off method for drug 
smuggling (probably due to increased difficulty in 
avoiding security mechanisms on site in ports, security 
displacement). 
 Overall increase of use of small vessels, usually private 
boats (i.e. yachts) or other smaller vessels (including 
submarine). These can be mooring in smaller ports, as 
well as have the agility of faster travel in international 
waters. The trend is towards diffusion, dilution and 
fragmentation of drug importation ‘jobs’ as a reaction to 
security displacement of crime.  
 Overall increase of quantities smuggled (as per 
detection) in containers, as containers are mostly meant 
to come out of the port. 
 
Across all port sites, investigation teams work in 
partnerships with others: the port-city interface, for what 
concerns law enforcement, is very small on the waterfront. 
Security networks comprise terminal security, port authorities, 
port policing teams (whether federal, national or local); border 
force units, custom and excise representatives and so on. In 
order to disrupt terminals’ business less – and also to allow for 
smarter allocation of resources - policing authorities rely more 
and more on intelligence-based interventions in the port, 
avoiding random and casual checks to container without prior 
knowledge on something to investigate on the cargo. The main 
challenge remains that these security networks often work with 
different security protocols, treating data according to various 
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confidentiality levels and without disclosing it to one another, 
for legal reasons mainly. In particular, the role of Border 
Agencies in all port sites, is interesting: on one side, these 
institutions enjoy the highest degree of access into port 
terminals; on the other side, they are often hybrid institutions, 
in between a duty and excise agency and a law enforcement 
agency, which might lead to different prioritisation of daily work 
as well as different perceptions of their work and capability by 





I. Security networks, made up of all different authorities 
and institutions engaged in security and policing at a 
given port, should be established as permanent units 
meeting regularly and have shared data platforms. 
II. A tenant mentality is often at play in the relationship 
between policing authorities and public institutions, and 
private owners of the port terminals (or in the case of 
Liverpool, the port territory). It is advised that security 
networks are ‘chaired’ periodically by a terminal 
employee alternating with a public body institution, to 
maintain balance.  
III. These security network teams should include a research 
& insight role dedicated to the following themes (the list 
is not exhaustive) with specific reference to each port 
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and its conditions and peculiarities. This role should 
report monthly or bimonthly to the security network: 
o Cross-border issues updates: these might 
include changes in drug production and 
supply mechanisms; changes in drug 
legislation around the world; changes in 
legislation pertaining waste in the country 
where the port exports the most; 
smuggling methods in trends around the 
world (diversified for region, for cargo and 
for type of shipment).  
o Debriefing and updates on criminality in 
the city including, but not only, drug 
importation networks; corruption 
networks and investigations on power 
and crime. 
o Debriefing and update on trade 
relationships in the port; this includes also 
a comparative look to other ports in the 
state/region of reference, as well as a 
cross-referencing of these with 
information from previous points.  
 
IV. Identify ways to not solely rely on intelligence-based 
interventions, but using more random and casual checks 
to operate a surprise effect on controls. The 
predictability of crime prevention and suppression 
techniques works against policing intended purposes in 
 197 
the long run. This is specifically important, as we will see 
in the next section, to curb on the ability of individual 
employees or dock workers or border agents - victims or 
agents of corruption – to sell reliable information on the 
schedule of the port and the movement of authorities 






Individual corruption is the most common door illicit 
networks use to complete their importations. Individual 
corruption is considered key to criminality on the waterfront, 
both as an enabler of illicit trades and as a stand-alone practice 
to acquire other types of benefits (including but not limited to 
money). In particular, illicit trade is often connected to 
occasional or systemic corruption of dock workers, indicated as 
the most common factor of persistent criminality on the 
waterfront. Individual corruption of port employees, terminal 
employees, police, custom, and border agents, is also 
considered a persistent feature of illicit trades in the port.  
 
In this type of corruption, which could be more or less 
recurring/occasional, industrial relationships often play a role. 
Labour racketeering remains a high concern, together with other 
forms of coercive systemic corruption on the waterfront carried 
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out by organised crime groups frequently and repeatedly 
accessing (and influencing) unions or other groups of workers. 
 
In addition to individual circumstances of people 
engaging in corrupt behaviours (which might be related to 
money shortages or other needs), for illicit trades, it is the 
function of individuals that becomes crucial to ‘access’. Port 
employees, dock workers, custom, police, and border agents can 
help gain advantage of what matters in importations: getting a 
knowledge advantage (selling information about the port and 
the supply chain) and avoiding controls. This is linked to the 
peculiarity of the port economy, which remains obscure to many 
and has a very fragmented nature between global economic 
choices and local management.  
 
Systemic forms of corruption, whether collusive or 
coercive, are often difficult to prove and detect. This is 
connected to the varied systems of investigating corruption at 
the border. A lot of emphasis is placed on individual corruption 
as enabler of other crimes (trafficking) and very thin are the 
boundaries between corrupt agents treated as offenders or as 
victims, when it comes to them providing doors or access keys 
to complete a ‘job’. Corruption as autonomous practice, which, 
in ports, usually manifests as part of infiltration in the legal 
economy, is heavily under-investigated due to difficulty in 
considering the port space as a special environment deserving of 
ad-hoc procedures for anti-corruption. The split between 
policing units and law enforcement agencies investigating 
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organised crime and institutions investigating corruption – with 
the sole exception of Italy and partially the United States – 




I. Institution of a port anti-corruption team that both 
conducts their own investigations and receives 
investigation leads from organised crime units in the city 
and/or in the port. Similarly to the Waterfront 
Commission in New York, the port anti-corruption team 
should be independent from the port authority and from 
law enforcement but share data with both.  
II. Adjust salary packages of dock workers, port employees, 
custom and border agents, on the basis of ethics 
incentives (including whistleblowing and other 
incremental benefits). Incentives should be based on the 
awareness of power relations in the industry and not 
offered as a bargain or as a form of trade. 
III. The port anti-corruption team should be working as a 
monitoring community, for what concerns spotting 
different types of corruption (coercive or collusion-
based). 
IV. Dispersion of discretionary power should be considered 
in job allocation: no function should be left in solitary 
administration, to avoid exploitation; rotation of job 





Infiltration in the legal economy and governance issues 
 
Infiltration in the port economy refers to attempts to 
influence or acquire business opportunities, ranging from 
infiltration in the supply chain to the provision of services on the 
grounds. Infiltration in the port economy emerges in all ports, 
albeit with different impact and different results. At the local 
level, infiltration of organised crime in the legal economy of the 
port manifests mostly as a means to an end – where the end is 
often illicit trade, to increase profit as well as laundering money. 
Employees or managers or other third-party brokers specialise 
in the port economy and can exploit this knowledge and sell it to 
the benefit of different criminal networks This manifests in two 
different scenarios.  
 Known companies active in a variety of markets 
and businesses in the city (from food import-
export to beauty salons, from furniture shops to 
car shops, from art dealers to phone companies) 
that normally use the maritime route for their 
supplies, are also occasionally or systematically 
used to disguise and conceal illicit products 
amongst their legitimate cargo. This can happen 
with or without awareness of the company 
managers. The knowledge a broker or an invested 
party needs in this scenario relates to: 
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o Warehousing/storage of container/cargo 
once arrived; 
o Origin of cargo; 
o  Schedule of supplies; 
 New companies (including transport companies 
or import-export) are set up with the intent and 
purpose of creating means to access the port in 
semi-legitimate ways. In this case, knowledge 
needed relates to: 
o Access cards/security checks to be 
admitted on port premises; 
o Establishment of a credible supply route; 
o Avoidance of checks and alert of control; 
o Storage facilities/warehousing available.  
 
The port economy is vulnerable to infiltration in terms of 
contracts for construction, security, logistics (including, 
warehousing) and transport, including large infrastructure (e.g. 
rails, roads). This is a form of high-level infiltration. These 
activities are mostly aimed at increasing profits; they are carried 
out by networks who are able to be active both through illegal 
and legal means, capable and willing to acquire economic power 
over certain economic sectors, whichever way. In the majority of 
port sites, investigators’ knowledge of organised crime groups in 
the city includes the interests of some of these groups in the 
port. Brokers, businessmen, investors, legal professionals, 
financial consultants, and other third parties might engage in 
collusive behaviours forming cartels over tenders and engaging 
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in unfair competition, through intimidation techniques or other 
forms of market exclusion. At times this can be done via 
corruption, at times it can be achieved through the use of other 
organised crime groups as enforcers. When this type of 
infiltration – usually associated to long-term, often large-scale 
contracts – becomes systemic this is a problem of governance.  
 
The port economy is a rather small field albeit truly 
global, which still manifests and interacts with city-based powers 
(economic and political). Governance is, intuitively, informal 
among very few big players that all know each other (terminal 
operators, shipping lines, carriers). Attempts to distort this 
governance for criminal or deviant purposes, is, however, 
confined to the local level, especially when port management is 
closer to political power. This can happen when 
administrators/managers in the port authorities are Activities of 
infiltration and attempts to govern the port space vary 
depending on the nature, the level of sophistication and the 
amount of investment that organised crime groups have in the 
city. The port is a territory where influence, power and 
consensus are convergent with economic success in the city as 
in the port. The port-city relationship develops across a range of 
influential political and economic actors around the city, with 
the ability and the will to access the port administration to 





I. Efforts to police organised crime in ports needs to 
consider the whole spectrum of sophistication of 
organised crime groups, from those only engaged in 
profit-seeking activities, to those also or solely engaged 
in power-seeking ones (mafia-type). Any effort to curb 
organised crime on the waterfront needs a special units 
that look at systemic corruption as both enabling large-
scale, recurring, trafficking, and as autonomous practice 
that distorts port governance.  
II. Either through a special unit of research embedded in the 
port, or through a special anti-corruption unit as per 
abovementioned hypothesis, a specific outlook to 
infiltration is needed, as part of countering of organised 
crime in the port. These units have to have a specific 
port-city relationship mandate for organised crime and 
corruption. They ought to pair intelligence-led policing 
that is normally applied to cross-border trafficking 
investigation, to monitoring of public contracts and anti-
collusion efforts.  
III. Investigations in the port-city relationship need to 
depart from tracking the level of sophistication of certain 
groups and networks of power (among businesses men 
as much as professionals) and their willingness – in 
addition to their capability - to enter corruptive or 
collusive pacts with corporations or other business 
partners, or via small firms, to access resources (including 
contracts and administrative roles).  
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IV. Similarly, these investigations need to target the 
capability – in addition to the intent – of key figures 
(professionals, financial services, consultants) to bend 
and exploit legal loopholes for tenders, and access or 
allocation of funds and resources. Social networks 
analysis, of qualitative or quantitative type, could 
identify people in position of brokerage and influential 
figures in various markets and industries – those who 
could, essentially, sell information and knowledge of the 




Intervening Factors  
 
Brexit – Preliminary Forecast 
 
Since the United Kingdom voted to leave the European 
Union in June 2016, and currently on the path to finally do so by 
end of December 2020, different scenarios on post-Brexit Britain 
have emerged. Some of these scenarios relate to borders, 
border security, and maritime trade. Readers are remanded to 
the Liverpool case study in this report for what concerns the 
proposals to introduce freeports, free trade zones, in ten ports 
in the UK. Since this project started in January 2019, and by the 
time it has ended in mid-2020, the proposal has been on the 
table and is very likely to gain traction. As it has been pointed 
out148 the current UK proposal for freeports is not addressing a 
number of issues that relate to organised crime in ports. Indeed, 
freeports yield a number of criminal opportunities for illicit drug 
trade, counterfeit trade, money laundering, tax evasion and 
evasion of custom duties. In particular, the already existing risk 
profiles of a port are augmented by the existence of free trade 
zones due to149:   
 
 
148 RUSI Briefing Paper - Free Ports, Not Safe Havens Preventing Crime in the 
UK’s Future Freeports - 
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/27042020_freeports_final.pdf  
149 Ibid. pages 5-6 
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o Reduced customs controls compared to 
the rest of the country; 
o Insufficient oversight of commercial 
activities in a freeport and inadequate 
record keeping; 
o Prevalence of cash transactions and 
reduced anti-money 
laundering/counterterrorist financing 
(AML/CTF) oversight;  
o Lack of reliable beneficial ownership 
records;  
o Inadequate physical security due to the 
lack of clear freeport boundaries.  
 
In addition to the freeport proposals, any formula, or 
deal, that will deliver Brexit poses a number of questions related 
to border security, trafficking, corruption and port governance 
in the UK and in relation to foreign partners, especially EU 
countries. Specific changes to the UK maritime regulations are 
on the way to be studied and assessed as it is still unclear, in mid 
2020 what the legislative scenario will be150.  
 
 
150 See: The UK maritime sectors beyond Brexit. A report on the impact of 
Brexit on UK shipping, maritime legal services, fisheries and trade by the 
Institute of Maritime Law and the Southampton Marine and Maritime 
Institute of the University of Southampton - 
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/426985/1/Final_IML_Report_Brexit.pdf  
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The first concern is Maritime Security. A policy report by 
academics at the university of Bristol151 has highlighted how the 
UK faces three critical challenges that Brexit will intensify: 1) A 
complex security environment with enormous transnational 
capacity (95% of all UK imports and ex-ports move by sea 
through over 400 British ports); 2) Current patchiness of capacity 
amongst different geographic spaces and regions; 3) The need 
to address problems of coordination across agencies delivering 
UK maritime security.  
 In 2019, the UK government created the Joint 
Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) to coordinate all 
the different agencies involved and foster 
interaction between them, but it still very early to 
gauge any success. 
 
When key collective EU maritime governance 
arrangements will either cease to apply or be revised, the UK 
might choose to regulate its own waters. This is the case of 
policies such as the Common Fisheries Policy152, for which both 
UK and EU fishing boats had access to quotas in UK waters. 
 
151 Delivering UK maritime security after Brexit: time for a joined-up 
approach, by Professor Tim Edmunds (SPAIS, University of Bristol) and Dr 
Scott Edwards (SPAIS, University of Bristol), March 2020, 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/policybristol/briefings-and-
reports-pdfs/SafeSeas%20report_v5.pdf  
152 Phillipson, J. and Symes, D. (2018) 'A sea of troubles': Brexit and the 
fisheries question, Marine Policy, Volume 90, Pages 168-173 
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 A sudden change of arrangements might bring to 
loopholes and grey areas to be exploited for 
criminal opportunities.  
 
Indeed, illegal fishing, border violations, and disorders 
including blockades of ports, are all included in the scenario 
depicted by Operation Yellowhammer153 that in August 2019 
studied the worst-case planning assumption and impact of Brexit 
for the UK Government.  
 Concurrent incidents will strain border agencies 
and institutions activating a response.  
 
Amongst other things, Operation Yellowhammer also 
highlighted how the Agri-food supply chain, especially for fresh 
produce, could be severely impacted after Brexit; it is expected 
that availability and choice of produce will decrease and 
therefore prices for certain products might increase. 
 This leaves a door open to contraband that in the 
food sector could be particularly lucrative 
between EU states and the UK.  
 
Also, it might become troublesome for UK personnel to 
carry out inspections in other EU ports, including Ireland. 






personnel performing security inspections or handling 
confidential information (including the personnel of recognised 
security organisations) requires a security vetting of the 
Member State of which the person concerned is a national. This 
means that United Kingdom personnel (thus holding a security 
clearance from the United Kingdom) can no longer carry out the 
security inspections referred to in the Directive 
 This could bring to decrease capacity of detection 
and increased corruption risks.  
 
Other concerns relate to illicit trade and particularly 
drugs, in addition to the concerns related to freeports. Cross-
border crimes, in the presence of uncertain times and policies or 
in the wake of changing protocols in border controls, are likely 
to increase For example, if cocaine production increases at the 
rate that it has increased in the past years (quadrupled in 
Colombia in the past four years) and the demand for cocaine in 
the UK is also increasing, cocaine trade to the UK will certainly 
not stop at Brexit.  
 Cross-border drug supply is likely to continue or 
increase, and the ports will certainly be affected 
by this. The likelihood that the UK’s borders will 
be an even more attractive destination for illicit 
goods, such as cocaine, especially after Brexit, is 
a realistic concern. This will also affect what is 
‘behind’ the borders of ports; distribution 
networks for drugs and other illicit products will 
have to adapt to new regulations and changes in 
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supply networks; certain territories might 
become more attractive for criminal groups 
willing to invest in new opportunities. 
 
It has been noted throughout this research that the 
majority of illicit drugs into Europe are routed through Spain, 
Netherlands and Belgium, key waypoints from South American 
ports, especially for cocaine. Heroin is mostly routed through the 
Balkans and mainland Europe. Increased controls at the borders 
in the UK, from EU countries might lead to two possible 
scenarios:  
 Exploitation of new routes of trafficking that cut 
the risk of being checked at the borders 
repeatedly: this can involve either an increased 
use of smaller vessels (as seen, this is already a 
trend) and/or the abuse of new trade lines from 
Spain or from North America that, according to 
some ports (including Liverpool) will form after 
Brexit to secure the Atlantic routes.  
 Should EU ports still be used for certain illicit 
trade routes, the results might be damaging for 
public health: with increased risks at the borders, 
it might be more expensive for traffickers to 
complete transactions in the short-medium term. 
This might bring to increase in drug prices until 
things settle down and adapt to the new normal 




Lastly, a strategic assessment from the UK National Crime 
Agency (NCA)154 warned that as UK businesses look to increase 
the amount of trade they have with non-EU countries after 
Brexit, the likelihood that they will be drawn into corrupt 
practices will increase.  
 Border corruption, both in terms of administrative 
corruption and in terms of governance abuse, in the 
wake of a more complex regulatory system is likely to 
increase. In particular, with changing practices in port 
calls, an eye should be kept on port access and 
companies (UK and foreign) ownerships.  
 The difficulty in curbing corporate criminality in the UK, 
as well as the increased challenges to run checks with 
European partners after Brexit, represent a concern in 
post-Brexit Britain, for what concerns corporate interests 
in ports. 
 
Covid-19 Pandemic – Preliminary Forecast 
 
 Since January 2020, with peak in March 2020, almost all 
countries in the world have entered periods of lockdown in an 
attempt to boost protection from contagion by Coronavirus 
Covid-19. Lockdown measures have particularly hit European 





and slowing down – if not stopping completely – international 
business relations.  
At the time of writing, May 2020, it is still hard to 
prognosticate future development both with the virus and with 
the economic impact of lockdowns and containment 
procedures. Ports play an essential role during a critical moment 
such as the pandemic, because food, cargoes, including those 
with life-saving supplies, cannot arrive to where they are needed 
if ports are not operational.  
The Covid-19 pandemic has not modified neither the 
purposes nor the results of this research project. However, 
considerations can be advanced in relation to the future of port 
management with relation to organised crime and illicit, cross-
border, trafficking through ports at this stage of the pandemic in 
light of studies and early observations about what has been 
happening in the port economy due to the pandemic155 
 
A. While there has been a steep reduction of trade 
in certain ports, at the end of April, the share of 
ports facing significant decreases in container 
vessel calls (in excess of a 25% drop) climbs to 
11%, compared to less than 10% last week and 
only 2-3% in the first two weeks in which the Port 
Economics Impact Barometer survey run in early 
 




April 2020. However, dockworkers, technical 
nautical services personnel, and the incidence of 
staff being placed on social wage schemes has 
been fluctuating during the pandemic.  
B. Port call procedure changes (e.g. hygiene 
inspections, distancing of workforce, disruption 
of port or related services) have been reporting 
fewer delays in early May than in March. In 
particular, In April 2020 8 out of 10 ports did not 
impose any restrictions on container vessels with 
the same applying for 3 out of 4 ports for other 
cargo vessels.  
C. Border checks, a lower availability of truck drivers 
and disruptions in terminal operations have 
negatively affected trucking operations in/out of 
the port area and to the hinterland during the 
pandemic and lockdowns. The end of April 2020 
Port Economics Impact Barometer reports that 
about 18% of the ports report delays (6-24 hours) 
or heavy delays (> 24 hours) in cross- border road 
transportation with 2% of the ports indicating 
that cross-border trucking has been discontinued. 
This, however, is an improvement from March 
2020, indicating that the situation is expected to 
go back to normal.  Indeed, about two thirds of 
the ports witness normal operations in cross-
border transport by truck and also by rail.  
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D. Interestingly, however, trucks companies appear 
as the most affected by the crisis, i.e. in some 
countries it was reported that more than 50% are 
actually closed; due to the present drop of the 
demand for services however, this has not 
affected services at ports.  
E. Warehousing and distribution activities are 
improving in April/May 2020; they had seen a 
particularly difficult time, due to the complexity 
of mobility of people/workers. Partial or full 
lockdown measures in different countries can 
lead to the fall of demand for certain consumer 
products which leads to fall in warehousing and 
distribution activities. Hoarding behaviours, 
which seems to be improving in April and May, 
has also disrupted foodstuff supply chains. Ports 
were either under-utilising or over-utilising their 
storage facilities but currently the situation is 
going back to normal. Indeed, food products and 
medicines are the products that continue to be 
on the rise.  
 
It seems obvious that the lasting impact of good flows 
may be minor due to the pandemic. It is clear that the deep 
international integration of supply chains and the resulting 
interdependencies are at the core of the economic disruption 
caused by the pandemic. Indeed, trends towards more local 
value chains have been recorded but it is hard to see the trend 
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of international economic integration being reversed, especially 
if/when the pandemic crisis is contained. This is valid also for 
illicit international trade.  
 
Focus should be kept on Latin American countries and 
the impact of Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown restriction on 
the drug trade. A lot will depend on the modes of transportation 
of the narcotics. Even with delays and stops to cargo travels, 
especially air transport, criminal networks can operate their 
businesses by changing routes, using unofficial border crossings 
and shifting trafficking modes, for example, instead of using 
commercial cargo by land, they might indeed increase available 
and informal maritime transportation using smaller vessels (i.e. 






 On one side, seizures in European ports have revealed 
that cocaine shipments have been arriving in even larger 
quantities during the March-April 2020 period especially 
in Antwerp and Rotterdam. However, cocaine 
production appears to be only partially impeded in 
Colombia, as some producers are suffering from a 
shortage of gasoline. In Bolivia, Covid-19 is limiting the 
ability of state authorities to control coca bush 
cultivation, which could lead to an increase in coca 
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production. In Peru, however, a drop in the price of 
cocaine (over 45%) suggests a reduction in trafficking 
opportunities156. 
 Even when containerised vessels have reduced calls in 
certain ports, the trend has been for some ocean carriers 
(like Maersk) to replace these cancellations by regional 
feeders with good frequency. As a result, the reduced 
number of long-haul calls has been counterbalanced157.  
 As reported158, Caribbean coast (Cartagena, Colombia), 
had a total throughput of 664,846 TEU during the first 
trimester in 2019, which increased 19% during the same 
period in 2020. The Pacific coast has experienced a 
decrease in its activity, since the port of Buenaventura, 
Colombia, experienced a drop of 11,3% in its activity 
during the first trimester in 2020 compared to the same 
period in 2019.  
→ Cocaine shipments on the Pacific route, which is 
the main corridor of cocaine mobility (through 
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Colombia and Ecuador travelling through Central 
America), appear more complicated as trade has 
decreased, but the same might not apply to the 
Caribbean routes.  
→ The economic crisis that could follow the 
pandemic may lead more workers/farmers to 
increase or start engaging in coca cultivation in all 
the major cocaine-producing countries. The 
increase in coca leaves prices, as figures from 
Peru show, will increase competition among 
those producers who have easier access to 
traffickers and are ‘higher up’ in the supply chain.  
→ As demand of cocaine is fluctuating (due to 
logistics of procurement and delays in arrival), 
price in the destination countries might increase 
too, to settle again to ‘normal’ prices as both 
supply and demand settle, once the pandemic 
restrictions are over. Overall reduction in cocaine 
trafficking in the near future, which might not last 
long though, can follow countries – like Peru – 
which are struggling with trafficking. 
→ The maritime trafficking of cocaine, considering 
what we know about container movement is not 
impaired and it will easily pick up on current 
delays.  Indeed, Latin American ports have not 
been heavily impacted, in terms of cargo 
 218 
volumes, by the current crisis159 and direct 
shipments of cocaine from Latin America to 
Europe can be arranged via smaller vessels 
(provided they don’t attract too much attention if 
other vessels are not running).  
 
Heroin 
 As for heroin, the UN found indications of an increase in 
the use of maritime routes for trafficking heroin to 
Europe along the “southern route” (the Indian Ocean). 
This is also to avoid increased border controls on land 
from Mexico to the US or in Asia. 
 
→ This would indicate a change in the strategy of 
trafficking networks and an adaptation to COVID-
19 measures, which might not last once these 
measures are lifted. 
→ Lower prices for heroin in some could be 
expected as trafficking via sea gets more difficult. 
 
Synthetic drugs 
 As for meth and fentanyl sales coming from the Mexican 
cartels are struggling because the coronavirus has closed 
borders and reduced supply chains from/in China, which 





 Where precursor chemicals are supplied in the region or 
domestically, then production, and therefore trafficking, 
has not been impeded, if not only marginally, by the 
restrictions of lockdown on personal movement. 
 
→ New types of synthetic drugs can emerge that 
would not necessitate cross-border precursors. 
Shortages of precursors might not last as soon as 
international travel is restored.  
 
Cannabis  
 The UN also indicates that lockdown has increased 
demand for cannabis, and that cannabis resin trafficking 
to Europe is not being disrupted by the restrictions 
related to the pandemic.  
 
→ This could intensify drug trafficking activities, 
including maritime ones, from North Africa to 
Europe in the future. 
→ Cannabis is often produced locally, near 
consumer markets, which also implies trafficking 
will remain unaffected. 
 
 
Corruption & Infiltration 
 
It is way too early to predict the impact of Covid-19 on 
the economy and the extent of the economic crisis that could 
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follow the pandemic is still guesswork. The links between this 
pandemic, its projected effects on the economy and corruption 
have been already explored160. Any attempt to forecast what this 
could mean for corruption on the waterfront is indeed 
dependent on further data on the following aspect: 
 
 Whether or not key industries involved also in the port 
economy will suffer from the pandemic aftermath. For 
example, whether or not truck companies struggling 
during lockdown will be able to go back to work and 
whether or not there will be the need for cash influxes to 
save some of these companies.  
→ This might have an influence in what type of 
businesses can be exploited for logistics, 
transport and deliveries in and out of the port.  
→ This might also facilitate the possibility of criminal 
groups, able to invest cash, to buy these 
companies out of bankruptcies, which eventually 
will give those groups an advantage in the 
industry.  
 
 If changes in the workforce of the port, and difficulties in 
organising rotas, and maintain services in a crisis where 







norm this will have short and medium terms effects on 
individual corruption: 
→ There might be the need to find new ‘doors’ 
and/or to change routes if a shortage or a 
difficulty to find reliable workers or agents at the 
port becomes a more stable effect of the 
pandemic in the next months.  
 
 In some cases of crisis, some government tend to believe 
that there is value in scrapping anti-corruption 
regulations to favour trade and commerce by speeding 
up procedures.  
→ Should this be the case, port authorities need to 
be extra careful in the allocation of contracts in 
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